Away MAVE

The Distance Mode of MA in Values and the Environment at Lancaster University

Block 4: Deep Ecology and Ecofeminism

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NB These materials do not represent the current (05/06) version of this module, and are offered here as only as an additional resource for students of environmental ethics.

	1. Deep Ecology: an introduction		2. Deep Ecology and Metaphysics/Consciousness
	3. Deep Ecology and Ethics		4. Deep Ecology as a Political Movement
	5. Ecofeminism		6. Ecofeminism's Critique of 'mainstream' Environmental Ethics
	7. Ecofeminist Approaches to Environmental Ethics		8. summary

In this block, we are going to explore two schools of thought in environmental philosophy - deep ecology and ecofeminism - that, to some extent at least, suggest that the approaches to environmental ethics we have considered so far in this module are wrongheaded. As will soon become clear, it's important to note that neither deep ecology nor ecofeminism are easy to define. Both deep ecology and ecofeminism are clusters of ideas, not all of which are held by those who might call themselves 'deep ecologists' or ecofeminists and some held by those who definitely would not. In both cases, different concepts are prioritised differently by different thinkers, and there are a number of different streams of thought under both headings!
Having begun, then, in this thoroughly confusing fashion, let's turn to think about these two movements individually!

Deep Ecology

Beginnings

The expression Deep Ecology is usually traced back to a paper published in 1973 by the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess. Born in Norway in 1912, Naess already had pursued a long and highly respected philosophical career as a philosopher (as well as a mountaineer), and was the founder of the philosophical journal Inquiry. His article "The Shallow and the Deep, LongRange Ecology Movement" published in this journal (Inquiry 16 1973) is regarded as the founding document of the deep ecology movement.
We will discuss many of the ideas Naess raises later in this block, but here we can consider some of the fundamental distinctions Naess makes. He suggested that there was a distinction to be made between what he calls shallow and deep ecology. Shallow ecology - or reform environmentalism - is, he claimed, about fighting pollution and resource depletion. Its central concern was the health and affluence of people in developing countries. Deep ecology, on the other hand, sought fundamental change. And it is here that we find some of the ideas most distinctive to deep ecology. Naess argues that deep ecology rejects the "man-in-environment image in favour of the relational total field image"; holds the view that: "every organism has an equal right to blossom and flourish"; and advocates the importance of diversity, local autonomy and decentralisation.

This very brief summary makes clear three different 'faces' of the deep ecology movement. First, it advocates a change in the way humans view the world - which we might call a metaphysical face. Secondly, it advocates a change in ethics; and thirdly, it suggests various political changes. That is to say, deep ecology has a metaphysical, an ethical and a political face. Indeed, it suggests that Western cultures need a 'paradigm shift' in order to construct a world changed in all these three aspects.

And it is, broadly speaking, in accord with these three faces that deep ecology has expanded and diversified from Naess' original article. Deep ecology has been viewed as a metaphysical or consciousness movement, concerned with changing the way the world is interpreted; as an ethical approach, concerned with the value of organisms and species; and as a political movement, concerned with local autonomy, democracy, and bioregionalism (being self sufficient within one's biological region). It's a mistake to split these aspects off too much, since the metaphysical shifts are sometimes seen as a basis for the other aspects, and there are ways in which all can be quite closely related. But thinking about these three 'faces' does help to clarify some basic ideas in deep ecology, so I'm just going to briefly look at them, and some of their main developments, more closely.

Deep Ecology and Metaphysics/Consciousness

Naess' statement that deep ecology was in part about 'rejection of the man-in-environment image in favour of the relational, total field image' has been the trigger for wide-ranging material in deep ecology. At root here is the view that it is relationships and interconnections which are fundamental in the world, rather than the world as being a collection of separate things. Influencing this view of the world have been ideas derived from the 'new physics' which emphasise that the world was a field of energy. One person whose work is sometimes drawn on here is the physicist Frizjof Capra, who wrote the well known popular physics books The Turning Point and The Tao of Physics. Capra argues that traditional views of the world based around mechanism (everything that exists has a mechanical explanation) and reductionism (the best way to understand something is by breaking it down into its component parts) are based on a view of physics which has been superseded. They work with an atomistic understanding of the world - where the world is built out of solid particles. But the new physics, primarily quantum physics and relativity, Capra argues, present a very different view of the world. Here, the world is seen as an interconnected web of relations; subatomic particles cannot be understood as isolated entities.

