IPP 507: Environmental Ethics

AWAYMAVE - The Distance Mode of MA in Values and the Environment at Lancaster University

Block 3 - The Contemporary Debate in Environmental Aesthetics

	Science based aesthetic appreciation
	Non-science based aesthetic appreciation

Cognitive or Science-based theories of aesthetic appreciation of nature

Now read chapter 4 pp. 86-102 of Aesthetics of the Natural Environment

and Allen Carlson, ‘Appreciating Art and Appreciating Nature’ in (Kemal and Gaskell)

Overview: Cognitive and non-cognitive approaches

The differences between art and nature appreciation cannot be ignored in understanding what is distinctive about the aesthetic response to nature, but at the same time they create some difficulties.

In fact, the problem has led at least one writer to claim that we cannot make aesthetic judgements of nature - there may be art criticism, but there can be no such thing when applied to nature.

Allen Carlson cites Robert Elliot’s argument:

Since the natural world does not have the features of art - an intentional object, an artefact, as shaped by purposes and designs of author, etc. - it cannot be the object of aesthetic evaluation.

But as Carlson points out, this stands in conflict with view that everything is open to aesthetic evaluation.

The problem is just how we then formulate the groundwork of aesthetic appreciation of nature in the absence of artistic foundation.

The various theories on each side of the current debate can be categorised into what are commonly referred to now as the ‘cognitive model’ and the ‘non-cognitive model’.

Cognitive approaches

This type of apparoach argues that we should turn to scientific knowledge - ecology, geology, etc. - to guide aesthetic appreciation of nature.

Allen Carlson, Marcia Eaton, Holmes Rolston, (Aldo Leopold to some extent)
Strong knowledge requirement from science (ecology)
Importance of truth, objectivity

Non-cognitive approaches

Scientific knowledge is not essential for such appreciation, and it puts forward an alternative framework or basis for appreciation, consisting in immediate perceptual experience, imagination and non-scientific narratives, among other features of experience.

Arnold Berleant, Ronald Hepburn, Kant, Yuriko Saito, Stan Godlovitch, Cheryl Foster, Emily Brady
No knowledge requirement; knowledge understood more widely to include folklore, myth, faith
not deeply subjective, but subjective aspects of aesthetic response are embraced to some extent
role of emotion, imagination become more important
situated, contextual, not detached

Some clarifications

In my view (but not according to Carlson) the distinction between the two models does not rest on an opposition between objectivity and subjectivity and the two are not sharply distinguished.

Although the cognitive model strives toward objectivity in aesthetic judgements of nature, the non-cognitive model is not opposed to this aim either, although it is more sympathetic to the role of subjectivity.

The distinction is also not sharply drawn along the lines of cognitive (knowledge) content.

Knowledge of one kind or another (scientific, cultural/indigenous, historical, religious) plays a role in each of the two models to a greater or lesser extent, so there is some overlap between them.

The non-cognitive model argues that scientific knowledge can play some role but that it is not necessary for aesthetic appreciation, while some science-based approaches argue that non-scientific knowledge has some role to play in aesthetic appreciation.

Carlson’s cognitive approach (the 'natural environmental model')

Kendall Walton’s ‘Categories of Art’

Carlson's strategy is importantly based on a argument put forward by Kendall Walton. Walton, an American philosopher working in aesthetics, argued in a now famous article, ‘ Categories of Art’ (Philosophical Review, 1970), that appropriate aesthetic appreciation of art must be guided by knowledge which enables us to perceive it in the correct category, e.g., cubist, post-impressionist, etc.

Example: we appropriately appreciate Van Gogh’s Sunflowers if we perceive the painting in the category of post-impressionism rather than cubism.

Why is this important?

Once we perceive it in the correct category, we are better able to determine whether it is a good work of art or not.

His point is aimed against the narrowness of formalism, which argues that the perception of form, design and colour is sufficient for the interpretation and evaluation of art.

He was also trying to show that knowledge is essential in aesthetic judgements, which can be viewed as an implicit criticism of Kant.

Allen Carlson's account of the justification of aesthetic judgements of nature incorporates the view that there is an appropriate way to appreciate natural objects when approached from the aesthetic point of view. Basically, he also thinks there are correct categories for aesthetic appreciation

These cannot be the categories of art - can’t apply them to nature - so where do we get the categories? Science, or more specifically, natural history, including ecology, geology, etc.

