An ENQUIRY concerning HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING
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SECTION I. Of the DIFFERENT SPECIES of PHILOSOPHY.
MORAL philosophy, or the science of human nature, may
be treated after two different manners; each of which has its peculiar merit,
and may contribute to the entertainment, instruction, and reformation of
mankind. The one considers man chiefly as born for action; and as influenced in
his measures by taste and sentiment; pursuing one object, and avoiding another,
according to the value which these objects seem to possess, and according to the
light in which they present themselves. As virtue, of all objects, is allowed to
be the most valuable, this species of philosophers paint her in the most amiable
colours; borrowing all helps from poetry and eloquence, and treating their
subject in an easy and obvious manner, and such as is best fitted to please the
imagination, and engage the affections. They select the most striking
observations and instances from common life; place opposite characters in a
proper contrast; and alluring us into the paths of virtue by the views of glory
and happiness, direct our steps in
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these paths by the soundest
precepts and most illustrious examples. They make us
feel the difference
between vice and virtue; they excite and regulate our sentiments; and so they
can but bend our hearts to the love of probity and true honour, they think, that
they have fully attained the end of all their labours.
The other species of philosophers consider man in the
light of a reasonable rather than an active being, and endeavour to form his
understanding more than cultivate his manners. They regard human nature as a
subject of speculation; and with a narrow scrutiny examine it, in order to find
those principles, which regulate our understanding, excite our sentiments, and
make us approve or blame any particular object, action, or behaviour. They think
it a reproach to all literature, that philosophy should not yet have fixed,
beyond controversy, the foundation of morals, reasoning, and criticism; and
should for ever talk of truth and falsehood, vice and virtue, beauty and
deformity, without being able to determine the source of these distinctions.
While they attempt this arduous task, they are deterred by no difficulties; but
proceeding from particular instances to general principles, they still push on
their enquiries to principles more general, and rest not satisfied till they
arrive at those original principles, by which, in every science, all human
curiosity must be bounded. Though their speculations seem abstract, and even
unintelligible to common readers, they aim at the approbation of the learned and
the wise; and think themselves sufficiently compensated for the labour of their
whole lives, if they can discover some hidden truths, which may contribute to
the instruction of posterity.
It is certain that the easy and obvious philosophy
will always, with the generality of mankind, have the preference above the
accurate and abstruse; and by many will be recommended, not only as more
agreeable, but more useful
PAGE 7
than the other. It enters more
into common life; moulds the heart and affections; and, by touching those
principles which actuate men, reforms their conduct, and brings them nearer to
that model of perfection which it describes. On the contrary, the abstruse
philosophy, being founded on a turn of mind, which cannot enter into business
and action, vanishes when the philosopher leaves the shade, and comes into open
day; nor can its principles easily retain any influence over our conduct and
behaviour. The feelings of our heart, the agitation of our passions, the
vehemence of our affections, dissipate all its conclusions, and reduce the
profound philosopher to a mere plebeian.
This also must be confessed, that the most durable, as
well as justest fame, has been acquired by the easy philosophy, and that
abstract reasoners seem hitherto to have enjoyed only a momentary reputation,
from the caprice or ignorance of their own age, but have not been able to
support their renown with more equitable posterity. It is easy for a profound
philosopher to commit a mistake in his subtile reasonings; and one mistake is
the necessary parent of another, while he pushes on his consequences, and is not
deterred from embracing any conclusion, by its unusual appearance, or its
contradiction to popular opinion. But a philosopher, who purposes only to
represent the common sense of mankind in more beautiful and more engaging
colours, if by accident he falls into error, goes no farther; but renewing his
appeal to common sense, and the natural sentiments of the mind, returns into the
right path, and secures himself from any dangerous illusions. The fame of CICERO flourishes at present; but that of
ARISTOTLE is utterly decayed. LA BRUYERE passes the seas, and still maintains his reputation: But
the glory of MALEBRANCHE is confined
to his own nation, and to his own age. And ADDISON, perhaps, will be read with pleasure, when LOCKE shall be entirely forgotten.
PAGE 8
The mere philosopher is a
character, which is commonly but little acceptable in the world, as being
supposed to contribute nothing either to the advantage or pleasure of society;
while he lives remote from communication with mankind, and is wrapped up in
principles and notions equally remote from their comprehension. On the other
hand, the mere ignorant is still more despised; nor is any thing deemed a surer
sign of an illiberal genius in an age and nation where the sciences flourish,
than to be entirely destitute of all relish for those noble entertainments. The
most perfect character is supposed to lie between those extremes; retaining an
equal ability and taste for books, company, and business; preserving in
conversation that discernment and delicacy which arise from polite letters; and
in business, that probity and accuracy which are the natural result of a just
philosophy. In order to diffuse and cultivate so accomplished a character,
nothing can be more useful than compositions of the easy style and manner, which
draw not too much from life, require no deep application or retreat to be
comprehended, and send back the student among mankind full of noble sentiments
and wise precepts, applicable to every exigence of human life. By means of such
compositions, virtue becomes amiable, science agreeable, company instructive,
and retirement entertaining.
Man is a reasonable being; and as such, receives from
science his proper food and nourishment: But so narrow are the bounds of human
understanding, that little satisfaction can be hoped for in this particular,
either from the extent or security of his acquisitions. Man is a sociable, no
less than a reasonable being: But neither can he always enjoy company agreeable
and amusing, or preserve the proper relish for them. Man is also an active
being; and from that disposition, as well as from the various necessities of
human life, must submit to business and occupation:
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But the mind requires some
relaxation, and cannot always support its bent to care and industry. It seems,
then, that nature has pointed out a mixed kind of life as most suitable to human
race, and secretly admonished them to allow none of these biasses to
draw
too much, so as to incapacitate them for other occupations and entertainments.
Indulge your passion for science, says she, but let your science be human, and
such as may have a direct reference to action and society. Abstruse thought and
profound researches I prohibit, and will severely punish, by the pensive
melancholy which they introduce, by the endless uncertainty in which they
involve you, and by the cold reception which your pretended discoveries shall
meet with, when communicated. Be a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy,
be still a man.
Were the generality of mankind contented to prefer the
easy philosophy to the abstract and profound, without throwing any blame or
contempt on the latter, it might not be improper, perhaps, to comply with this
general opinion, and allow every man to enjoy, without opposition, his own taste
and sentiment. But as the matter is often carried farther, even to the absolute
rejecting of all profound reasonings, or what is commonly called
metaphysics, we shall now proceed to consider what can reasonably be
pleaded in their behalf.
We may begin with observing, that one considerable
advantage, which results from the accurate and abstract philosophy, is, its
subserviency to the easy and humane; which, without the former, can never attain
a sufficient degree of exactness in its sentiments, precepts, or reasonings. All
polite letters are nothing but pictures of human life in various attitudes and
situations; and inspire us with different sentiments, of praise or blame,
admiration or ridicule, according to the qualities of the object, which they set
before us. An artist must be better qualified to succeed in
PAGE 10
this undertaking, who,
besides a delicate taste and a quick apprehension, possesses an accurate
knowledge of the internal fabric, the operations of the understanding, the
workings of the passions, and the various species of sentiment which
discriminate vice and virtue. How painful soever this inward search or enquiry
may appear, it becomes, in some measure, requisite to those, who would describe
with success the obvious and outward appearances of life and manners. The
anatomist presents to the eye the most hideous and disagreeable objects; but his
science is useful to the painter in delineating even a
VENUS or an
HELEN. While the latter employs all the richest colours of his
art, and gives his figures the most graceful and engaging airs; he must still
carry his attention to the inward structure of the human body, the position of
the muscles, the fabric of the bones, and the use and figure of every part or
organ. Accuracy is, in every case, advantageous to beauty, and just reasoning to
delicate sentiment. In vain would we exalt the one by depreciating the
other.Besides, we may observe, in every art or profession, even those which most
concern life or action, that a spirit of accuracy, however acquired, carries all
of them nearer their perfection, and renders them more subservient to the
interests of society. And though a philosopher may live remote from business,
the genius of philosophy, if carefully cultivated by several, must gradually
diffuse itself throughout the whole society, and bestow a similar correctness on
every art and calling. The politician will acquire greater foresight and
subtility, in the subdividing and balancing of power; the lawyer more method and
finer principles in his reasonings; and the general more regularity in his
discipline, and more caution in his plans and operations. The stability of
modern governments above the ancient, and the accuracy of modern philosophy,
have improved, and probably will still improve, by similar gradations.
