IPP 507: Environmental Ethics

AWAYMAVE - The Distance Mode of MA in Values and the Environment at Lancaster University

Block 4 - The Integrated Aesthetic

Multi-sensuous Engagement and Disinterestedness

Now read chapter 5 of Aesthetics of the Natural Environment

Why an 'Integrated Aesthetic'?

The integrated aesthetic is ‘integrated’ in the sense that I want to draw upon both the situation of the subject and the situation of the object for guiding appreciation. As I see it, appreciation comes about through the subject’s appreciative capacities – perception, imagination, and so on, coupled with open, sympathetic attention to qualities of the aesthetic object. Approaching the problem of appreciation in this way prevents leaning too heavily toward a subject-oriented or object-oriented account and captures the potential richness of as many relevant features as may be present in any particular encounter with an environment.

My preference for ‘integration’ underscores how aesthetic appreciation of nature involves a relationship between appreciator and environment:

1. It captures the environing experience of nature, as it surrounds the appreciator, as opposed to an experience of perceiving landscape from a distance, as a spectator would observe a painting.

2. Given that environments change from day to day, season to season, year to year, and so on, my approach intends to capture how each aesthetic appreciation of the same landscape is potentially different. Some features of the landscape may stay the same, but others change, and things may happen during the time we are appreciating it.

There is movement, new things to smell or see, and changes in light, wind and temperature. The aesthetic situation reflects the complexity of environmental appreciation, where appreciation is more like a happening, and where that happening creates the conditions of the situation we are in.

The integrated aesthetic stresses the idea of situatedness but I am not putting forward a full-blown engagement or holistic account such as Arnold Berleant’s. Aesthetic experience is characterised by a relationship between appreciator and environment, rather than becoming one with nature, where every aspect of one’s being would be part of appreciation. The appreciator is placed in a certain way – aesthetically – in relation to an environment. It is meant to capture all the possible types of aesthetic relations that can arise through participating with, or even interacting with what one is situated in – the environment.

In these relations, some distance is maintained, rather than our being fully integrated with the environment. Recognition of nature’s otherness is implicit in appreciation.

More specifically, this is expressed through the concept of disinterestedness, which I put forward as one component of appreciation. Although inspired by Kant's use of the concept, I aim for a renewed understanding of disinterestedness, where its negative connotations are stripped away to reveal it as a concept that supports engagement and sympathetic attention.

Disinterestedness also helps to filter out idiosyncratic features of the appreciator. In this respect, the integrated aesthetic falls short of embracing all aspects of the subject. Some aspects will not be given prominence mainly because they may idiosyncratic or not easily shared by others making aesthetic judgements of the same object. In this way, I distinguish aesthetic appreciation as a shared activity from the more private or personal activity of expressing preferences.

Multi-Sensuous Engagement

Aesthetic appreciation begins in perception. The immediate, first-hand experience of environments and their objects constitutes the basis of all aesthetic valuing of nature. Perception includes all of the different types of our sensory contact with the world – seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, combined with thoughts, imagining and beliefs. All of our senses, alone and in conjunction with other capacities, enable the perception of aesthetic qualities.

Perceptual exploration of environments involves a range of potential perspectives as well as a range of different senses to draw upon. A landscape can be perceived from far away, as a view, or close up, within it. We can select particular objects for close scrutiny, such as a moss-covered rock, or allow our senses to wander from one object to the next, shifting attention and focus, perceiving more or less carefully depending on how our aesthetic interest is activated by our surroundings.

We may seek out various perspectives in all sorts of ways but often environmental qualities stop us in our tracks and demand our attention; the vivid colour of a sunset; the haunting cry of the curlew; the spectacular drama of thunder and lightning; the smell of wet, autumn leaves; or the incredible texture of moss.

These situations occur by natural processes and spontaneity – rain falling on our faces; leaves falling from the trees, clouds moving across the sun. Also, the dynamic character of natural environments is perhaps most evident in the way that perceptual qualities change. Our visual, aural, tactile, olfactory and gustatory experiences of nature are all subject to change caused by atmospheric conditions, and so on.

Exercise

Think of two examples of your sensory engagement with environments (either actual experiences you have had or hypothetical ones):
(1) in which you seek out a distinctive, non-visual perspective (from hearing, touching, tasting or smelling); and (2) in which nature stops you in your tracks, as described above.