Carlson’s categories of aesthetic appreciation of nature

Carlson draws on Walton’s argument to argue that knowledge of the natural sciences and their ‘common-sense predecessors and analogues’ replace artistic context in our appreciation of nature. Based on this strategy, he argues:

‘The analogous account holds that there are different ways to perceive natural objects and landscapes. This is to claim that they, like works of art, can be perceived in different categories, but not, of course in different categories of art, but rather in different “categories of nature.” Analogous to the way The Starry Night might be perceived either as a post-impressionist or as an expressionist painting, a whale might be perceived either as a fish or as a mammal....Further, for natural objects or landscapes some categories are correct and others not.’ (See ‘Nature and Positive Aesthetics’, p. 26; and in his book, Aesthetics and the Environment, p. 89.)

Carlson identifies natural science and its ‘common-sense predecessors and analogues’ as a replacement for the knowledge of artistic traditions and styles that guide our appreciation of art.

Appropriate and significant aesthetic appreciation of nature is impossible without ‘something like the experience and knowledge of the naturalist.’

Carlson does not assume that all aesthetic responses to nature will be grounded in what is a rather strong epistemological requirement on the appreciator.

The aesthetic response come through the mere perception of our environment, the careful use of which will lead to the discovery of aesthetic qualities in nature, but:

-exercise of selecting and focusing is guided by a nonaesthetic and nonartistic story, provided by science, and it is this story that enables us to perceive that order.
-so even perception in the aesthetic response to nature is dependent on scientific knowledge.
-science not only serves to deepen aesthetic appreciation, but without it we are unlikely to make aesthetic judgements that are true.
-we may overlook or misapprehend some aesthetic quality in nature unless aesthetic appreciation is supported by scientific categories.

Carlson again:
‘The rorqual whale is a graceful and majestic mammal. However, were it perceived as a fish, it would appear more lumbering, somewhat oafish, perhaps even a bit clumsy (maybe somewhat like a basking shark).’ (Ibid.)

Aesthetic judgements here = ‘It is majestic’; ‘It is oafish’
(compare ‘It is grey-blue’, ‘It is smooth’)

Objective aesthetic judgements

Carlson thinks that his approach gives us the answer to how aesthetic judgements of nature can be OBJECTIVE:

By combining perceptual qualities with the objectivist epistemology of science, Carlson is able to pin down something close to general criteria for the aesthetic evaluation of nature.
What we know about nature informs our perception of it by providing categories through which to correctly perceive it.
I would be wrong in my judgement that the whale is clumsy if I perceive it in the incorrect category, just as I would be mistaken if I judged one of Picasso’s cubist works to be a poor attempt at impressionism.

Why do you think Carlson argues for such a strong requirement of scientific knowledge? Why is such objectivity important?

His answer:
Carlson is critical of aesthetic subjectivism for good reasons, and this is surely a strength of his account. The ethical implications of aesthetic subjectivism are potentially quite dangerous to the natural environment.

If beauty is in the eye of the beholder, then it could be argued that there is no way to arbitrate between personal opinions. One person's view will be as sound as the next person's, so that:

For example: A nature conservationist who wishes to prevent a road being built through a forest will have no defensible aesthetic grounds for arguing their case.

Carlson's broad aim is to show that we can make aesthetic judgements of nature that have some claim to truth, and if aesthetic value is to play any role in environmental decision-making, then it cannot be reduced to the arbitrariness of extreme subjectivity.

rodinthink What do you think? Is the common-sense belief that ‘beauty is in the eye of the beholder’ potentially problematic in an environmental planning and policy-making context? If yes, then is establishing the objectivity of aesthetic judgments necessary?

Strengths of the science-based approach

If one agrees with Walton’s argument, it is reasonable to appeal to natural history instead of art history to determine appropriate appreciative categories for nature. As artefacts, paintings can be contextualized according to their history; and for natural objects, rocks or forests, why not turn to their history, such as geology and ecology?
role of knowledge - we need it for informed judgements about nature and how to save natural environment.
Objectivity - better in decision-making, clearer, easier to defend.

Criticisms of Carlson’s approach

(Further discussion of these points and others may be found in Chapter 4 of Brady.)

