Topics: integrated menu with links

 

Topics	Links to Sections in Presentations
Identity theory	Identity 1 Jackson's 'knowledge' argument Introduction How the course is meant to work The Cartesian Gap Responses to dualism Caution: let's keep 'the mind' problematised Two important landmarks: phenomenology and behaviourism Identity 1 The Identity Hypothesis: 'Consciousness Is A Brain Process' A brain event / event in consciousness: one thing seen from two points of view - inside and outside - ? There Are Some Mental Items For Which It Is Difficult To Think Of A Plausible Dispositional Analysis. Place's Thesis: That There Is Nothing Logically Confused In Thinkng That These Residual Mental Items May Turn Out To Be Processes In The Brain. He Is Not Trying To Show That Statements About Sensations Are To Be Understood As Statements About Brain Processes. He Is Not Claiming That Statements About Sensations (Eg) Are Reducible To, Or Analyzable Into, Statements About Brain Processes. His Thesis Does Not Hinge On The Meaning Of Terms The 'Is' Of Definition And The 'Is' Of Composition A Parallel: 'A Cloud Is A Mass Of Particles In Suspension Another Parallel: 'Lightning Is A Motion Of Electric Charges' The Phenomenologal Fallacy
Functionalism	Functionalism 1 Machine Functionalism 'Software' The survival program Three levels of description Functionalism 2 An objection to identity theory: might silicon badgers feel pain? Type / token distinction Different hardware, same calculation Reprise: the three levels of description Teleological functionalism The meaning of 'functionalism' in 'teleological functionalism': functional analysis Reprise: machine and teleological functionalism contrasted Calculation and consciousness: a problem with machine functionalism avoided by teleological functionalism Consciousness in the Matrix Pointer forward: outstanding issues for teleological functionalism
Instrumentalism	Instrumentalism 1 Belief + desire explanations Folk psychology and the everyday prediction of behaviour 'Theoretical constructs' Patterns in behaviour and patterns in the brain Instrumentalism 2 The intentional stance: introduction Three stances towards systems Argument that the pattern of behaviour which supports folk psychology is objective. Argument that the existence of the pattern of human behaviour which supports folk psychology does not imply the existence of a similar pattern of activity in the brain.
Language	Language 1 Introduction: teaching computers to talk The Chinese room argument Response Understanding Language 2 The syntax-semantics distinction Uninterpreted symbols Logical calculi 'Grammar' in natural languages Semantics Language 3 Introduction The Representational Theory Of Thinking A 'naturalistic' alternative 'Hooking up' The Causal Account Of 'Hooking up' Two broad approaches to how the brain/mind works Language 4 Introduction Arguments For The Proposition That Mental States Called 'Beliefs' Must Have Structure Natural Language Is 'Productive' Natural Language Is Systematic The Methodological Argument
Intentionality	Intentionality Language Items Have Intentionality (At least some) mental states have intentionality One Account Is This: That Language Items Get Their Intentionality From The Intentionality Of Mental Items. The Thesis That What Confers Intentionality Is Meaning Physicalist Approaches To Intentionality Reminder: The representational theory of thinking
Connectionism	Connectionism 1 A Reminder: The von Neumann Computer Connectionist systems NETtalk Difficulties with representational theory of thought Connectionism 2 Reprise: how a connectionist system works The key to learning in a connectionist system: backpropogation. (Simulation of?) goal-seeking in a computer. Representation in a connectionist system Connectionist systems are specially good at learning. Connectionism invites interdisciplinarity Value of connectionist models highlighted
Eliminativism	Eliminativism Connectionism and generality - a long shot Eliminativism - outline The claim that 'folk psychology' is a theory.
The Status of Folk Psychology	The Status of Folk Psychology 1 Beliefs are partly determined by context Machine states Brain states The Status of Folk Psychology 2 Replicas with different beliefs The water / twater scenario The principle of psychological autonomy Implications

Updated 24:03:03