"Quantum theory has shown that subatomic particles are not isolated grains of matter but are probability patterns, interconnections inan inseparable cosmic web that includes he human observer and her consciousness…at the subatomic level, the interrelations and interactions between the parts and the whole are more fundamental than the parts themselves" Capra (1982) The Tao of Physics (London: Wildwood House)

Supporting material is also drawn from ecology and the emphasis on ecosystems and the degree of interdependence between them. The ecological writer Barry Commoner is sometimes cited here - because he described the principle that everything is interconnected as the 'First Law of Ecology'.

Metaphysical developments of deep ecology, then, have generally adopted views of this kind. We can identify a number of key points as follows:

1) All is fundamentally one; the holistic view is the best.
2) The world can be viewed as a field of energy or a web of life which not only interlinks everything, but which constitutes all that is. Individual organisms can be described as knots in the web, which is in a constant state of process and change.
3) The notion of the world as composed from discrete, separated things should be abandoned.
4) Relationality is more fundamental than independence.
5) Dualism (mind/body; human/nature spirit/matter) has no place.
6) Parts of the world cannot be analysed in isolation from the whole.

It's been suggested that the use of quantum physics here is deeply suspect - that there are many interpretations of quantum physics, and Capra's is one of the less likely ones! In his book Thinking about Nature (London: Routledge 1988) Andrew Brennan is critical of all such claims from scientific theories: He says:
"Physics gives no special support…to global holism - these doctrines should be seen for what they are - metaphysical positions which are not open to conclusive proof or refutation." (p.7) But this raises a more general question you might want to ponder - what are appropriate relationships between scientific theories and metaphysical claims about the way the world is?

A point to ponder

Must metaphysical claims about the world at least be compatible with scientific thinking, even if they don't claim support from it?
Please send any thoughts on this to the discussion site

Deep ecology and ethics

This view of metaphysics sets up quite a few tensions in possible approaches to ethics - although most deep ecologists are agreed that a new metaphysics is required to underpin any approach to environmental ethics (and it's here that the critique of much of the work in 'mainstream' environmental ethics is focused). Non-holistic environmental ethicists, at least, can be seen as still holding a metaphysical view of the world where individuals are separate, rather than seeing them as 'knots in a web'. Given this kind of analysis it seems odd at first sight that deep ecology should ever have espoused an ethical approach phrased 'all living things have an equal right to blossom and flourish'. Doesn't this depend on a view of each living thing as being separate, with its own well-being - a view very like Paul Taylor's that we looked at in Block 2 and which certainly didn't rest on the kind of metaphysical transformation being suggested here?

Responses to this problem have developed in different ways. Some deep ecologists have emphasised the importance of the metaphysics, and developed new approaches to thinking about ethics. One prominent theorist on deep ecology, Warwick Fox, in his book Toward a Transpersonal Ecology (New York: Shambala 1991) suggested that the metaphysics of deep ecology 'renders ethics superfluous'. A very simplified version of this argument goes something like this: if we accept the deep ecology worldview - that in some profound sense we are not separate from the world around us - then there are no clear boundaries between ourselves and the world. The world is part of our extended selves; everyone and everything is part of me. So destruction of the natural world is not harming someone different to me; it is harming myself. Thus, beyond valuing myself, it is not necessary to construct great ethical edifices - one is, rather, acting in one's self-interest. So protecting the world can be seen as a kind of self-defence.

Questions for Thought

Positions like this are often said to rest on an idea of 'extended self', where either the self is seen as literally extended into the world, or as able to psychologically extend itself into the world by identifying with it. Thus the world is not 'other', it is 'self'. And thus we would treat it better.
But is this not only a kind of extended self, but also a kind of extended selfishness? Is it basically egocentric (and indirectly, therefore, anthropocentric?) Do we (for instance) want a kind of morality where we help people because we see them as part of ourselves, or because they are others, independent of us, with their own well-being? These are questions which, as we shall see, feminists constantly fire at deep ecologists.