1. From art to nature

Carlson is perhaps too eager to move from art to nature when understanding appreciation. His use of Walton suggests he’s not willing to use another totally different starting point. Art appreciation really seems to demand knowledge, but with nature - why push this point? Also, Carlson’s article in Kemal and Gaskell argues for the idea of order appreciation of nature (as akin to design appreciation of art) - so models of art appreciation figure in his views.

The upshot of this problem and the one before it is a further criticism, raised by Arnold Berleant.

He argues that the scientific model supports a disengaged approach rather than embracing the distinctive possibilities offered by the natural environment. Carlson recognises that nature is an environment, and not merely an object or set of objects, but his model retains the distanced, contemplative and rationalistic aspects of scientific analysis.

Berleant argues that the traditional disinterested standpoint of aesthetic appreciation is mistaken, even in the context of art. Rather than standing back from nature, Berleant holds that perceptual immersion is more suited to the aesthetic approach, and more suited to appreciating nature as environment.

2. Carlson's account of knowledge

First, the necessary condition demanded by Carlson is not met - counterexamples may be found. Do we really need knowledge of knowledge of natural science to aesthetically appreciate nature?

NO: I can find the colours forms and texture of a rock-face stunning (an aesthetic judgement) without knowing its geology, can’t I?

When I find out age of rocks, or that it’s a type of rock that absorbs heat and so is always warm to touch, this may explain non-aesthetic properties which give rise to the aesthetic properties I find there, and even deepen aesthetic appreciation, but such knowledge is not a necessary condition.

YES: I might not be able to appreciate the barren landscape of a lava flow, if I don't know anything about it. It might just appear back and lifeless or UGLY. When I know that the blackness is the hard result of fiery orange rock in a liquid form, then frozen etc., might begin to see it as beautiful (then again, I might still see it as ugly!).

Also, science may deepen appreciation, but it might also get in the way. Kant thought it would be hard for botanist to detach from her or his scientific interest in a flower (I once asked a botanist about this - he said he could detach from his scientific concerns).

Second, we have the problem of understanding what Carlson means by ‘scientific knowledge’.

Carlson’s knowledge requirement itself is ambiguous. Sometimes it is a very strong epistemological requirement. At one point he says the knowledge of a naturalist is 'essential'.

But then in light of criticisms (see e.g., Noel Carroll’s article in Kemal and Gaskell), Carlson has, more recently, weakened the knowledge requirement to knowledge of natural history and ‘its common-sense analogues’. However, what does this mean - just names? If so, just names - being able to identify what a thing is, is not significant enough to get the objectivity he wants.

Interestingly, in his latest work (see his book Aesthetics and the Environment), he allows for a bit more leeway in terms of other kinds of knowledge. For example, he argues that indigenous knowledge in the form of myths can sometimes be relevant to appreciation. He gives the example (see chapter 14) of American Indian mythological descriptions of landscape features which have become embedded in cultural understandings of landscapes. Also, in an article written after his 2000 book, he broadens his approach to knowledge to include some forms of cultural knowledge, but the bottom line, as it were, is still science [see Carlson, ‘Nature Appreciation and the Question of Aesthetic Relevance’, in A. Berleant, ed. Environment and the Arts (Ashgate, 2002).]

3. Carlson’s theory is too reductive/essentialist

Scientific knowledge no doubt can sometimes deepen our appreciation of the object, but that it should be a condition of 'significant aesthetic appreciation’ is excessively restrictive on aesthetic experience - it is reductionist.

Perhaps we want a more flexible guide to aesthetic appreciation, i.e., one which is open to a range of experience as an appropriate foundation for aesthetic judgements, a foundation which includes a range of experience and knowledge: memory, emotion, imagination, folklore, myth, religion, human/cultural history as well as natural history.

Finally, Carlson takes an entirely uncritical view of science, whereas others have argued that science itself is shaped by culture and is not immune to subjectivity.

Other cognitive approaches

Holmes Rolston (in ‘Does Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature Need to Be Science-Based?’ British Journal of Aesthetics, 1995.)

His view appears to be more open and less reductionism than Carlson, but he is still critical of myths. Ecology forms, on Rolston’s view, the solid base of aesthetic appreciation.Rolston is more embracing of knowledge and experience beyond science, but he is still rather wary of subjective elements.