PAGE 11
Were there no advantage to be reaped from these
studies, beyond the gratification of an innocent curiosity, yet ought not even
this to be despised; as being one accession to those few safe and harmless
pleasures, which are bestowed on human race. The sweetest and most inoffensive
path of life leads through the avenues of science and learning; and whoever can
either remove any obstructions in this way, or open up any new prospect, ought
so far to be esteemed a benefactor to mankind. And though these researches may
appear painful and fatiguing, it is with some minds as with some bodies, which
being endowed with vigorous and florid health, require severe exercise, and reap
a pleasure from what, to the generality of mankind, may seem burdensome and
laborious. Obscurity, indeed, is painful to the mind as well as to the eye; but
to bring light from obscurity, by whatever labour, must needs be delightful and
rejoicing.
But this obscurity in the profound and abstract
philosophy, is objected to, not only as painful and fatiguing, but as the
inevitable source of uncertainty and error. Here indeed lies the justest and
most plausible objection against a considerable part of metaphysics, that they
are not properly a science; but arise either from the fruitless efforts of human
vanity, which would penetrate into subjects utterly inaccessible to the
understanding, or from the craft of popular superstitions, which, being unable
to defend themselves on fair ground, raise these intangling brambles to cover
and protect their weakness. Chaced from the open country, these robbers fly into
the forest, and lie in wait to break in upon every unguarded avenue of the mind,
and overwhelm it with religious fears and prejudices. The stoutest antagonist,
if he remit his watch a moment, is oppressed. And many, through cowardice and
folly, open the gates to the enemies, and willingly receive them with reverence
and submission, as their legal sovereigns.
PAGE 12
But is this a sufficient reason, why philosophers
should desist from such researches, and leave superstition still in possession
of her retreat? Is it not proper to draw an opposite conclusion, and perceive
the necessity of carrying the war into the most secret recesses of the enemy? In
vain do we hope, that men, from frequent disappointment, will at last abandon
such airy sciences, and discover the proper province of human reason. For,
besides, that many persons find too sensible an interest in perpetually
recalling such topics; besides this, I say, the motive of blind despair can
never reasonably have place in the sciences; since, however unsuccessful former
attempts may have proved, there is still room to hope, that the industry, good
fortune, or improved sagacity of succeeding generations may reach discoveries
unknown to former ages. Each adventurous genius will still leap at the arduous
prize, and find himself stimulated, rather than discouraged, by the failures of
his predecessors; while he hopes that the glory of atchieving so hard an
adventure is reserved for him alone. The only method of freeing learning, at
once, from these abstruse questions, is to enquire seriously into the nature of
human understanding, and shew, from an exact analysis of its powers and
capacity, that it is by no means fitted for such remote and abstruse subjects.
We must submit to this fatigue, in order to live at ease ever after: And must
cultivate true metaphysics with some care, in order to destroy the false and
adulterate. Indolence, which, to some persons, affords a safeguard against this
deceitful philosophy, is, with others, overbalanced by curiosity; and despair,
which, at some moments, prevails, may give place afterwards to sanguine hopes
and expectations. Accurate and just reasoning is the only catholic remedy,
fitted for all persons and all dispositions; and is alone able to subvert that
abstruse philosophy and metaphysical jargon, which, being mixed up with popular
superstition, renders it in
PAGE 13
a manner impenetrable to
careless reasoners, and gives it the air of science and wisdom.
Besides this advantage of rejecting, after deliberate
enquiry, the most uncertain and disagreeable part of learning, there are many
positive advantages, which result from an accurate scrutiny into the powers and
faculties of human nature. It is remarkable concerning the operations of the
mind, that, though most intimately present to us, yet, whenever they become the
object of reflection, they seem involved in obscurity; nor can the eye readily
find those lines and boundaries, which discriminate and distinguish them. The
objects are too fine to remain long in the same aspect or situation; and must be
apprehended in an instant, by a superior penetration, derived from nature, and
improved by habit and reflection. It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part
of science barely to know the different operations of the mind, to separate them
from each other, to class them under their proper heads, and to correct all that
seeming disorder, in which they lie involved, when made the object of reflection
and enquiry. This task of ordering and distinguishing, which has no merit, when
performed with regard to external bodies, the objects of our senses, rises in
its value, when directed towards the operations of the mind, in proportion to
the difficulty and labour, which we meet with in performing it. And if we can go
no farther than this mental geography, or delineation of the distinct parts and
powers of the mind, it is at least a satisfaction to go so far; and the more
obvious this science may appear (and it is by no means obvious) the more
contemptible still must the ignorance of it be esteemed, in all pretenders to
learning and philosophy.
Nor can there remain any suspicion, that this science
is uncertain and chimerical; unless we should entertain such a scepticism as is
entirely subversive of all speculation, and even action. It cannot be doubted,
that the mind
PAGE 14
is endowed with several
powers and faculties, that these powers are distinct from each other, that what
is really distinct to the immediate perception may be distinguished by
reflection; and consequently, that there is a truth and falsehood in all
propositions on this subject, and a truth and falsehood, which lie not beyond
the compass of human understanding. There are many obvious distinctions of this
kind, such as those between the will and understanding, the imagination and
passions, which fall within the comprehension of every human creature; and the
finer and more philosophical distinctions are no less real and certain, though
more difficult to be comprehended. Some instances, especially late ones, of
success in these enquiries, may give us a juster notion of the certainty and
solidity of this branch of learning. And shall we esteem it worthy the labour of
a philosopher to give us a true system of the planets, and adjust the position
and order of those remote bodies; while we affect to overlook those, who, with
so much success, delineate the parts of the mind, in which we are so intimately
concerned?
But may we not hope, that philosophy, if cultivated
with care, and encouraged by the attention of the public, may carry its
researches still farther, and discover, at least in some degree, the secret
springs and principles, by which the human mind is actuated in its operations?
Astronomers had long contented themselves with proving, from the phaenomena, the
true motions, order, and magnitude of the heavenly bodies: Till a philosopher,
at last, arose, who seems, from the happiest reasoning, to have also determined
the laws and forces, by which the revolutions of the planets are governed and
directed. The like has been performed with regard to other parts of nature. And
there is no reason to despair of equal success in our enquiries concerning the
mental powers and oeconomy, if prosecuted with equal capacity and caution. It is
probable, that one
PAGE 15
operation and principle of
the mind depends on another; which, again, may be resolved into one more general
and universal: And how far these researches may possibly be carried, it will be
difficult for us, before, or even after, a careful trial, exactly to determine.
This is certain, that attempts of this kind are every day made even by those who
philosophize the most negligently: And nothing can be more requisite than to
enter upon the enterprize with thorough care and attention; that, if it lie
within the compass of human understanding, it may at last be happily atchieved;
if not, it may, however, be rejected with some confidence and security. This
last conclusion, surely, is not desirable; nor ought it to be embraced too
rashly. For how much must we diminish from the beauty and value of this species
of philosophy, upon such a supposition? Moralists have hitherto been accustomed,
when they considered the vast multitude and diversity of those actions that
excite our approbation or dislike, to search for some common principle, on which
this variety of sentiments might depend. And though they have sometimes carried
the matter too far, by their passion for some one general principle; it must,
however, be confessed, that they are excusable in expecting to find some general
principles, into which all the vices and virtues were justly to be resolved. The
like has been the endeavour of critics, logicians, and even politicians: Nor
have their attempts been wholly unsuccessful; though perhaps longer time,
greater accuracy, and more ardent application may bring these sciences still
nearer their perfection. To throw up at once all pretensions of this kind may
justly be deemed more rash, precipitate, and dogmatical, than even the boldest
and most affirmative philosophy, that has ever attempted to impose its crude
dictates and principles on mankind.
What though these reasonings concerning human nature
seem abstract, and of difficult comprehension? This affords
PAGE 16
no presumption of
their falsehood. On the contrary, it seems impossible, that what has hitherto
escaped so many wise and profound philosophers can be very obvious and easy. And
whatever pains these researches may cost us, we may think ourselves sufficiently
rewarded, not only in point of profit but of pleasure, if, by that means, we can
make any addition to our stock of knowledge, in subjects of such unspeakable
importance.
But as, after all, the abstractedness of these
speculations is no recommendation, but rather a disadvantage to them, and as
this difficulty may perhaps be surmounted by care and art, and the avoiding of
all unnecessary detail, we have, in the following enquiry, attempted to throw
some light upon subjects, from which uncertainty has hitherto deterred the wise,
and obscurity the ignorant. Happy, if we can unite the boundaries of the
different species of philosophy, by reconciling profound enquiry with clearness,
and truth with novelty! And still more happy, if, reasoning in this easy manner,
we can undermine the foundations of an abstruse philosophy, which seems to have
hitherto served only as a shelter to superstition, and a cover to absurdity and
error!