Deep Ecology and Ethics Continued…

It's clear how the ethics of deep ecology might go this way, by holding very tightly to the metaphysics of the world as a seamless web. However, other versions of deep ecology have taken more conventional paths, following the initial statement of Naess that every living thing has an equal right to blossom and flourish. It should be noted, though, that Naess' statement was intended as 'a principle' - he acknowledged that 'we are entitled to satisfy vital needs and this implies a lot of killing and destruction' . Undoubtedly, biocentric equality is enormously difficult to live with (as it were) and subsequently has been modified by deep ecologists a number of times. Some sympathy has been expressed towards the development of a value hierarchy. However, that all organisms (not just sentient ones) have intrinsic value is very widely held in the deep ecology movement. This has been captured in a series of 'basic principles of deep ecology (versions of which are in the readings for this section).

Thinking about the Basic Principles - some questions
have a go at each of these in your own notes

1) The principles claim as valuable all living organisms and also 'richness and diversity'.
Plainly these are different kinds of things. What might one do when they clash?

2) Do you think deep ecologists would always want to affirm diversity as a value? Doesn't it suggest, for instance, that there's an obligation to genetically engineer lots of new, different organisms?

3) What might 'richness' of life forms be, if not diversity?

4) And the question everyone always raises - what are vital needs? Naess, discussing this point in the second reading below, says that it's "deliberately left vague". Is this helpful - or unhelpful?

5) The principles clearly suggest the need for human population decrease - and the last point suggests that if you agree you should try to implement the changes. What should one do to reduce population? Is not having your own children an appropriate response?

6) The principles talk about human 'interference' in the non-human world. Here's that problem again, that we came upon in block 3. If humans are to be separated from the non-human world - such that they can 'interfere' with it, how can they also be one with it? This seems to contradict the holistic metaphysics emphasised earlier. Deep ecologists want both to say that humans are natural, and that they should reduce interference with nature. Is there a way around this?

7) What does an obligation to attempt to implement the principles mean? (we shall be looking at this briefly in the next section).

Deep Ecology as a Political Movement

The third way in which deep ecology has developed is as a political movement - using the term political in a very broad sense. Some of the places where deep ecology has been of political importance are:

a) the development of bioregionalism.

In summary, bioregionalism, as suggested above, is about regional self-sufficiency. Advocates of bioregionalism divide the earth into a series of 'bioregions' - areas which constitute one integrated ecosystem - such as watersheds. These bioregions, it is argued, should form the point of identity for populations rather than the artificial boundaries of states and counties. Individuals should be educated about the ecology of their bioregion. Bioregions should aim at being increasingly self-sufficient in food and other materials and reducing their imports from other bioregions. It's also often argued that bioregions should be units of government too - thus the political boundaries would reflect natural boundaries. In summary, it's argued, the development of bioregions would help people to identify with and feel part of their environment, and would also reduce the massive transportation costs of a global market in goods and services.

b) The protection of wilderness and natural diversity.

We are going to look at wilderness in more detail in Block 5. But for now it is useful to note that Deep Ecologists, especially in the United States, have been closely associated with wilderness protection movements. (This is obviously in line with the 8 principles). This has included radical environmental activism - the 'organisation' Earth First!, well known for its tactics of protest, sit-ins, sabotage of environmentally-damaging equipment like bulldozers, spiking trees etc grew out of the deep ecology movement and adopted a programme of direct action. Many environmental actions in Europe and the US have been undertaken by those adhering to some form of deep ecology. Generally speaking, these activists are non-violent, against people at least.

c) spiritual/consciousness groups.

This is a third area in which deep ecologists have been involved (and here I'm stretching the word 'political' to its limits). Spirituality has been important to some many deep ecologists right from the start (hence some scathing dismissal of deep ecology as eco-la-la from environmentalists less inclined to adopt a spiritual approach!) As we shall see when we come to the readings, spirituality is certainly not alien to Naess' writing. Spiritual developments of deep ecology have been myriad (within paganism, Buddhism and Christianity, amongst others). Sometimes they have involved adopting practices associated with indigenous peoples (such as the use of sweat lodges in the US, an American Indian practice.) Another spiritual practice adopted by some deep ecologists has been what is called 'A Council of All Beings'. In this ritual, each participant adopts the identity of a particular creature, speaks for it and plays its role: a practice which attempts to encourage participants to identify with members of other species.

