is directly opposed to the Representational Theory of Thinking. It is the thesis that explaining our own and others' behaviour in terms of beliefs and desires - folk psychology - is completely mistaken and that the advance of neuroscience will clarify what concepts we should employ instead (to give us better predictions). Folk psychology it is claimed throws little or no light on many features of human behaviour. It will be replaced by neuroscience just as Aristotelian physics gave way to Newtonian (which has of course itself given way since).
Dennett defends the idea that when we explain someone's behaviour in terms of belief and desires we are not invoking internal states. We are invoking theoretical constructs which have been elaborated because of their explanatory power.
Instumentalism is incompatable with the representational theory of thought.
To say that thinking is a matter of manipulating representations of propositions is to say that thinking is like speaking. It is 'quasi-limguistic'. The Representational Theory of Thinking thus implies there must be a 'Language of Thought'.
We ordinarily explain our own behaviour and the behaviour of others in terms of beliefs and desires.A first thought of the physically-minded is to propose that there are processes in the brain that correspond to beliefs and others that correspond to desires. This is, crudely, what is known as the representational view of thinking.
It is argued that beliefs (which form a central part of Folk psychology) are made what they are partly by the context of the believer. Putnam argued the same point with his water / twater scenario.
If established, this point would threaten to undermine both