PAGE 17
SECTION II. Of the ORIGIN of IDEAS.
EVERY one will readily allow, that there is a
considerable difference between the perceptions of the mind, when a man feels
the pain of excessive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he
afterwards recalls to his memory this sensation, or anticipates it by his
imagination. These faculties may mimic or copy the perceptions of the senses;
but they never can entirely reach the force and vivacity of the original
sentiment. The utmost we say of them, even when they operate with greatest
vigour, is, that they represent their object in so lively a manner, that we
could almost say we feel or see it: But, except the mind be disordered by
disease or madness, they never can arrive at such a pitch of vivacity, as to
render these perceptions altogether undistinguishable. All the colours of
poetry, however splendid, can never paint natural objects in such a manner as to
make the description be taken for a real landskip. The most lively thought is
still inferior to the dullest sensation.
We may observe a like distinction to run through all
the other perceptions of the mind. A man in a fit of anger, is actuated in a
very different manner from one who only thinks of that emotion. If you tell me,
that any person is in love, I easily understand your meaning, and form a just
conception of his situation; but never can mistake that conception for the real
disorders and agitations of the passion. When we reflect on our past sentiments
and
PAGE 18
affections, our thought is a
faithful mirror, and copies its objects truly; but the colours which it employs
are faint and dull, in comparison of those in which our original perceptions
were clothed. It requires no nice discernment or metaphysical head to mark the
distinction between them.
Here therefore we may divide all the perceptions of
the mind into two classes or species, which are distinguished by their different
degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible and lively are commonly
denominated THOUGHTS or IDEAS. The other species want a name in our
language, and in most others; I suppose, because it was not requisite for any,
but philosophical purposes, to rank them under a general term or appellation.
Let us, therefore, use a little freedom, and call them IMPRESSIONS; employing that word in a sense
somewhat different from the usual. By the term impression, then, I mean
all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or
hate, or desire, or will. And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which
are the less lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, when we reflect on
any of those sensations or movements above mentioned.
Nothing, at first view, may seem more unbounded than
the thought of man, which not only escapes all human power and authority, but is
not even restrained within the limits of nature and reality. To form monsters,
and join incongruous shapes and appearances, costs the imagination no more
trouble than to conceive the most natural and familiar objects. And while the
body is confined to one planet, along which it creeps with pain and difficulty;
the thought can in an instant transport us into the most distant regions of the
universe; or even beyond the universe, into the unbounded chaos, where nature is
supposed to lie in total confusion. What never was seen, or heard of, may yet be
conceived; nor is any thing beyond the power of thought, except what implies an
absolute contradiction.
PAGE 19
But though our thought seems to possess this unbounded
liberty, we shall find, upon a nearer examination, that it is really confined
within very narrow limits, and that all this creative power of the mind amounts
to no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or
diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience. When we
think of a golden mountain, we only join two consistent ideas, gold, and
mountain, with which we were formerly acquainted. A virtuous horse we can
conceive; because, from our own feeling, we can conceive virtue; and this we may
unite to the figure and shape of a horse, which is an animal familiar to us. In
short, all the materials of thinking are derived either from our outward or
inward sentiment: The mixture and composition of these belongs alone to the mind
and will. Or, to express myself in philosophical language, all our ideas or more
feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones.To prove
this, the two following arguments will, I hope, be sufficient. First, when we
analyse our thoughts or ideas, however compounded or sublime, we always find,
that they resolve themselves into such simple ideas as were copied from a
precedent feeling or sentiment. Even those ideas, which, at first view, seem the
most wide of this origin, are found, upon a nearer scrutiny, to be derived from
it. The idea of God, as meaning an infinitely intelligent, wise, and good Being,
arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and augmenting,
without limit, those qualities of goodness and wisdom. We may prosecute this
enquiry to what length we please; where we shall always find, that every idea
which we examine is copied from a similar impression. Those who would assert,
that this position is not universally true nor without exception, have only one,
and that an easy method of refuting it; by producing that idea, which, in their
opinion, is not derived from this source.
PAGE 20
It will then be incumbent on
us, if we would maintain our doctrine, to produce the impression or lively
perception, which corresponds to it.
Secondly. If it happen, from a defect of the organ,
that a man is not susceptible of any species of sensation, we always find, that
he is as little susceptible of the correspondent ideas. A blind man can form no
notion of colours; a deaf man of sounds. Restore either of them that sense, in
which he is deficient; by opening this new inlet for his sensations, you also
open an inlet for the ideas; and he finds no difficulty in conceiving these
objects. The case is the same, if the object, proper for exciting any sensation,
has never been applied to the organ. A LAPLANDER or NEGROE has
no notion of the relish of wine. And though there are few or no instances of a
like deficiency in the mind, where a person has never felt or is wholly
incapable of a sentiment or passion, that belongs to his species; yet we find
the same observation to take place in a less degree. A man of mild manners can
form no idea of inveterate revenge or cruelty; nor can a selfish heart easily
conceive the heights of friendship and generosity. It is readily allowed, that
other beings may possess many senses of which we can have no conception; because
the ideas of them have never been introduced to us, in the only manner, by which
an idea can have access to the mind, to wit, by the actual feeling and
sensation.
There is, however, one contradictory phaenomenon,
which may prove, that it is not absolutely impossible for ideas to arise,
independent of their correspondent impressions. I believe it will readily be
allowed, that the several distinct ideas of colour, which enter by the eye, or
those of sound, which are conveyed by the ear, are really different from each
other; though, at the same time, resembling. Now if this be true of different
colours, it must be no less so of the different shades of the same colour; and
each shade
PAGE 21
produces a distinct idea,
independent of the rest. For if this should be denied, it is possible, by the
continual gradation of shades, to run a colour insensibly into what is most
remote from it; and if you will not allow any of the means to be different, you
cannot, without absurdity, deny the extremes to be the same. Suppose, therefore,
a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and to have become
perfectly acquainted with colours of all kinds, except one particular shade of
blue, for instance, which it never has been his fortune to meet with. Let all
the different shades of that colour, except that single one, be placed before
him, descending gradually from the deepest to the lightest; it is plain, that he
will perceive a blank, where that shade is wanting, and will be sensible, that
there is a greater distance in that place between the contiguous colours than in
any other. Now I ask, whether it be possible for him, from his own imagination,
to supply this deficiency, and raise up to himself the idea of that particular
shade, though it had never been conveyed to him by his senses? I believe there
are few but will be of opinion that he can: And this may serve as a proof, that
the simple ideas are not always, in every instance, derived from the
correspondent impressions; though this instance is so singular, that it is
scarcely worth our observing, and does not merit, that for it alone we should
alter our general maxim.
Here, therefore, is a proposition, which not only
seems, in itself, simple and intelligible; but, if a proper use were made of it,
might render every dispute equally intelligible, and banish all that jargon,
which has so long taken possession of metaphysical reasonings, and drawn
disgrace upon them. All ideas, especially abstract ones, are naturally faint and
obscure: The mind has but a slender hold of them: They are apt to be confounded
with other resembling ideas; and when we have often employed any
PAGE 22
term, though without a
distinct meaning, we are apt to imagine it has a determinate idea, annexed to
it. On the contrary, all impressions, that is, all sensations, either outward or
inward, are strong and vivid: The limits between them are more exactly
determined: Nor is it easy to fall into any error or mistake with regard to
them. When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion, that a philosophical term is
employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but
enquire,
from what impression is that supposed idea derived? And if it be
impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion. By bringing
ideas into so clear a light, we may reasonably hope to remove all dispute, which
may arise, concerning their nature and reality
A.
PAGE 23
SECTION III. Of the ASSOCIATION of IDEAS.
IT is evident, that there is a principle of connexion
between the different thoughts or ideas of the mind, and that, in their
appearance to the memory or imagination, they introduce each other with a
certain degree of method and regularity. In our more serious thinking or
discourse, this is so observable, that any particular thought, which breaks in
upon the regular tract or chain of ideas, is immediately remarked and rejected.
And even in our wildest and most wandering reveries, nay in our very dreams, we
shall find, if we reflect, that the imagination ran not altogether at
adventures, but that there was still a connexion upheld among the different
ideas, which succeeded each other. Were the loosest and freest conversation to
be transcribed, there would immediately be observed something, which connected
it in all its transitions. Or where this is wanting, the person, who broke the
thread of discourse, might still inform you, that there had secretly revolved in
his mind a succession of thought, which had gradually led him from the subject
of conversation. Among different languages, even where we cannot suspect the
least connexion or communication, it is found, that the words, expressive of
ideas, the most compounded, do yet nearly correspond to each other: A certain
proof, that the simple ideas, comprehended in the compound ones, were bound
together by some universal principle, which had an equal influence on all
mankind.