Exercise

To be clear that you've grasped some of the central ideas he's talking about, try to summarise to yourself
1) How he understands the 'deep' in deep ecology
2) What he means by 'ecosophy' in general
3) How he understands Ecosophy T in particular
4) What he means by 'Self-realisation!' of both humans and non-human
5) What he means by 'total view'

Some questions about Naess' writing:

1) Naess suggests that deep ecology can have a variety of different backgrounds or contexts (eg Buddhism, Christianity etc) but that deep ecologists should converge on the 8-point platform (the apron diagram illustrates this). Does this mean that Naess' deep ecology is pluralist, and if so, in what sense? What do you make of the apron diagram?
2) Do you think that Naess' vision of a much simpler society is utterly unrealistic? Might it have economic consequences he doesn't take into account?
3) In his discussion of the 8-point platform Naess suggests that rivers, landscapes and ecosystems count as "living". Do they? In what sense?
4) Can there be a "core democracy in the biosphere"?
5) Naess maintains that we naturally delight in diversity. Do we? How could we know this? Does this mean that ethnocentrism (for instance) is stunting our natural love for diversity?
6) Must deep ecology be religious (in some sense of the word?)
7) Is it indecent for a teacher to proclaim an ethic for tactical reasons only? (p.196)
8) What similarities, and what key differences do you see between deep ecology and positions in environmental ethics we've already looked at - in particular that of Paul Taylor, and the land ethic?
Send your response to question 8 to the discussion site

Points to think about from the Glasser reading

1. Glasser argues that 'deep ecology' is frequently misunderstood, albeit in a variety of different ways. Do you think that he is right about this? How significant are these 'misunderstandings'?
2. On p.218, Glasser discusses Naess' 'anti-dogmatism'. Do you think Naess is anti-dogmatic?
3. Is Naess right to suggest, as Glasser reports (p 219) that humans 'act as if we have systematic conceptual structures for relating to the world, total views'?
4. Does Glasser's discussion of The Deep Ecology Platform (DEP) cast any further light on its role in the deep ecology movement?

Useful websites on deep ecology:

Interview with Michael Zimmermann
http://www.erraticimpact.com/~ecologic/html/deep_ecology.htm#online

Article by Stephen Harding in Resurgence on Deep Ecology
http://www.gn.apc.org/resurgence/185/harding185.htm

Sierra Navada Institute

Having looked at deep ecology, and its contribution to debates in environmental ethics, I now want to move on to ecofeminism, and to think about how the variety of views encompassed by this term also contribute to thinking about the environment ethically. Ecofeminists, especially Plumwood, have also offered a range of further objections to deep ecology, which we can look at in the next section in more detail.

Ecofeminism

The term 'ecofeminism' was first used in 1974 by Francoise D'Eaubonne. Since then ecofeminism has become a large but diverse movement, encompassing thinkers from a wide range of perspectives from within the feminist movement and the environmental movement. Although ecofeminism is diverse, there does seem to be one core shared premise: that there is a link between what is understood as the domination of nature and the domination of women. Sometimes this is expressed as the view that oppression of women and the natural world are 'twin' oppressions, stemming from the same cause. Here's a classic statement of this perceived link:
"Women must see that there can be no liberation for them and no solution to the ecological crisis within a society whose fundamental model of relationship is domination. They must unite the demands of the women's movement with those of the ecological movement to envisage a radical reshaping of the basic socio-economic relations and the underlying values of this society" Ruether, Rosemary Radford (1975) New Woman/New Earth p.204

The language of oppression and domination makes clear that this is a value-movement: ecofeminists argue that both the oppression of women and nature is wrong, and should be eliminated. However, the nature of the link between these twin oppressions has been understood in many different ways and consequently the best way of eliminating these twin oppressions is also contested.

Initial Questions

Some have wanted to question this fundamental premise of ecofeminism, by asking the following:

a)Can "oppression" mean the same thing when it's applied to women and when it's applied to nature?
b)What kind of evidence, and what volume of evidence could possibly be adduced to support the idea of a link between the oppression of women and nature?