Aldo Leopold A Sand County Almanac:

Where does Aldo Leopold’s ‘conservation aesthetic’ fit into all this? He offers no clear environmental theory; most environmental philosophers agree on that. So how do we retrieve a coherent set of ideas from what he says, especially given that he says little explicitly about the aesthetic, although plenty about his own aesthetic experiences of nature?

I see him as falling more into the cognitive camp, simply because he emphasizes the importance of the ecology and having that solid knowledge at the basis of our enjoyment of nature. He also connects beauty to integrity and stability, as if beauty can only occur in ecologically sound or healthy environments. This would suggest the importance of understanding the ecology behind the beauty.

But note too that Leopold certainly appreciates the more phenomenological approach: the sheer immediacy of aesthetic experience of nature, without mediation by knowledge. In this respect he seems to follow a rather traditional idea of the aesthetic as something sensuous, not intellectual.

It is possible perhaps to read Leopold at two levels - one scientific, the other experiential/phenomenological, and that his aesthetic operates at these two levels.

rodinthink What role would you give to scientific knowledge in aesthetic appreciation of nature? Reflect on your own experiences here. Do we need, say, basic knowledge of marine biology to appreciate aesthetic qualities in seascapes and sea life? If one had such knowledge, would you say that your aesthetic judgements would be more justifiable (or easier to defend?). You might like to post your answer to this onto the discussion site.

Non-cognitive or non-science based theories of aesthetic appreciation of nature

Now read chapter 4 pp. 102-119 of Aesthetics of the Natural Environment and

Arnold Berleant, ‘The Aesthetics of Art and Nature’ in Kemal and Gaskell.

Overview: Non-cognitive approaches to aesthetic appreciation of nature

Now we turn to non-cognitive approaches, approaches which do not have the same epistemological requirement as Carlson and others put forward in cognitive views. Most non-cognitive approaches demand a richer account of aesthetic appreciation of nature in terms of the context and situation of the appreciator. They encourage the inclusion of more subjective aspects of the experience, like emotion and imagination.

This set of theories vary and emphasize more or less subjective features of appreciation. My own position on this (which I elaborate in Block 4), is that we need to be sensitive to the object-centredness of Carlson’s approach, which makes the object the centre of attention and also may lead to greater non-instrumental valuing of nature. But at the same time we cannot ignore the importance and common occurrence of subjective aspects of aesthetic appreciation.

What I would like to do is to discuss a few different views in less detail than I did with Carlson. This is to give you an idea of how the different subjective features of appreciation might play some role. Each of the views I consider emphasises a different aspect of appreciation.

1. Arnold Berleant’s aesthetics of engagement: immediate perception/sensory immersion; dissolution of subject-object distancing
2. Noel Carroll’s ‘arousal model’
3. Stan Godlovitch's 'natural aesthetics'

In Chapter 4 (Brady, 2003), I discuss Yuriko Saito's theory as well as these others. She offers a very promising approach as one that, in many respects, combines the cognitive and non-cognitive approaches.

Arnold Berleant’s 'aesthetics of engagement'

Many of the philosophers on this side of the debate favour a phenomenological aesthetic approach. The phenomenological perspective in this context functions both as a critical and descriptive framework.

It is critical of the subject-object and mind-body dichotomy implicit in Kant’s model, the landscape model and the natural environmental model. One of the fundamental drawbacks of these models is the assumption that nature is appreciated as an object from the perspective of a disembodied, contemplative appreciator.

In one important respect though the phenomenological approach harks back to Kant, in that it emphasises the immediacy of perception and feeling in the aesthetic response.

But disinterestedness, which in part facilitates the unmediated nature of the aesthetic response for Kant, has no place in this approach. Instead, this approach assumes fullness of participation. Berleant’s view brings these ideas together nicely:

'Perceiving environment from within, as it were, looking not at it, but in it, nature becomes something quite different; it is transformed into a realm in which we live as participants, not observers....The aesthetic mark of all such times is not disinterested contemplation but total engagement, a sensory immersion in the natural world that reaches the still uncommon experience of unity.' (Berleant, ‘The Aesthetics of Art and Nature’, Kemal and Gaskell, p. 236)

Berleant’s aesthetics of engagement values activity rather than passivity, involvement rather than distancing, situatedness rather than detachment/disinterestedness.