PAGE 24
Though it be too obvious to escape observation, that
different ideas are connected together; I do not find, that any philosopher has
attempted to enumerate or class all the principles of association; a subject,
however, that seems worthy of curiosity. To me, there appear to be only three
principles of connexion among ideas, namely, Resemblance,
Contiguity in time or place, and Cause or Effect.
That these principles serve to connect ideas will not,
I believe, be much doubted. A picture naturally leads our thoughts to the
original *: The mention of one apartment in a building naturally
introduces an enquiry or discourse concerning the others †: And if we think of a wound, we can scarcely forbear
reflecting on the pain which follows it ‡. But that this enumeration is compleat, and that there are no
other principles of association, except these, may be difficult to prove to the
satisfaction of the reader, or even to a man's own satisfaction. All we can do,
in such cases, is to run over several instances, and examine carefully the
principle, which binds the different thoughts to each other, never stopping till
we render the principle as general as possible §. The more instances we examine, and the more care we employ,
the more assurance shall we acquire, that the enumeration, which we form from
the whole, is compleat and entire.
PAGE 25
SECTION IV. SCEPTICAL DOUBTS
concerning the OPERATIONS of the UNDERSTANDING.
PART I.
ALL the objects of human reason or enquiry may
naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and
Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra,
and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation, which is either intuitively or
demonstratively certain. That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the
square of the two sides, is a proposition, which expresses a relation
between these figures. That three times five is equal to the half of
thirty, expresses a relation between these numbers. Propositions of this
kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on
what is any where existent in the universe. Though there never were a circle or
triangle in nature, the truths, demonstrated by EUCLID, would for ever retain their certainty and evidence.
Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human
reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their
truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every
matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction,
and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever
so conformable to reality. That the
PAGE 26
sun will not rise
to-morrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more
contradiction, than the affirmation,
that it will rise. We should in
vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively
false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived
by the mind.
It may, therefore, be a subject worthy of curiosity,
to enquire what is the nature of that evidence, which assures us of any real
existence and matter of fact, beyond the present testimony of our senses, or the
records of our memory. This part of philosophy, it is observable, has been
little cultivated, either by the ancients or moderns; and therefore our doubts
and errors, in the prosecution of so important an enquiry, may be the more
excusable; while we march through such difficult paths, without any guide or
direction. They may even prove useful, by exciting curiosity, and destroying
that implicit faith and security, which is the bane of all reasoning and free
enquiry. The discovery of defects in the common philosophy, if any such there
be, will not, I presume, be a discouragement, but rather an incitement, as is
usual, to attempt something more full and satisfactory, than has yet been
proposed to the public.
All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be
founded on the relation of Cause and Effect. By means of that relation
alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses. If you were to ask
a man, why he believes any matter of fact, which is absent; for instance, that
his friend is in the country, or in FRANCE; he would give you a reason; and this reason would be some
other fact; as a letter received from him, or the knowledge of his former
resolutions and promises. A man, finding a watch or any other machine in a
desart island, would conclude, that there had once been men in that island. All
our reasonings concerning fact are of the same nature. And
PAGE 27
here it is constantly
supposed, that there is a connexion between the present fact and that which is
inferred from it. Were there nothing to bind them together, the inference would
be entirely precarious. The hearing of an articulate voice and rational
discourse in the dark assures us of the presence of some person: Why? because
these are the effects of the human make and fabric, and closely connected with
it. If we anatomize all the other reasonings of this nature, we shall find, that
they are founded on the relation of cause and effect, and that this relation is
either near or remote, direct or collateral. Heat and light are collateral
effects of fire, and the one effect may justly be inferred from the other.
If we would satisfy ourselves, therefore, concerning
the nature of that evidence, which assures us of matters of fact, we must
enquire how we arrive at the knowledge of cause and effect.
I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition,
which admits of no exception, that the knowledge of this relation is not, in any
instance, attained by reasonings à priori; but arises entirely from
experience, when we find, that any particular objects are constantly conjoined
with each other. Let an object be presented to a man of ever so strong natural
reason and abilities; if that object be entirely new to him, he will not be
able, by the most accurate examination of its sensible qualities, to discover
any of its causes or effects. ADAM,
though his rational faculties be supposed, at the very first, entirely perfect,
could not have inferred from the fluidity, and transparency of water, that it
would suffocate him, or from the light and warmth of fire, that it would consume
him. No object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the senses,
either the causes which produced it, or the effects which will arise from it;
nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference concerning
real existence and matter of fact.
PAGE 28
This proposition, that causes and effects are
discoverable, not by reason, but by experience, will readily be admitted
with regard to such objects, as we remember to have once been altogether unknown
to us; since we must be conscious of the utter inability, which we then lay
under, of foretelling, what would arise from them. Present two smooth pieces of
marble to a man, who has no tincture of natural philosophy; he will never
discover, that they will adhere together, in such a manner as to require great
force to separate them in a direct line, while they make so small a resistance
to a lateral pressure. Such events, as bear little analogy to the common course
of nature, are also readily confessed to be known only by experience; nor does
any man imagine that the explosion of gunpowder, or the attraction of a
loadstone, could ever be discovered by arguments à priori. In like
manner, when an effect is supposed to depend upon an intricate machinery or
secret structure of parts, we make no difficulty in attributing all our
knowledge of it to experience. Who will assert, that he can give the ultimate
reason, why milk or bread is proper nourishment for a man, not for a lion or a
tyger?
But the same truth may not appear, at first sight, to
have the same evidence with regard to events, which have become familiar to us
from our first appearance in the world, which bear a close analogy to the whole
course of nature, and which are supposed to depend on the simple qualities of
objects, without any secret structure of parts. We are apt to imagine, that we
could discover these effects by the mere operation of our reason, without
experience. We fancy, that were we brought, on a sudden, into this world, we
could at first have inferred, that one Billiard-ball would communicate motion to
another upon impulse; and that we needed not to have waited for the event, in
order to pronounce with certainty concerning it. Such is the influence of
custom, that, where it is strongest, it not only covers our natural ignorance,
but
PAGE 29
even conceals itself, and
seems not to take place, merely because it is found in the highest degree.
But to convince us, that all the laws of nature, and
all the operations of bodies without exception, are known only by experience,
the following reflections may, perhaps, suffice. Were any object presented to
us, and were we required to pronounce concerning the effect, which will result
from it, without consulting past observation; after what manner, I beseech you,
must the mind proceed in this operation? It must invent or imagine some event,
which it ascribes to the object as its effect; and it is plain that this
invention must be entirely arbitrary. The mind can never possibly find the
effect in the supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination. For
the effect is totally different from the cause, and consequently can never be
discovered in it. Motion in the second Billiard-ball is a quite distinct event
from motion in the first; nor is there any thing in the one to suggest the
smallest hint of the other. A stone or piece of metal raised into the air, and
left without any support, immediately falls: But to consider the matter à
priori, is there any thing we discover in this situation, which can beget
the idea of a downward, rather than an upward, or any other motion, in the stone
or metal?
And as the first imagination or invention of a
particular effect, in all natural operations, is arbitrary, where we consult not
experience; so must we also esteem the supposed tye or connexion between the
cause and effect, which binds them together, and renders it impossible, that any
other effect could result from the operation of that cause. When I see, for
instance, a Billiard-ball moving in a straight line towards another; even
suppose motion in the second ball should by accident be suggested to me, as the
result of their contact or impulse; may I not conceive, that a hundred different
events might as well follow from that cause? May not both these balls remain at
absolute rest? May not the
PAGE 30
first ball return in a
straight line, or leap off from the second in any line or direction? All these
suppositions are consistent and conceivable. Why then should we give the
preference to one, which is no more consistent or conceivable than the rest? All
our reasonings
à priori will never be able to shew us any foundation for
this preference.
In a word, then, every effect is a distinct event from
its cause. It could not, therefore, be discovered in the cause, and the first
invention or conception of it, à priori, must be entirely arbitrary. And
even after it is suggested, the conjunction of it with the cause must appear
equally arbitrary; since there are always many other effects, which, to reason,
must seem fully as consistent and natural. In vain, therefore, should we pretend
to determine any single event, or infer any cause or effect, without the
assistance of observation and experience.
