is directly opposed to Folk Psychology. It is the thesis that explaining our own and others' behaviour in terms of beliefs and desires - folk psychology - is completely mistaken and that the advance of neuroscience will clarify what concepts we should employ instead (to give us better predictions). Folk psychology it is claimed throws little or no light on many features of human behaviour. It will be replaced by neuroscience just as Aristotelian physics gave way to Newtonian (which has of course itself given way since).
Dennett defends the idea that when we explain someone's behaviour in terms of belief and desires we are not invoking internal states. We are invoking theoretical constructs which have been elaborated because of their explanatory power.
Instumentalism is incompatable with the representational theory of thought.
It is argued that beliefs (which form a central part of Folk psychology) are made what they are partly by the context of the believer. Putnam argued the same point with his water / twater scenario.
If established, this point would threaten to undermine both
what is going on when a person is thinking is that states of bits of the brain represent propositions and these are manipulated in various ways.