Try writing a few lines describing each experience.

The Aural Environment

The sounds of nature are all around us, and they significantly contribute to the environing quality of natural aesthetic appreciation. Birdsong, rippling water, wind through the trees, creaking tree limbs, distant sounds of human culture, such as aeroplanes, voices, farm machinery, cars and so on, may all create a soundscape. We are often unaware of these sounds until they actually capture our attention, when for example, a sound enters our experience in a vivid way - a curlew’s cry is heard as it passes into range, or we come upon a crashing waterfall. There is great pleasure in nature’s tranquillity, which is not silence but natural sounds, and we may balk at the intrusion of human noise upon it.

LINKS TO BIRD CALLS:

http://www.open.ac.uk/Nature_Trail/Birds.htm

http://www.birdeurovision.org/

The Tactile Environment

Touch is one of the most intimate ways we explore nature; it is the least distanced and most interactive of all the senses. When we reach out to touch nature, it touches us back, if not intentionally. Touch gives us the feel and texture of our world, and invites bodily engagement through our face, hands and feet, and in some cases, our whole body.

Reflect on the various textures or feel of these objects: wet moss; different textures of tree bark; a layer of pine needles underfoot; sand; fish skin and scales; cold water; a rose petal; pebbles, rocks and shells.

We can also experience tactile qualities from a distance, visually, when we perceive waves in the sea, waves in fields of grain and the different textures and patterns created by rocks, trees and other vegetation on mountains. Textural aesthetic qualities range from the soft, blue haziness covering a mountain range to the stiff, unpleasant feel of heather that has been burned, leaving only short, coarse vegetation behind.

I can't give you more than a photo of the textures of nature here in the virtual environment, but try this rich website:

LINK TO TEXTURES SITE:

http://textures.forrest.cz

The Olfactory and Gustatory Environment

Smells (and tastes) have been neglected in philosophy for various reasons but they can be important routes into appreciating nature's qualities. In the context of more human environments, smells and tastes are an important part of our lives - from pleasant smells and tastes such as wine, perfume, babies, etc., to unpleasant ones such as excrement, rotting vegetables or pollution.

In the natural environment, we are often unaware of smells around us; like sounds, they constitute a sensuous backdrop and are appreciated only when we attend to them or when they impose themselves upon us. The fragrance of a pine forest, for example, operates at a general level, while more specific smells might then enter our experience, such as the peaty, moist smell of a rotting log, or the putrid odour of an animal carcass. Like sounds, smells come and go, as we move past them or come upon them, and when the wind shifts direction.

Gustatory experiences are less common than the olfactory in the environmental context, but we do value tastes in coming to know what is around us. We may taste the salt from the sea air while wandering by the sea, or taste rain water as it streams down our faces, or we may enjoy sampling berries or other edibles in a forest or meadow.

Exercise

Can you recall any taste experiences you've had of the natural environment?
You might post these onto the discussion site so as to build up an interesting class list.

Disinterestedness

I find disinterestedness a helpful concept for environmental aesthetics because it helps us to locate an alternative to the sometimes common (and mistaken) view where aesthetic value is reduced to amenity value, where nature becomes ours for our pleasure and where scenic views are for our consumption rather than having value in themselves in virtue of their aesthetic qualities.

Disinterested shows how aesthetic valuing can be conceived in a way that backgrounds personal preferences and utilitarian concerns in our approach to nature, and foregrounds an appreciation of its qualities - thus making nature the centre of our appreciation (as opposed to ourselves as the centre in terms of a gratification of our senses).

The concept of disinterestedness has had a long tradition in aesthetics going back to 18th century British moral philosophy and aesthetics, but it gets its most important treatment as a defining feature of aesthetic judgement in Kant’s philosophy. (In pages 129-130, Chapter 5 of Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, I set out how Kant develops the concept of disinterestedness, so you might want to look there in order to get a sense of how the term has been used by him.)