Hence we may discover the reason, why no philosopher,
who is rational and modest, has ever pretended to assign the ultimate cause of
any natural operation, or to show distinctly the action of that power, which
produces any single effect in the universe. It is confessed, that the utmost
effort of human reason is, to reduce the principles, productive of natural
phaenomena, to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the many particular effects
into a few general causes, by means of reasonings from analogy, experience, and
observation. But as to the causes of these general causes, we should in vain
attempt their discovery; nor shall we ever be able to satisfy ourselves, by any
particular explication of them. These ultimate springs and principles are
totally shut up from human curiosity and enquiry. Elasticity, gravity, cohesion
of parts, communication of motion by impulse; these are probably the ultimate
causes and principles which we shall ever discover in nature; and we may esteem
ourselves sufficiently happy, if, by accurate enquiry and reasoning, we can
trace up the particular phaenomena
PAGE 31
to, or near to, these
general principles. The most perfect philosophy of the natural kind only staves
off our ignorance a little longer: As perhaps the most perfect philosophy of the
moral or metaphysical kind serves only to discover larger portions of it. Thus
the observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy,
and meets us, at every turn, in spite of our endeavours to elude or avoid it.
Nor is geometry, when taken into the assistance of
natural philosophy, ever able to remedy this defect, or lead us into the
knowledge of ultimate causes, by all that accuracy of reasoning, for which it is
so justly celebrated. Every part of mixed mathematics proceeds upon the
supposition, that certain laws are established by nature in her operations; and
abstract reasonings are employed, either to assist experience in the discovery
of these laws, or to determine their influence in particular instances, where it
depends upon any precise degree of distance and quantity. Thus, it is a law of
motion, discovered by experience, that the moment or force of any body in motion
is in the compound ratio or proportion of its solid contents and its velocity;
and consequently, that a small force may remove the greatest obstacle or raise
the greatest weight, if, by any contrivance or machinery, we can encrease the
velocity of that force, so as to make it an overmatch for its antagonist.
Geometry assists us in the application of this law, by giving us the just
dimensions of all the parts and figures, which can enter into any species of
machine; but still the discovery of the law itself is owing merely to
experience, and all the abstract reasonings in the world could never lead us one
step towards the knowledge of it. When we reason à priori, and consider
merely any object or cause, as it appears to the mind, independent of all
observation, it never could suggest to us the notion of any distinct object,
such as its effect; much less, shew us the inseparable and inviolable connexion
between them. A man must be very sagacious, who could discover by
PAGE 32
reasoning, that crystal is
the effect of heat, and ice of cold, without being previously acquainted with
the operation of these qualities.
PART II.
But we have not, yet, attained any tolerable
satisfaction with regard to the question first proposed. Each solution still
gives rise to a new question as difficult as the foregoing, and leads us on to
farther enquiries. When it is asked, What is the nature of all our reasonings
concerning matter of fact? the proper answer seems to be, that they are
founded on the relation of cause and effect. When again it is asked, What is
the foundation of all our reasonings and conclusions concerning that
relation? it may be replied in one word, EXPERIENCE. But if we still carry on our sifting humour, and ask,
What is the foundation of all conclusions from experience? this implies a
new question, which may be of more difficult solution and explication.
Philosophers, that give themselves airs of superior wisdom and sufficiency, have
a hard task, when they encounter persons of inquisitive dispositions, who push
them from every corner, to which they retreat, and who are sure at last to bring
them to some dangerous dilemma. The best expedient to prevent this confusion, is
to be modest in our pretensions; and even to discover the difficulty ourselves
before it is objected to us. By this means, we may make a kind of merit of our
very ignorance.
I shall content myself, in this section, with an easy
task, and shall pretend only to give a negative answer to the question here
proposed. I say then, that, even after we have experience of the operations of
cause and effect, our conclusions from that experience are not founded on
reasoning, or any process of the understanding. This answer we must endeavour,
both to explain and to defend.
It must certainly be allowed, that nature has kept us
at a great distance from all her secrets, and has afforded
PAGE 33
us only the knowledge of a
few superficial qualities of objects; while she conceals from us those powers
and principles, on which the influence of these objects entirely depends. Our
senses inform us of the colour, weight, and consistence of bread; but neither
sense nor reason can ever inform us of those qualities, which fit it for the
nourishment and support of a human body. Sight or feeling conveys an idea of the
actual motion of bodies; but as to that wonderful force or power, which would
carry on a moving body for ever in a continued change of place, and which bodies
never lose but by communicating it to others; of this we cannot form the most
distant conception. But notwithstanding this ignorance of natural powers
*and principles, we always presume, when we see like sensible
qualities, that they have like secret powers, and expect, that effects, similar
to those which we have experienced, will follow from them. If a body of like
colour and consistence with that bread, which we have formerly eat, be presented
to us, we make no scruple of repeating the experiment, and foresee, with
certainty, like nourishment and support. Now this is a process of the mind or
thought, of which I would willingly know the foundation. It is allowed on all
hands, that there is no known connexion between the sensible qualities and the
secret powers; and consequently, that the mind is not led to form such a
conclusion concerning their constant and regular conjunction, by any thing which
it knows of their nature. As to past
Experience, it can be allowed to
give
direct and
certain information of those precise objects only,
and that precise period of time, which fell under its cognizance: But why this
experience should be extended to future times, and to other objects, which for
aught we know, may be only in
PAGE 34
appearance similar; this is
the main question on which I would insist. The bread, which I formerly eat,
nourished me; that is, a body of such sensible qualities, was, at that time,
endued with such secret powers: But does it follow, that other bread must also
nourish me at another time, and that like sensible qualities must always be
attended with like secret powers? The consequence seems nowise necessary. At
least, it must be acknowledged, that there is here a consequence drawn by the
mind; that there is a certain step taken; a process of thought, and an
inference, which wants to be explained. These two propositions are far from
being the same,
I have found that such an object has always been attended
with such an effect, and
I foresee, that other objects, which are, in
appearance, similar, will be attended with similar effects. I shall allow,
if you please, that the one proposition may justly be inferred from the other: I
know in fact, that it always is inferred. But if you insist, that the inference
is made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to produce that reasoning. The
connexion between these propositions is not intuitive. There is required a
medium, which may enable the mind to draw such an inference, if indeed it be
drawn by reasoning and argument. What that medium is, I must confess, passes my
comprehension; and it is incumbent on those to produce it, who assert, that it
really exists, and is the origin of all our conclusions concerning matter of
fact.
This negative argument must certainly, in process of
time, become altogether convincing, if many penetrating and able philosophers
shall turn their enquiries this way; and no one be ever able to discover any
connecting proposition or intermediate step, which supports the understanding in
this conclusion. But as the question is yet new, every reader may not trust so
far to his own penetration, as to conclude, because an argument escapes his
enquiry, that therefore it does not really exist. For this
PAGE 35
reason it may be requisite
to venture upon a more difficult task; and enumerating all the branches of human
knowledge, endeavour to shew, that none of them can afford such an argument.
All reasonings may be divided into two kinds, namely
demonstrative reasoning, or that concerning relations of ideas, and moral
reasoning, or that concerning matter of fact and existence. That there are no
demonstrative arguments in the case, seems evident; since it implies no
contradiction, that the course of nature may change, and that an object,
seemingly like those which we have experienced, may be attended with different
or contrary effects. May I not clearly and distinctly conceive, that a body,
falling from the clouds, and which, in all other respects, resembles snow, has
yet the taste of salt or feeling of fire? Is there any more intelligible
proposition than to affirm, that all the trees will flourish in DECEMBER and JANUARY, and decay in MAY and JUNE? Now
whatever is intelligible, and can be distinctly conceived, implies no
contradiction, and can never be proved false by any demonstrative argument or
abstract reasoning à priori.
If we be, therefore, engaged by arguments to put trust
in past experience, and make it the standard of our future judgment, these
arguments must be probable only, or such as regard matter of fact and real
existence, according to the division above mentioned. But that there is no
argument of this kind, must appear, if our explication of that species of
reasoning be admitted as solid and satisfactory. We have said, that all
arguments concerning existence are founded on the relation of cause and effect;
that our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience; and
that all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition, that the
future will be conformable to the past. To endeavour, therefore, the proof of
this last supposition by probable arguments, or arguments regarding
PAGE 36
existence, must be evidently
going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very point in
question.