Beyond this shared premise about the twin domination of women and nature, there are a variety of different kinds of ecofeminism - as there are, more broadly, a variety of kinds of feminism. Two of the most important ecofeminisms are cultural ecofeminism and socialist ecofeminism. In brief, cultural ecofeminists tend to argue that women are essentially different from men, that they have a "nature"; in which particular characteristics (such as nurturing) are manifested, and that this nature makes women close to nature. (Note the use of "nature" in that sentence to mean two different things - in the first instance it means inner essence; and in the second, the non-human world). Sometimes cultural ecofeminism is associated with a goddess-based spirituality; but however this is viewed, in all cases, cultural ecofeminists argue that there should be a revaluation of "women's work" including the bearing and bringing up of children.
Socialist ecofeminism on the other hand maintains that although it may be widely thought that women are "closer to nature", this is a social construction. Some women do not have such characteristics, some men do, and everyone could learn them: that is to say, socialist ecofeminism rejects these kinds of essentialist claims about human beings. For socialist ecofeminists, racism, sexism, classism and naturism are entwined oppressions which can be changed; and they are committed to achieving such changes.

Ecofeminist Critique of "Mainstream" Environmental Ethics

Ecofeminists have offered a wide range of criticisms of the mainstream approaches to environmental ethics we considered in blocks 2 and 3, and also of deep ecology. Iwant to start by looking at some of these criticisms, because they provide a useful point of access from which to think about ecofeminist ethics in general. Three of these criticisms are summarized below.

1.Criticism of the Emphasis on Rationality

Ecofeminists point out that many of the main approaches to environmental ethics we've considered emphasise rationality and denigrate feeling. Such a view, of course, characterizes many ethical positions, not just in environmental ethics. Kant, as you may remember, maintained that if one carried out an action in response to one's feelings, then it couldn't be ethical. Similar positions are maintained by a variety of environmental ethicists - see below:

"We were not especially "interested in" animals. Neither of us had ever been inordinately fond of dogs, cats or horses in the way that many people are. We didn't "love" animals. ..The assumption that in order to be interested in such matters one must be an "animal-lover" is itself an inclination of the absence of the slightest inkling that the moral standards we apply amongst human beings might extend to other animals….The portrayal of those who protest against cruelty to animals as sentimental, emotional animal lovers has had the effect of excluding the entire issue of our treatment of nonhumans from serious political and moral discussion" Singer (1975) Preface to Animal Liberation p. ix

"The attitude of respect for persons …is both a moral one and an ultimate one. It is a moral attitude because it is universalizable and disinterested. That is, each moral agent who sincerely has the attitude advocates its universal adoption by all other agents, regardless of whether they are so inclined and regardless of their fondness or lack of fondness for other individuals" Taylor (1986) Respect for Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press) p. 41

Ecofeminists, on the other hand, want to emphasise the importance of feeling in our ethical behaviour. Humans are not purely rational beings- we are not Dr Spocks! Ethics, they argue, should take into account that we are more complex beings composed from emotions as well as reason - and, further, that reason and emotion cannot be separated as easily as such approaches to ethics might suggest.

2. Criticism of the Emphasis on Universalisation

Ecofeminists point out that mainstream approaches to environmental ethics work on abstract principles of justice that are supposed to apply to all people everywhere. Underlying this is the traditional view that ethics must be universalisable. This "universalisation" plainly has different forms in different approaches to ethics. It might mean, as in Kant, a universal law. It might mean putting yourself in the position of an ideal observer. It might mean making the same calculations everyone would make. But in all these instances, the idea that a moral judgement should be universalisable, appropriate for everyone in that situation, and thus impersonal is fundamental. Singer, again, makes a classic statement of such a position:

"My ability to reason shows me the possibility of detaching myself from my own perspective and shows me what the universe might look like if I had no personal perspective". (Singer: How are we to Live p.229)

For some ecofeminist ethicists, this kind of position ignores the complex and particular nature of ethical situations in which we might find ourselves. It might be that in the same situation it is appropriate for different people to do different things, given their history, their background and their relations to other people involved. Nel Noddings, a leading feminist ethicist, puts it like this:

"A and B, struggling with a moral decision, are two different persons with different factual histories, different projects and aspirations and different ideals. It may indeed be right, morally right, for A to do X and B to do not-X." Noddings, Nel (1982) Caring (California University Press) p.85-6

Furthermore, ecofeminists urge that we should be suspicious of claims to be working from a universal position, the impartial "point of view" of the universe. Might not such "impartiality" simply obscure the interests of those involved by cloaking them in impartial language? In a sense this echoes a kind of Nietzschean understanding of ethics: that ethical positions are driven by underlying emotional commitments, but that in a step of self-deception these underlying commitments are not acknowledged, and claim to be "rationality". Look for instance at how Regan thinks "conformity with reflective intuitions" is important in ethics. But where have these intuitions come from? What drives them?