More recently, the concept has been supported to some extent by some environmental aestheticians such as Carlson and Hepburn. For example, Carlson recognises the value of disinterestedness, and he has defended it against the claim that it is incompatible with active, participatory aesthetic appreciation [see Carlson, ‘Aesthetics and Engagement’, British Journal of Aesthetics, 33:3, 1993, pp. 220-7, and Allen Carlson, Aesthetics and the Environment: The Appreciation of Nature, Art and Architecture (London and New York: Routledge, 2000)]. Berleant is very critical of the concept, and many of my points in support of the concept, below, attempt to deal with what I see to be some misunderstandings on his part.

You might be interested to know that Hepburn and Berleant are currently involved in a debate on the concept of disinterestedness, published in the new on-line aesthetics journal, Contemporary Aesthetics. Have a look if you are interested (excuse the pun):

LINK:

http://www.contempaesthetics.org

Problems with Disinterestedness (and some misconceptions)

The common criticisms are:

(1) disinterestedness wrongly characterises aesthetic appreciation as a 'blank cow-like stare' (nothing against cows intended! - this is an expression used by some aestheticians in relation to art)

(2) disinterestedness necessarily underpins a formalist aesthetics which is indefensible because it claims that the aesthetic is identified exclusively with the perception of form

For more detail on how these criticisms play out, see Chapter 5 in Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, pp. 130-132.

Defending Disinterestedness

The concept of disinterestedness does not entail the passivity, abstraction and formalism assumed by its critics. Aesthetic appreciation does not require that we set aside who we are, it requires only that we set aside what we want. Disinterested aesthetic appreciation does not have to be impersonal or detached from the self; we approach the object from a concrete standpoint and, if we choose, relate the object to ourselves but apart from wants and desires.

The first objection rests on what I take to be a seriously mistaken assumption: that there is some conflict between disinterestedness and engagement with the aesthetic object. But aesthetic attention involves the active use of the capacities of perception, thought and imagination (as supported for example by Kant's account).

Disinterestedness is too often taken to mean indifference rather than interest or attention to aesthetic qualities alone. 'Distancing' is mistakenly coupled with the idea of creating distance (physical or otherwise) between subject and object rather than distancing oneself from desires and needs which might get in the way of appreciating the object itself. 'Detachment' is understood not as setting aside utilitarian interests in relation to an object, but rather, mistakenly, as cutting oneself off from one's own experience.

think In Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, pp. 134-136, I set out some examples to try to show how some very individual or personal features of the subject are compatible with a disinterested standpoint. Do you think that these examples are convincing in support of my case? If yes, why? If not, why not?

In dealing with the second objection, I would argue that disinterestedness does not go hand in hand with formalism. In my book, I return to the butterfly example (p. 138) to support this claim. Background knowledge may be part of our experience of the natural world, and this is not inconsistent with a disinterested stance. We have to understand knowledge here as fed into the experience, where we are still keep focused on the object/environment qua aesthetic object, rather than that knowledge distracting us from aesthetic qualities.

Disinterestedness and Valuing Nature

I suppose it would be fair to say that a moral motivation lies behind my view that disinterestedness is an important component of aesthetic appreciation of nature. I think it helps us to respond to nature as it is, to allow nature to be itself and for us to focus on its value. I find Iris Murdoch's way of putting this quite moving, and so I return to her lines (as quoted in my book):

'I am looking out of my window in an anxious and resentful state of mind, oblivious of my surroundings, brooding perhaps on some damage done to my prestige. Then suddenly, I observe a hovering kestrel. In a moment everything is altered. The brooding self with its hurt vanity has disappeared. There is nothing left but kestrel. And when I return to thinking of the other matter it seems less important.' (Murdoch, The Sovereignty of the Good, p. 84).

Disinterestedness as the basis of aesthetic appreciation defines a standpoint that backgrounds the concerns of self-interest and utility in relation to nature and foregrounds its aesthetic qualities as valuable in their own right. It supports a less human-centred approach to aesthetic appreciation of nature, and potentially operates to preclude hedonistic valuing. It may even support an attitude of respect for nature (that's my hope anyway).

Exercise

I'd be very curious to find out who you think wins the argument here (Brady and Hepburn v. Berleant, and others). Is disinterestedness important in aesthetic appreciation of nature? Post your answer to the discussion site.