In reality, all arguments from experience are founded
on the similarity, which we discover among natural objects, and by which we are
induced to expect effects similar to those, which we have found to follow from
such objects. And though none but a fool or madman will ever pretend to dispute
the authority of experience, or to reject that great guide of human life; it may
surely be allowed a philosopher to have so much curiosity at least, as to
examine the principle of human nature, which gives this mighty authority to
experience, and makes us draw advantage from that similarity, which nature has
placed among different objects. From causes, which appear similar, we
expect similar effects. This is the sum of all our experimental conclusions. Now
it seems evident, that, if this conclusion were formed by reason, it would be as
perfect at first, and upon one instance, as after ever so long a course of
experience. But the case is far otherwise. Nothing so like as eggs; yet no one,
on account of this appearing similarity, expects the same taste and relish in
all of them. It is only after a long course of uniform experiments in any kind,
that we attain a firm reliance and security with regard to a particular event.
Now where is that process of reasoning, which, from one instance, draws a
conclusion, so different from that which it infers from a hundred instances,
that are nowise different from that single one? This question I propose as much
for the sake of information, as with an intention of raising difficulties. I
cannot find, I cannot imagine any such reasoning. But I keep my mind still open
to instruction, if any one will vouchsafe to bestow it on me.
Should it be said, that, from a number of uniform
experiments, we infer a connexion between the sensible qualities and the
secret powers; this, I must confess, seems the
PAGE 37
same difficulty, couched in
different terms. The question still recurs, on what process of argument this
inference is founded? Where is the medium, the interposing ideas, which
join propositions so very wide of each other? It is confessed, that the colour,
consistence, and other sensible qualities of bread appear not, of themselves, to
have any connexion with the secret powers of nourishment and support. For
otherwise we could infer these secret powers from the first appearance of these
sensible qualities, without the aid of experience; contrary to the sentiment of
all philosophers, and contrary to plain matter of fact. Here then is our natural
state of ignorance with regard to the powers and influence of all objects. How
is this remedied by experience? It only shews us a number of uniform effects,
resulting from certain objects, and teaches us, that those particular objects,
at that particular time, were endowed with such powers and forces. When a new
object, endowed with similar sensible qualities, is produced, we expect similar
powers and forces, and look for a like effect. From a body of like colour and
consistence with bread, we expect like nourishment and support. But this surely
is a step or progress of the mind, which wants to be explained. When a man says,
I have found, in all past instances, such sensible qualities conjoined with
such secret powers: And when he says,
similar sensible qualities will
always be conjoined with similar secret powers; he is not guilty of a
tautology, nor are these propositions in any respect the same. You say that the
one proposition is an inference from the other. But you must confess that the
inference is not intuitive; neither is it demonstrative: Of what nature is it
then? To say it is experimental, is begging the question. For all inferences
from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the
past, and that similar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities.
If there be any suspicion, that the course of nature may
PAGE 38
change, and that the past
may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, and can give rise
to no inference or conclusion. It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments
from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future; since all
these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance. Let the
course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular; that alone, without some
new argument or inference, proves not, that, for the future, it will continue
so. In vain do you pretend to have learned the nature of bodies from your past
experience. Their secret nature, and consequently, all their effects and
influence, may change, without any change in their sensible qualities. This
happens sometimes, and with regard to some objects: Why may it not happen
always, and with regard to all objects? What logic, what process of argument
secures you against this supposition? My practice, you say, refutes my doubts.
But you mistake the purport of my question. As an agent, I am quite satisfied in
the point; but as a philosopher, who has some share of curiosity, I will not say
scepticism, I want to learn the foundation of this inference. No reading, no
enquiry has yet been able to remove my difficulty, or give me satisfaction in a
matter of such importance. Can I do better than propose the difficulty to the
public, even though, perhaps, I have small hopes of obtaining a solution? We
shall at least, by this means, be sensible of our ignorance, if we do not
augment our knowledge.
I must confess, that a man is guilty of unpardonable
arrogance, who concludes, because an argument has escaped his own investigation,
that therefore it does not really exist. I must also confess, that, though all
the learned, for several ages, should have employed themselves in fruitless
search upon any subject, it may still, perhaps, be rash to conclude positively,
that the subject must, therefore, pass all human comprehension. Even though we
examine
PAGE 39
all the sources of our
knowledge, and conclude them unfit for such a subject, there may still remain a
suspicion, that the enumeration is not compleat, or the examination not
accurate. But with regard to the present subject, there are some considerations,
which seem to remove all this accusation of arrogance or suspicion of mistake.
It is certain, that the most ignorant and stupid
peasants, nay infants, nay even brute beasts, improve by experience, and learn
the qualities of natural objects, by observing the effects, which result from
them. When a child has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a
candle, he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle; but will expect
a similar effect from a cause, which is similar in its sensible qualities and
appearance. If you assert, therefore, that the understanding of the child is led
into this conclusion by any process of argument or ratiocination, I may justly
require you to produce that argument; nor have you any pretence to refuse so
equitable a demand. You cannot say, that the argument is abstruse, and may
possibly escape your enquiry; since you confess, that it is obvious to the
capacity of a mere infant. If you hesitate, therefore, a moment, or if, after
reflection, you produce any intricate or profound argument, you, in a manner,
give up the question, and confess, that it is not reasoning which engages us to
suppose the past resembling the future, and to expect similar effects from
causes, which are, to appearance, similar. This is the proposition which I
intended to enforce in the present section. If I be right, I pretend not to have
made any mighty discovery. And if I be wrong, I must acknowledge myself to be
indeed a very backward scholar; since I cannot now discover an argument, which,
it seems, was perfectly familiar to me, long before I was out of my cradle.
PAGE 40
SECTION V. SCEPTICAL SOLUTION of
these DOUBTS.
PART I.
THE passion for philosophy, like that for religion,
seems liable to this inconvenience, that, though it aims at the correction of
our manners, and extirpation of our vices, it may only serve, by imprudent
management, to foster a predominant inclination, and push the mind, with more
determined resolution, towards that side, which already draws too much,
by the biass and propensity of the natural temper. It is certain, that, while we
aspire to the magnanimous firmness of the philosophic sage, and endeavour to
confine our pleasures altogether within our own minds, we may, at last, render
our philosophy like that of EPICTETUS,
and other Stoics, only a more refined system of selfishness, and reason
ourselves out of all virtue, as well as social enjoyment. While we study with
attention the vanity of human life, and turn all our thoughts towards the empty
and transitory nature of riches and honours, we are, perhaps, all the while,
flattering our natural indolence, which, hating the bustle of the world, and
drudgery of business, seeks a pretence of reason, to give itself a full and
uncontrouled indulgence. There is, however, one species of philosophy, which
seems little liable to this inconvenience, and that because it strikes in with
no disorderly passion of the human mind, nor can mingle itself with any natural
affection or propensity; and that is
PAGE 41
the
ACADEMIC or
SCEPTICAL philosophy. The academics always talk of doubt and
suspense of judgment, of danger in hasty determinations, of confining to very
narrow bounds the enquiries of the understanding, and of renouncing all
speculations which lie not within the limits of common life and practice.
Nothing, therefore, can be more contrary than such a philosophy to the supine
indolence of the mind, its rash arrogance, its lofty pretensions, and its
superstitious credulity. Every passion is mortified by it, except the love of
truth; and that passion never is, nor can be carried to too high a degree. It is
surprising, therefore, that this philosophy, which, in almost every instance,
must be harmless and innocent, should be the subject of so much groundless
reproach and obloquy. But, perhaps, the very circumstance, which renders it so
innocent, is what chiefly exposes it to the public hatred and resentment. By
flattering no irregular passion, it gains few partizans: By opposing so many
vices and follies, it raises to itself abundance of enemies, who stigmatize it
as libertine, profane, and irreligious.
Nor need we fear, that this philosophy, while it
endeavours to limit our enquiries to common life, should ever undermine the
reasonings of common life, and carry its doubts so far as to destroy all action,
as well as speculation. Nature will always maintain her rights, and prevail in
the end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever. Though we should conclude, for
instance, as in the foregoing section, that, in all reasonings from experience,
there is a step taken by the mind, which is not supported by any argument or
process of the understanding; there is no danger, that these reasonings, on
which almost all knowledge depends, will ever be affected by such a discovery.
If the mind be not engaged by argument to make this step, it must be induced by
some other principle of equal weight and authority; and that principle will
preserve its influence as long as human
PAGE 42
nature remains the same.
What that principle is, may well be worth the pains of enquiry.
Suppose a person, though endowed with the strongest
faculties of reason and reflection, to be brought on a sudden into this world;
he would, indeed, immediately observe a continual succession of objects, and one
event following another; but he would not be able to discover any thing farther.
He would not, at first, by any reasoning, be able to reach the idea of cause and
effect; since the particular powers, by which all natural operations are
performed, never appear to the senses; nor is it reasonable to conclude, merely
because one event, in one instance, precedes another, that therefore the one is
the cause, the other the effect. Their conjunction may be arbitrary and casual.