This situatedness is not just that of the object but also that of the subject. The experience of the individual appreciator - emotions, values, beliefs, and memories - become as important as the object of aesthetic attention. Thus, the aesthetic response, including any judgements we make, is determined as much by the situation of the appreciator as by the natural environment.

Berleant’s approach constitutes a shift to concern for the experience of the appreciator, as opposed to Carlson’s object-centred approach. Berleant is, of course, still interested in the environment, but he thinks we also ought to attend to the individual appreciator.

Carroll's 'arousal model'

Carlson’s view has been criticised on the grounds that it is too restrictive and narrow an account of how we appreciate nature aesthetically. He says this appreciation must be grounded in scientific knowledge, and he is critical of subjective aspects of that experience, which would include emotions and imagination.

When Kant talks about the role of feeling in the aesthetic response, he means a feeling of delight or pleasure in connection to beauty. Here he is not talking about emotions, but a more basic (and less complex) feeling than that.

rodinthink What is the role of emotions in our response to nature? We are moved by nature aren’t we, just as we are moved by music or films? How important is this response, and is it appropriate (especially in giving support for the aesthetic judgements we make of nature)?

Consider these examples:
Being moved to tears by a view of mountains
Finding thunder fearful and great
Describing the sea as ‘angry’
Feeling melancholy when walking across a vast empty moor

Carroll begins by writing:

'My major worry about Carlson’s stance is that it excludes certain very common appreciative responses to nature - responses of a less intellective, more visceral sort, which we might refer to as ‘being moved by nature.’ (Noel Carroll, ‘On Being Moved by Nature’, Kemal and Gaskell, p. 245)

Carroll claims that these are common responses, yet on Carlson’s account they are unimportant at best, problematic (because subjective), at worst.

Not all natural objects or landscapes will evoke an emotive response, but for those which do, what can we say about them?

Carroll’s strategy

He does not reject Carlson’s approach, but thinks we need another one alongside it, to show that there are other ways to appreciate nature aesthetically (and appropriately). In particular, he discusses how we can be moved by nature and have such an experience without guidance by scientific categories.

Note that Carroll’s focus is on our emotional responses to nature; he does not address in detail the more specific question of how nature can be expressive itself, but we’ll look at that problem later in this unit.

1. Being moved by nature

Emotional responses are not subjective projections onto the landscape (which would be Carlson’s problem with such responses). They do not just come from the subject. They are in part due to something about the object we perceive.

Emotional responses involve selective attention to the environment - some definite thing or things in the environment form the object/s of my emotional response

Example: If I find a waterfall grand, which involves a feeling of excitement, I do so because particular non-aesthetic features of the waterfall cause that response, e.g. the large scale of it.

These non-aesthetic features serve to justify my response - it grand and exciting because of its sheer size.

2. Being emotionally moved by nature is a subclass of being emotionally moved.

When we are emotionally moved, we are emotionally moved by something.

Example: I must be afraid of something, angry with someone, etc.

So, if we want to give explanations of emotions generally, then we have to explain them in terms of having objects, and in terms of those objects.

There is also another aspect to explaining emotions - which has to do with the beliefs of the subject, that is, the beliefs that person has concerning the object of his or her emotion.

So how we explain emotions - why they occur, etc. depends upon both the person’s beliefs and the way that relates to the object of their emotion.

Example: To explain why Scott is afraid of an oncoming tank, we have to understand something about tanks (are powerful and heavy), and Scott’s beliefs about tanks (he is afraid of them because he knows that they can harm people).

3. Appropriate vs. inappropriate responses

Carroll uses these points to show not only that we can explain our emotional responses to nature. They are explained in terms of the object’s properties and the beliefs of the person having the emotional response, but also to determine the inappropriateness and appropriateness of emotional responses.

We assess emotions according to the nature of the object, and according to whether one individual’s beliefs about some object accord with other people’s beliefs. He argues that the beliefs are reasonable if they cohere with other people’s beliefs.

Example: Scott’s fear of an oncoming tank would appear to be an appropriate response given that tanks are in fact powerful and heavy, and that it is reasonable (at least in relation to other people’s beliefs) to believe that they are harmful.

So we can assess Scott’s emotional response as appropriate to that object.

Moving to the context of aesthetic appreciation of nature, this model of emotions and their explanation and assessment is relevant and useful.