Imagination, Emotion and Knowledge in the Integrated Aesthetic

Now read chapter 6 of Aesthetics of the Natural Environment

Imagination

Both Kant and Hepburn argue that imagination has a significant role in aesthetic appreciation of nature. For Kant, imagination is central in aesthetic judgements of nature. It frees the mind up from the constraints of intellectual and practical interests and enables a play of associations and creative reflection in relation to nature’s qualities. Hepburn also wants to highlight imagination’s power, where it enables us to:

'shift attention flexibly from aspect to aspect of the natural objects before one, to shift focus from close-up to long shot, from textural detail to overall atmospheric haze or radiance; to overcome stereotyped grouping and clichéd ways of seeing.’ ('Contemporary Aesthetics and the Neglect of Natural Beauty', p. 47).

Through imagination we can adopt several different perspectives, as well as entirely new ones. It gives us ways to reach beyond stereotyped modes of appreciating environments: to come afresh to familiar or everyday environments and to locate previously undiscovered qualities.

Thomas Heyd makes a similar point when he argues that we can overcome aesthetic boredom or fatigue ‘by increasing the contrast in our perceptual experience, and, generally, by enhancing the possibilities for the play of imagination’ (Heyd, ‘Aesthetic Appreciation and the Many Stories About Nature’, p. 130). This is partly achieved by integrating various non-scientific stories of the land into appreciation.

Imagination and Natural Environments

We can identify four ways in which imagination functions in aesthetic appreciation of nature: metaphorical imagination; exploratory imagination; projective imagination; ampliative imagination and revelatory imagination. I shall highlight three of them here.

Exploratory Imagination

Exploratory imagination is the most deeply tied to perception of the various modes we use. Here, imagination follows the lead of perception and explores the various perceptual qualities and relationships between qualities as we attend to the aesthetic object.

While perception does much of the work in simply taking in the various features of the object and cordoning it off in our perceptual field, imagination reaches beyond this in a free contemplation of the object.

As imagination brings meanings to bear on perceptual qualities, we identify aesthetic qualities and broaden our grasp of the object. In this way exploratory imagination helps the appreciator to make an initial discovery of aesthetic qualities.

think Can you think of an example of exploratory imagination?

Projective Imagination

Projective imagination draws on imagination's projective powers. Projection involves imagining ‘on to’ what is perceived such that what is actually there is somehow replaced with or overlaid by a projected image. In visually exploring the stars at night, for example, imaginative activity overlays perception in attempting to unify the various forms traced by individual stars, perhaps by naturally projecting geometrical shapes onto them. Sometimes we take the further imaginative leap of projecting ourselves into natural objects and ‘scenes’.

[GARDEN Photo to be inserted

Caption: An example of invitation in gardens (see Stephanie Ross quotation in Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, p. 155).]

think Can you think of other cases of projective imagination in which we project ourselves into natural environments or objects?

Ampliative Imagination

The third mode of imaginative activity, ampliative imagination, involves the inventive powers of imagination, and need not make use of images. It is marked by heightened creative powers and a special curiosity in its response to natural objects.

Here imagination amplifies what is given in perception, thereby reaching beyond the mere projection of images onto objects. This activity is therefore more penetrative, resulting in a deeper imaginative treatment of the object. It is imagination in its most active mode in aesthetic experience.

In contemplating the smoothness of a sea pebble, I visualise the relentless surging of the ocean as it has shaped the pebble into its worn form. I might also imagine how it looked before it became so smooth, this image contributing to my wonder and delight in the object. Merely thinking about the pebble does not vivify the silky smoothness that is emphasised by contrasting its feel with an image of its pre-worn state. Ampliative imagination enables us to expand upon what we perceive by placing or contextualising the aesthetic object with narrative images.

think Can you think of an example of ampliative imagination?

Revelatory Imagination

Where ampliative imagination leads to disclosure or revelation, I call this imaginative activity 'revelatory'. In this mode, invention stretches the power of imagination to its limits, and this often gives way to new ideas and meanings; revelation in the non-religious sense.

Coming upon a huge landslide (or even a more modest pile of boulders at the bottom of a valley) may bring home in a deep way the tremendous power of natural forces - imagining and feeling that the earth is something that moves and shifts, even though we may stand quite solidly upon it. I also recall the first time I saw the Northern Lights. For me, it was certainly an experience of the sublime, and through it, I felt in a strong way the sense of earth being only one, insignificant part of a much greater galaxy (and universe).