There may be no reason to infer the existence of one from the appearance of the
other. And in a word, such a person, without more experience, could never employ
his conjecture or reasoning concerning any matter of fact, or be assured of any
thing beyond what was immediately present to his memory and senses.
Suppose again, that he has acquired more experience,
and has lived so long in the world as to have observed similar objects or events
to be constantly conjoined together; what is the consequence of this experience?
He immediately infers the existence of one object from the appearance of the
other. Yet he has not, by all his experience, acquired any idea or knowledge of
the secret power, by which the one object produces the other; nor is it, by any
process of reasoning, he is engaged to draw this inference. But still he finds
himself determined to draw it: And though he should be convinced, that his
understanding has no part in the operation, he would nevertheless continue in
the same course of thinking. There is some other principle, which determines him
to form such a conclusion.
PAGE 43
This principle is
CUSTOM or
HABIT. For wherever the repetition of any particular act or
operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, without
being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding; we always say,
that this propensity is the effect of
Custom. By employing that word, we
pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity. We only
point out a principle of human nature, which is universally acknowledged, and
which is well known by its effects. Perhaps, we can push our enquiries no
farther, or pretend to give the cause of this cause; but must rest contented
with it as the ultimate principle, which we can assign, of all our conclusions
from experience. It is sufficient satisfaction, that we can go so far; without
repining at the narrowness of our faculties, because they will carry us no
farther. And it is certain we here advance a very intelligible proposition at
least, if not a true one, when we assert, that, after the constant conjunction
of two objects, heat and flame, for instance, weight and solidity, we are
determined by custom alone to expect the one from the appearance of the other.
This hypothesis seems even the only one, which explains the difficulty, why we
draw, from a thousand instances, an inference, which we are not able to draw
from one instance, that is, in no respect, different from them. Reason is
incapable of any such variation. The conclusions, which it draws from
considering one circle, are the same which it would form upon surveying all the
circles in the universe. But no man, having seen only one body move after being
impelled by another, could infer, that every other body will move after a like
impulse. All inferences from experience, therefore, are effects of custom, not
of reasoning
B.
PAGE 44
Custom, then, is the great
guide of human life. It is that principle alone, which renders our experience
useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events
with those which have appeared in the past.
PAGE 45
Without the influence of
custom, we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact, beyond what is
immediately present to the memory and senses. We should never know how to adjust
means to ends, or to employ our natural powers in the production of any effect.
There would be an end at once of all action, as well as of the chief part of
speculation.
But here it may be proper to remark, that though our
conclusions from experience carry us beyond our memory and senses, and assure us
of matters of fact, which happened in the most distant places and most remote
ages; yet some fact must always be present to the senses or memory, from which
we may first proceed in drawing these conclusions. A man, who should find in a
desert country the remains of pompous buildings, would conclude, that the
country had, in ancient times, been cultivated by civilized inhabitants; but did
nothing of this nature occur
PAGE 46
to him, he could never form
such an inference. We learn the events of former ages from history; but then we
must peruse the volumes, in which this instruction is contained, and thence
carry up our inferences from one testimony to another, till we arrive at the
eye-witnesses and spectators of these distant events. In a word, if we proceed
not upon some fact, present to the memory or senses, our reasonings would be
merely hypothetical; and however the particular links might be connected with
each other, the whole chain of inferences would have nothing to support it, nor
could we ever, by its means, arrive at the knowledge of any real existence. If I
ask, why you believe any particular matter of fact, which you relate, you must
tell me some reason; and this reason will be some other fact, connected with it.
But as you cannot proceed after this manner,
in infinitum, you must at
last terminate in some fact, which is present to your memory or senses; or must
allow that your belief is entirely without foundation.
What then is the conclusion of the whole matter? A
simple one; though, it must be confessed, pretty remote from the common theories
of philosophy. All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely
from some object, present to the memory or senses, and a customary conjunction
between that and some other object. Or in other words; having found, in many
instances, that any two kinds of objects, flame and heat, snow and cold, have
always been conjoined together; if flame or snow be presented anew to the
senses, the mind is carried by custom to expect heat or cold, and to
believe, that such a quality does exist, and will discover itself upon a
nearer approach. This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in such
circumstances. It is an operation of the soul, when we are so situated, as
unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we receive benefits; or hatred,
when we meet with injuries. All these operations are a species of natural
PAGE 47
instincts, which no
reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able, either to
produce, or to prevent.
At this point, it would be very allowable for us to
stop our philosophical researches. In most questions, we can never make a single
step farther; and in all questions, we must terminate here at last, after our
most restless and curious enquiries. But still our curiosity will be pardonable,
perhaps commendable, if it carry us on to still farther researches, and make us
examine more accurately the nature of this belief, and of the
customary conjunction, whence it is derived. By this means we may meet
with some explications and analogies, that will give satisfaction; at least to
such as love the abstract sciences, and can be entertained with speculations,
which, however accurate, may still retain a degree of doubt and uncertainty. As
to readers of a different taste; the remaining part of this section is not
calculated for them, and the following enquiries may well be understood, though
it be neglected.
PART II.
Nothing is more free than the imagination of man; and
though it cannot exceed that original stock of ideas, furnished by the internal
and external senses, it has unlimited power of mixing, compounding, separating,
and dividing these ideas, in all the varieties of fiction and vision. It can
feign a train of events, with all the appearance of reality, ascribe to them a
particular time and place, conceive them as existent, and paint them out to
itself with every circumstance, that belongs to any historical fact, which it
believes with the greatest certainty. Wherein, therefore, consists the
difference between such a fiction and belief? It lies not merely in any peculiar
idea, which is annexed to such a conception as commands our assent, and which is
wanting to every known fiction. For as the mind has
PAGE 48
authority over all its
ideas, it could voluntarily annex this particular idea to any fiction, and
consequently be able to believe whatever it pleases; contrary to what we find by
daily experience. We can, in our conception, join the head of a man to the body
of a horse; but it is not in our power to believe, that such an animal has ever
really existed.
It follows, therefore, that the difference between
fiction and belief lies in some sentiment or feeling, which is
annexed to the latter, not to the former, and which depends not on the will, nor
can be commanded at pleasure. It must be excited by nature, like all other
sentiments; and must arise from the particular situation, in which the mind is
placed at any particular juncture. Whenever any object is presented to the
memory or senses, it immediately, by the force of custom, carries the
imagination to conceive that object, which is usually conjoined to it; and this
conception is attended with a feeling or sentiment, different from the loose
reveries of the fancy. In this consists the whole nature of belief. For as there
is no matter of fact which we believe so firmly, that we cannot conceive the
contrary, there would be no difference between the conception assented to, and
that which is rejected, were it not for some sentiment, which distinguishes the
one from the other. If I see a billiard-ball moving towards another, on a smooth
table, I can easily conceive it to stop upon contact. This conception implies no
contradiction; but still it feels very differently from that conception, by
which I represent to myself the impulse, and the communication of motion from
one ball to another.
Were we to attempt a definition of this
sentiment, we should, perhaps, find it a very difficult, if not an impossible
task; in the same manner as if we should endeavour to define the feeling of cold
or passion of anger, to a creature who never had any experience of these
sentiments. BELIEF
PAGE 49
is the true and proper name
of this feeling; and no one is ever at a loss to know the meaning of that term;
because every man is every moment conscious of the sentiment represented by it.
It may not, however, be improper to attempt a
description of this
sentiment; in hopes we may, by that means, arrive at some analogies, which may
afford a more perfect explication of it. I say then, that belief is nothing but
a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of an object, than what
the imagination alone is ever able to attain. This variety of terms, which may
seem so unphilosophical, is intended only to express that act of the mind, which
renders realities, or what is taken for such, more present to us than fictions,
causes them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a superior influence on
the passions and imagination. Provided we agree about the thing, it is needless
to dispute about the terms. The imagination has the command over all its ideas,
and can join and mix and vary them, in all the ways possible. It may conceive
fictitious objects with all the circumstances of place and time. It may set
them, in a manner, before our eyes, in their true colours, just as they might
have existed. But as it is impossible, that this faculty of imagination can
ever, of itself, reach belief, it is evident, that belief consists not in the
peculiar nature or order of ideas, but in the
manner of their conception,
and in their
feeling to the mind. I confess, that it is impossible
perfectly to explain this feeling or manner of conception. We may make use of
words, which express something near it. But its true and proper name, as we
observed before, is
belief; which is a term, that every one sufficiently
understands in common life. And in philosophy, we can go no farther than assert,
that
belief is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas
of the judgment from the fictions of the imagination. It gives them more weight
and influence; makes them appear
PAGE 50
of greater importance;
inforces them in the mind; and renders them the governing principle of our
actions. I hear at present, for instance, a person's voice, with whom I am
acquainted; and the sound comes as from the next room. This impression of my
senses immediately conveys my thought to the person, together with all the
surrounding objects. I paint them out to myself as existing at present, with the
same qualities and relations, of which I formerly knew them possessed. These
ideas take faster hold of my mind, than ideas of an enchanted castle. They are
very different to the feeling, and have a much greater influence of every kind,
either to give pleasure or pain, joy or sorrow.