Carroll writes:
‘All things being equal, being excited by the grandeur of something that one believes to be of a large scale is an appropriate emotional response. Moreover, if the belief in the large scale of the cascade is one that it true for others as well, then the emotional response of being excited by the grandeur of a waterfall is an objective one. It is not subjective, distorted or wayward.’ (Carroll in Kemal and Gaskell, p. 258, my emphasis.)

Why is Carroll’s point important? What could it mean to say that an emotional response is appropriate?

If Carroll is to make his argument successful against Carlson, then he needs to show that emotional responses are not merely subjective or arbitrary; they can be part of a legitimate aesthetic appreciation of nature.

Stan Godlovitch's 'Natural Aesthetics'

Godlovitch (SG) offers an extremely interesting approach which contrasts quite strongly with all the other views discussed above. I classify his approach as non-cognitive because he does not think that knowledge of nature is necessary for aesthetic appreciation. But he also argues that we should detach as much as possible from knowledge, cultural experience and values, and human attitudes, when appreciating nature. For it is only in this way that nature can be itself and be taken on its own terms.

What SG is after is a proper recognition of nature as mystery, as something other from ourselves that we cannot grasp on human terms, and which may not be, therefore, graspable at all. Only in this way will we treat nature ethically within aesthetic appreciation.

By developing an 'acentric aesthetic' as he calls it, we do not appropriate nature through humanising it. His view is suggestive of the sublime, only because in the sublime we become so fully aware of our insignificance next to nature.

But how then can we appreciate nature aesthetically at all?

According to SG, we are supposed to develop a kind of 'aesthetic aloofness', whereby we regard nature at a distance as unknowable.

But does this make the content of aesthetic appreciation empty? This is what some critics have claimed.

rodinthink What do you think? Can we actually appreciate nature's qualities aesthetically on his account? I find his view quite attractive, but I am frankly puzzled as to what our aesthetic response would look like - what would its content be? Could we apply aesthetic concepts like 'wonderful','gorgeous', 'strange', 'incredible', 'powerful', 'lovely'? I'd be very interested to hear your views on this on the discussion site.

Strengths and weaknesses of non-science-based approaches

Strengths

1. Opens out and broadens scope of aesthetic experience; not narrow or reductive; all embracing

2. More flexible and free than science-based, and so able to cope with complexity of environmental experience.

3. Makes room for subjective elements of aesthetic response which are important to us - emotions, imagination, etc.

4. Practical benefit: more inclusive, perhaps less detached and more sensitive of surroundings. It is possible that more respect for nature could result. Potentially more inclusive of locals interests etc.; not elitist in demanding expert knowledge.

Weaknesses

1. Objectivity and subjectivity

Problems of subjectivity:
-the possibility of manipulating nature through self-indulgent fantasy
-trivialising or sentimentalising nature
-inconvenience and difficulty in taking all more subjective aspects on board, and all different individual input into judgements and so on in policy/decision-making processes

Ways to cope with these problems without turning to science/strong knowledge base:

Avoid an aesthetic approach to nature that ‘distorts, ignores, suppresses truth about its objects, feels and thinks about them in ways that falsify how nature really is.’(Ronald Hepburn, ‘Trivial and Serious in Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature’, in Kemal and Gaskell, p. 69)
Determining the boundary between true and false approaches is not determined by science, but on a case by case basis, taking into consideration the variability of nature and the individual experience of the appreciator.

Moving forward with the non-cognitive model

The valuable role of the non-scientific approach is that it depends upon and encourages a type of experience which is crucial to our relationship to the natural environment.

In the practical context, consider the following reflection made by a resident living near the site of a proposed road through a forest in Finland:

‘You should never plan a road if you haven’t visited the place many times. It is not enough to go there once....You should go in different moods. You should go when you’re drunk, and try the feeling of how it is to sing in the forest. You should go the following day when you have a hangover. You should go when your heart is broken.....Then perhaps you know if you can build that road or not.’ [Risto Lotvonen, resident of Hyvinkää, Finland, quoted in an article by Pauline von Bonsdorff, 'Paths of Environmental Aesthetics' (in a Finnish publication)]

We might say that such an experience brings about a sort of 'aesthetic knowledge' - through perception and emotion we have a deeper grasp of this environment. The idea here is that we gain valuable knowledge, but knowledge which grows out of an individual’s experience.

Emily Brady

October, 2003