Not all imaginative revelations are pleasant and positive. Imaginative engagement also reveals the horror and suffering of humanity and the natural world. Witnessing human evil, natural disasters, or even the everyday encounter of a cat stalking and killing a bird, strike imagination in ways that spread meaning more deeply, and in ways that also make these experiences more demanding and difficult to undergo.

Reining in Imagination

Imagination, rather like emotion, has had a rough ride in philosophy. Within aesthetics and the arts, it is heralded as the seat of artistic creativity and genius, however, outside aesthetics it is often derided as distracting us from truth and leading us into a world of fantasy.

This latter attitude seems to be implicit in some of the criticisms raised against imagination in aesthetic appreciation of nature. The main charge is that it sometimes leads us away from the object rather than towards it, and thus leads to inappropriate responses. When in its most fanciful mode, imagination may produce personal fantasies that distract attention from the aesthetic object, and possibly lead to trivialising and sentimentalising nature.

(This type of criticism is raised by Marcia Eaton, Ronald Moore and Robert Fudge. I discuss them at length and defend imagination against them in Aesthetics of the Natural Environment, pp. 161-170.)

We can identify three ways to understand how imagination is guided and works along 'rules of relevance' in aesthetic appreciation of nature:

(1) the way the object’s qualities evoke and direct our imaginings - here imagination is guided through our perception of various qualities in the object/environment.
(2) disinterestedness;
(3) imagining well, which is characterised by comparing imagination to a virtue, so that we ‘imagine well’ when we use imagination skilfully and appropriately according to the context of aesthetic appreciation.

The philosopher R.K. Elliott describes how we may focus on the aesthetic object while also using imagination to deepen our appreciation o fit (here he discusses this is relation to artworks):

'[Imagination] seems to have a double movement: an expansive moving out from the work along lines of relevance, and a turning back upon the work which concentrates the additional ideas or images around it like a nimbus. One might add that Imagination obeys not only a rule of relevance but a rule of decorum, for the rapt state would be at an end if a thought or image which was felt to belittle the work obtruded into it.'( R. K. Elliott, ‘Imagination in the Experience of Art’, Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, vol. six, 1971–1972: Philosophy and the Arts (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1974), p. 101)

You might like to have a look at the way Ronald Hepburn finds a medium between overly trivialising and overly serious aesthetic appreciation of nature in his 'Trivial and Serious in Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature'.

think What do you think? Is imagination prone to overly humanising nature?

Emotion and Nature

Emotion is a valuable resource in aesthetic appreciation but it too suffers from caricature: it is commonly viewed as too subjective and arbitrary to pin down as a legitimate part of appreciation. Any discussion of it needs to show not only how nature can evoke emotion and be expressive, but also give some assurance that emotion will not lead to wayward or distorting responses.

Recall that In his article, 'On Being Moved By Nature: Between Religion and Natural History', Noel Carroll addresses the specific problem of justifying emotional responses to nature, that is, the particular emotions we feel when we experience great waterfalls, richly textured mosses, or tiny spiders. Carroll's article is also worth a look for its criticisms of Carlson too. Carroll says that Carlson's 'natural environmental model' simply leaves no room for our emotional responses. I think he's right.

He adopts a cognitive theory of emotions and sets out to show how emotion can be an appropriate response to nature. An emotional response is appropriate or inappropriate according to its object and aspects of the subject having the emotion, including particular beliefs surrounding the object.

On Carroll’s view, justifying the feeling of excitement from the grandeur of a waterfall depends upon the qualities of the waterfall and the beliefs and thoughts that underlie the response. The thoughts and beliefs cannot be subjective, but rather must be reasonably shared by other people.

Using this strategy he shows how emotional responses are not subjective projections onto the landscape and how they relate to the whole aesthetic situation – subject, object and context.

You might wonder why Carroll sees himself as having to 'justify' emotional responses to nature. This is because he is conscious of the objectivist strategy of Carlson, and he is trying to show that something often viewed as deeply personal can none the less have objective import. This becomes important in trying to show that emotional responses to nature have importance beyond ourselves and ought to be taken seriously (that's assuming we want them to be taken seriously beyond ourselves, e.g., in cases where our responses may have a role in fighting to conserve some natural area.)

