JR / VP
Question
When you were discussing propositions, you used the example
"My brother is in London". ‘This is said to be a state of part
of a person brain.’ So in other words, can proposition be seen as a memory?
Would a certain memory or just the single grouping of neurons be a proposition?
(As in the group of neurons that read in "code" /My brother/ is in
/London".
Response
For the representational theory of mind, the thesis is
that in the case of a belief some aspect of the brain or brain activity represents
it. It leaves open just what is the representation - could be eg a pattern of
activity in a particular network of neurons.
The theory assumes that a belief involves a proposition - ie it is an 'attitude'
towards a proposition. So it is maintaining that propositions are represented
somehow within the brain.
Question
Another question is that can a proposition or a sentence
be not just words or symbols, but visual sentences (such as a visual memory),
or even sound memories where there are no visual things, but just sound. Why
is it that we are hooked up on words, in language, when our brain does not just
think in words, and we are talking about language? Perhaps I am off track but
it seems interesting enough to ask.
Response
No, I don't think you are off-track at all. As you realize,
the Churchlands would be sympathetic with the points you are making. They say
precisely that we musn't get committed to the idea that all 'thinking' must
be a matter of manipulating representations of propositions.
But Fodor gives arguments - not at all easy to find a way round - for the thesis
that thinking must involve representations of propositions, and we consider
these in the next presentation.
Question
Since the Churchlands want to throughout "folk psychology" and replace it with a pure neuroscience. Wouldn’t they want to the representational theory of thinking? Or do they? I was confused about that as well.
Response
You miss out a crucial word here, but let me guess. 'Junk'? The Churchlands want to reject the representational theory of thinking, yes.