3. Criticism of the search for essence of moral considerability

A further problem ecofeminists raise with many approaches to environmental ethics is the search for necessary and sufficient "qualities" to earn moral considerability. If you have the right quality: sentience, subject-of-a-life, being alive etc - you can be let into the magic circle; if not, you are left outside it. Animal liberation theorists are obviously the greatest offenders in this respect - since they, especially Regan - leave most of the environment outside of the circle of moral considerability. But ecofeminists tend to argue that ethics should not be about expanding the circle in this sense - looking for ever broader and more inclusive criteria - but changing the terms on which things come to matter. Rather than search for essences - which is intrinsically individual-focused- they suggest, we should turn to relationships. This has the advantage of allowing for much more particular and contextual thinking. It allows non-humans to be taken into account individually, and differences between them to be considered. For instance, for Singer there is no moral difference between a pet dog and a wild wolf. Both are sentient and entitled to exactly the same moral treatment. But ecofeminists want to ask much more detailed questions about the individual animals, our relationships with them, how they relate to human society and other members of their species, and so on, before making moral decisions about how they should be treated.

Some Ecofeminist Approaches to Environmental Ethics

Ecofeminist ethicists have tended to reject this abstract, rational and universalist approach to ethical thinking suggesting instead that environmental ethics, rather than being based on a particular universalising understanding of reason, can instead be built on relationships of care between humans and the non-humans/particular environments in which they are located. This does not mean that reason should be abandoned altogether; but rather that as Plumwood argues in Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, reason should "find a form which encourages sensitivity to the conditions under which we exist on the earth…and enables us to acknowledge our debt to the sustaining others of the earth".

This idea of "care" has been central to the development of feminist ethics more generally. It stems from a ground-breaking work by Carol Gilligan, called In a Different Voice, published in 1982. Gilligan studied children at play in school grounds and noticed that boys and girls tended to have different ways of formulating play. Boys' games seemed to focus around abstract rules of justice, to which players had to conform, whereas girls' games seemed to concern relationships and the expression (or not) of care. From these observations, Glligan theorized that there were different ethical "voices" - the voice of justice and the voice of care - and that men were more often associated with the first voice, whilst women were associated with the second. (These associations were not exclusive - some girls and women did use a justice voice, or even alternated voices; and Glligan didn't suggest that these different voices were "natural" rather than socially constructed). Gilligan suggested that both voices had a place to play in ethics, and that the voice of care shouldn't be excluded, a point she makes very tellingly in the quotation below:

"Theoretically, the distinction between justice and care cuts across the familiar divisions between thinking and feeling, egoism and altruism, theoretical and practical reasoning. It call attention to the fact that all relationships, public and private can be characterised in terms both of equality and in terms of attachment. And that both inequality and detachment constitute grounds for moral concern. Since everyone is vulnerable both to oppression and abandonment, two moral visions - one of justice and one of care - recur in human experience". Gilligan, Carol (1994) "Moral Orientation and Moral Development" in May and Sharratt (eds) Applied Ethics (NJ: Prentice Hall) p.262

The idea of a voice of care in ethics, has been taken up by many ecofeminists as well as feminists more generally. It informs some of the key elements which recur in ecofeminist ethics, such as:

· Relationship is fundamental in ethical decision-making;
· Ethics is contextual and particular, depending on the constellations of relationships involved in any particular set of circumstances;
· There's a need to develop ethical attitudes (we might even say virtues) such as empathy & affection;
· Ethical thinking should be based on attachment, not detachment. Rather than being seen as a moral virtue, detachment can be seen as a moral problem because it leads to moral blindness or indifference and a failure to discern need. "Detachment is considered the hallmark of mature moral thinking within a justice perspective, signifying the ability to judge dispassionately, to weigh evidence in an even-handed manner, balancing the claims of other and self. From a care perspective, detachment is the moral problem". (Gilligan, in May and Sharratt above, p. 271)

In order to see how this works out in a bit more detail, let's look at the fourth reading in this block, by one of the leading ecofeminist ethicists, Karen Warren.