Exercise

In what ways have you been moved by nature? What is the range of emotions you have felt? You might jot them down. Do you think the range is as wide as it is in the appreciation of artworks (music, film, novels, visual art, etc.)?

Knowledge

Scientific knowledge

Remember that Carlson believes that scientific knowledge is a necessary condition of appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature. In my approach, scientific knowledge may have a role, as fed into our aesthetic experiences of nature. It may even deepen and expand our aesthetic appreciation. But the integrated aesthetic does not make such knowledge a necessary or even important part of aesthetic experience.

I have to admit that after writing the book, I am inclined to agree that there will be some cases where we will need some knowledge of a scientific sort in order to properly appreciate something (but not in all cases)!!. This is especially true in cases of so-called unscenic nature. A dull-looking bog may become beautiful if we are given knowledge of its various species and its history (here imagination may step in to reconstruct its history). It is perhaps true that if we spent enough time there without that knowledge we could come to experience its beauty, but I'm not sure.

A Pluralist View of Knowledge

Carlson thinks that the main legitimate source of knowledge for aesthetic appreciation of nature is scientific knowledge (recently he seems to be allowing in some other forms such as indigenous knowledge). But people like myself, Thomas Heyd, and others, adopt a more pluralistic stance toward knowledge. There can be many stories about nature, and many of them will give us rich, appropriate (non-wayward) ways of grasping and valuing nature's qualities.

An example I use back in Chapter 3 of the book may be of interest here:

In the Nordic environment of Finland, the word for the Aurora Borealis is ‘revontulet’, which means ‘fox fires’. It is said to derive from old folklore that explains the bright, pulsating, red and blue lights as the painterly effects of the arctic fox’s bushy tail, which starts fires and sprays snow into the night sky. (Recounted by Joe Brady in ‘Aurora Borealis: The Northern Lights’, http://virtual.finland.fi/finfo/english/aurora_borealis.html . This is the original source but unfortunately this link on the web no longer works).

Through another story, the story of science, the colours of the Aurora Borealis take on another meaning . We see them not as the fiery art of the arctic fox, but rather as caused by solar winds moving across the upper atmosphere and hitting gas molecules, which creates light. The colours are not the fox’s chosen palate, but rather they correspond to the colours of gases in the ionosphere.

In the interpretation of the Aurora Borealis, both folklore and science provide acceptable interpretations; they give alternative ways of seeing the spectacular show in the sky. If the point were simply to understand the phenomenon before us, with knowledge as the aim, the scientist would give us the fullest factual explanation. But here, we are talking about aesthetic appreciation, and that is something quite different.

Local Knowledge

Local knowledge can be described as a type of common sense knowledge, which is based in the experience of a place and local practices in relation to the land - experiences which may also have a strong aesthetic element. It has an important role to play in environmental policy-making, since public consultation is becoming more and more important. (This doesn't mean that these days such knowledge always wins over expert knowledge!)

For some interesting examples of local knowledge, see the following:

Richard Mabey's ongoing project to develop a Birds Britannica, compiled using many contributions from the public (similar to his already published Flora Britannica):

http://www.randomhouse.co.uk/birdsbritannica/

Another favourite of mine is the ‘Biodiversity Stories’ website, sponsored by Scottish Natural Heritage and the Royal Botanic Gardens Edinburgh, which brings together in one place a range of knowledges about species and habitats and our cultural relationship to them. The public is invited to contribute audio and text-based stories about the wildlife, ecology and landscapes of Scotland, with folktales, old legends, poems, ecological accounts and stories about practical uses of nature.

http://www.biodiversitystories.co.uk

Exercise:

Do you know of a case from environmental conservation where local knowledge has played an important role? How would aesthetic experience have been involved in that knowledge? If so, why not share it with others through the discussion site.

Emily Brady, November 2003

IPP 507: Environmental Ethics

Block 4 - The Integrated Aesthetic

Multi-sensuous Engagement and Disinterestedness

Suggested reading from Kemal and Gaskell

Suggested further reading for this section:

Why an 'Integrated Aesthetic'?

Multi-Sensuous Engagement

Disinterestedness

Imagination, Emotion and Knowledge in the Integrated Aesthetic

Suggested reading from Kemal and Gaskell

Further reading for this section:

Imagination

Imagination and Natural Environments

Emotion and Nature

Knowledge