Clarifying Warren's Ideas:

1) What does Warren mean by "oppressive conceptual frameworks"?
2) What's a "logic of domination", and why is it so important in Warren's analysis?
3) Do you think there's a kind of virtue theory lurking in Warren's argument (eg on p. 333)?
4) How exactly does Warren interpret relationship? Look especially at the top of p. 334.

Some questions about Warren's article

1) Warren talks quite a bit about hierarchy, and when value hierarchical thinking is appropriate. Be sure you understand the distinctions she is making, and then think about some of the environmental ethicists we've considered (eg Regan or Attfield). Are they value-hierarchical? If so, would it be justifiably so in Warren's terms?

2) Can rocks be subordinated? Can one have relationships with them? Can one care for them? Does it matter whether one climbs a rock to dominate it, or as part of a caring relationship with it? If so, why?

3) Do you agree with Warren that rocks can have some kind of ethical significance, in contexts in which one is relating to them? Could it be argued that this is another extended kind of egocentrism?

4) On p. 328, Warren formally lays out a kind of argument she thinks has been historically pursued which has led to the oppression of both women and nature. Can you think of historical evidence for this argument? And do you think this argument can be found active today?

5) Warren seems to be arguing that feminism must be ecofeminism. Do you think she's right?

6) Is the "first person narrative" a possible way forward for environmental ethics? If so, why? If not, why not?

7) How do you respond to the 8 principles of ecofeminist ethics Warren outlines? Are there points where you strongly agree or disagree? (There seems something odd in the text here - is there a repetition of the same points in slightly different words?)

Some General Questions about Ecofeminist Ethics

1) If ecofeminist environmental ethics is contextual and non-universalist, does this mean that there are no absolutes, that "anything goes"? Warren, in the article we've looked at, resists this interpretation by suggesting a series of "boundary conditions" which must be met if an ethic is to be described as "feminist" at all (for instance, it must exclude sexism and racism). But can ecofeminists consistently have such boundary conditions? Does this compromise their contextualism?

2) Doesn't an ethic of care result in a kind of ethical nepotism? We've encountered this question earlier, but it is precisely to avoid this charge that the "mainstream" environmental ethicists practice universalisation! What kind of place can justice have in ecofeminist ethics?

3) What about people who don't care/can't care? Should they be re-educated? What if this doesn't work?

4) What about abusive relationships of care? What happens in cases where someone sacrifices themselves in caring to someone who abuses their care? Aren't there times when it is appropriate to stop caring (and perhaps think about self-justice?)

Web Tips:

The main ecofeminist site is at: http://www.ecofem.org/

For a bibliography, see http://www.ecofem.org/biblio/

There are a number of articles on ecofeminism in Ethics and the Environment Volume 4, Issue 2,
Pages 125-250 (1999) - a journal available online through the university library.

Summary of Block 4

This block looked at deep ecology and ecofeminism as important schools of thought in environmental philosophy. It considered
1. The diversity of both deep ecology and ecofeminism as schools of thought
2. Deep ecology as a movement with metaphysical, ethical and political faces
3. The metaphysics of deep ecology with its emphasis on interrelatedness and holism and versions of "the new physics" and ecology
4. The variant ethics of deep ecology including a form of biocentric egalitarianism, but also positions valuing the "extended self"
5. The 8-point deep ecology platform
6. The political developments linked to deep ecology, including bioregionalism, direct action and spiritual/ecological ritual
7. The writing of Arne Naess
8. Ecofeminism as emphasizing the "twin oppression" of women and nature
9. The critique of "mainstream" environmental ethics by ecofeminists on the grounds of its emphasis on rationality, universalisation, essentialism
10. Ecofeminist ethics emphasizing care, context, relationship and attachment
11. Karen Warren's account of ecofeminism.

To complete this block make sure that you have responded to some of your peer's contributions to the discussion site