Let us, then, take in the whole compass of this
doctrine, and allow, that the sentiment of belief is nothing but a conception
more intense and steady than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination,
and that this manner of conception arises from a customary conjunction of
the object with something present to the memory or senses: I believe that it
will not be difficult, upon these suppositions, to find other operations of the
mind analogous to it, and to trace up these phaenomena to principles still more
general.
We have already observed, that nature has established
connexions among particular ideas, and that no sooner one idea occurs to our
thoughts than it introduces its correlative, and carries our attention towards
it, by a gentle and insensible movement. These principles of connexion or
association we have reduced to three, namely, Resemblance,
Contiguity, and Causation; which are the only bonds, that unite
our thoughts together, and beget that regular train of reflection or discourse,
which, in a greater or less degree, takes place among all mankind. Now here
arises a question, on which the solution of the present difficulty will depend.
Does it happen, in all these relations, that, when one of the objects is
presented to the
PAGE 51
senses or memory, the mind
is not only carried to the conception of the correlative, but reaches a steadier
and stronger conception of it than what otherwise it would have been able to
attain? This seems to be the case with that belief, which arises from the
relation of cause and effect. And if the case be the same with the other
relations or principles of association, this may be established as a general
law, which takes place in all the operations of the mind.
We may, therefore, observe, as the first experiment to
our present purpose, that, upon the appearance of the picture of an absent
friend, our idea of him is evidently enlivened by the resemblance, and
that every passion, which that idea occasions, whether of joy or sorrow,
acquires new force and vigour. In producing this effect, there concur both a
relation and a present impression. Where the picture bears him no resemblance,
at least was not intended for him, it never so much as conveys our thought to
him: And where it is absent, as well as the person; though the mind may pass
from the thought of the one to that of the other; it feels its idea to be rather
weakened than enlivened by that transition. We take a pleasure in viewing the
picture of a friend, when it is set before us; but when it is removed, rather
chuse to consider him directly, than by reflection in an image, which is equally
distant and obscure.
The ceremonies of the ROMAN CATHOLIC religion
may be considered as instances of the same nature. The devotees of that
superstition usually plead in excuse for the mummeries, with which they are
upbraided, that they feel the good effect of those external motions, and
postures, and actions, in enlivening their devotion and quickening their
fervour, which otherwise would decay, if directed entirely to distant and
immaterial objects. We shadow out the objects of our faith, say they, in
sensible
PAGE 52
types and images, and render
them more present to us by the immediate presence of these types, than it is
possible for us to do, merely by an intellectual view and contemplation.
Sensible objects have always a greater influence on the fancy than any other;
and this influence they readily convey to those ideas, to which they are
related, and which they resemble. I shall only infer from these practices, and
this reasoning, that the effect of resemblance in enlivening the ideas is very
common; and as in every case a resemblance and a present impression must concur,
we are abundantly supplied with experiments to prove the reality of the
foregoing principle.
We may add force to these experiments by others of a
different kind, in considering the effects of contiguity as well as of
resemblance. It is certain, that distance diminishes the force of every
idea, and that, upon our approach to any object; though it does not discover
itself to our senses; it operates upon the mind with an influence, which
imitates an immediate impression. The thinking on any object readily transports
the mind to what is contiguous; but it is only the actual presence of an object,
that transports it with a superior vivacity. When I am a few miles from home,
whatever relates to it touches me more nearly than when I am two hundred leagues
distant; though even at that distance the reflecting on any thing in the
neighbourhood of my friends or family naturally produces an idea of them. But as
in this latter case, both the objects of the mind are ideas; notwithstanding
there is an easy transition between them; that transition alone is not able to
give a superior vivacity to any of the ideas, for want of some immediate
impression *.
PAGE 53
No one can doubt but
causation has the same influence as the other two relations of resemblance and
contiguity. Superstitious people are fond of the reliques of saints and holy
men, for the same reason, that they seek after types or images, in order to
enliven their devotion, and give them a more intimate and strong conception of
those exemplary lives, which they desire to imitate. Now it is evident, that one
of the best reliques, which a devotee could procure, would be the handywork of a
saint; and if his cloaths and furniture are ever to be considered in this light,
it is because they were once at his disposal, and were moved and affected by
him; in which respect they are to be considered as imperfect effects, and as
connected with him by a shorter chain of consequences than any of those, by
which we learn the reality of his existence.
Suppose, that the son of a friend, who had been long
dead or absent, were presented to us; it is evident, that this object would
instantly revive its correlative idea, and recal to our thoughts all past
intimacies and familiarities, in more lively colours than they would otherwise
have appeared to us. This is another phaenomenon, which seems to prove the
principle above-mentioned.
We may observe, that, in these phaenomena, the belief
of the correlative object is always presupposed; without which the relation
could have no effect. The influence of the picture supposes, that we
believe our friend to have
PAGE 54
once existed. Contiguity to
home can never excite our ideas of home, unless we
believe that it really
exists. Now I assert, that this belief, where it reaches beyond the memory or
senses, is of a similar nature, and arises from similar causes, with the
transition of thought and vivacity of conception here explained. When I throw a
piece of dry wood into a fire, my mind is immediately carried to conceive, that
it augments, not extinguishes the flame. This transition of thought from the
cause to the effect proceeds not from reason. It derives its origin altogether
from custom and experience. And as it first begins from an object, present to
the senses, it renders the idea or conception of flame more strong and lively
than any loose, floating reverie of the imagination. That idea arises
immediately. The thought moves instantly towards it, and conveys to it all that
force of conception, which is derived from the impression present to the senses.
When a sword is levelled at my breast, does not the idea of wound and pain
strike me more strongly, than when a glass of wine is presented to me, even
though by accident this idea should occur after the appearance of the latter
object? But what is there in this whole matter to cause such a strong
conception, except only a present object and a customary transition to the idea
of another object, which we have been accustomed to conjoin with the former?
This is the whole operation of the mind, in all our conclusions concerning
matter of fact and existence; and it is a satisfaction to find some analogies,
by which it may be explained. The transition from a present object does in all
cases give strength and solidity to the related idea.
Here, then, is a kind of pre-established harmony
between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas; and though the
powers and forces, by which the former is governed, be wholly unknown to us; yet
our thoughts and conceptions have still, we find, gone on in the same train
PAGE 55
with the other works of
nature. Custom is that principle, by which this correspondence has been
effected; so necessary to the subsistence of our species, and the regulation of
our conduct, in every circumstance and occurrence of human life. Had not the
presence of an object instantly excited the idea of those objects, commonly
conjoined with it, all our knowledge must have been limited to the narrow sphere
of our memory and senses; and we should never have been able to adjust means to
ends, or employ our natural powers, either to the producing of good, or avoiding
of evil. Those, who delight in the discovery and contemplation of
final
causes, have here ample subject to employ their wonder and admiration.
I shall add, for a further confirmation of the
foregoing theory, that, as this operation of the mind, by which we infer like
effects from like causes, and vice versa, is so essential to the
subsistence of all human creatures, it is not probable, that it could be trusted
to the fallacious deductions of our reason, which is slow in its operations;
appears not, in any degree, during the first years of infancy; and at best is,
in every age and period of human life, extremely liable to error and mistake. It
is more conformable to the ordinary wisdom of nature to secure so necessary an
act of the mind, by some instinct or mechanical tendency, which may be
infallible in its operations, may discover itself at the first appearance of
life and thought, and may be independent of all the laboured deductions of the
understanding. As nature has taught us the use of our limbs, without giving us
the knowledge of the muscles and nerves, by which they are actuated; so has she
implanted in us an instinct, which carries forward the thought in a
correspondent course to that which she has established among external objects;
though we are ignorant of those powers and forces, on which this regular course
and succession of objects totally depends.
PAGE 56
SECTION VI. Of PROBABILITY *.
THOUGH there be no such thing as Chance in the
world; our ignorance of the real cause of any event has the same influence on
the understanding, and begets a like species of belief or opinion.
There is certainly a probability, which arises from a
superiority of chances on any side; and according as this superiority encreases,
and surpasses the opposite chances, the probability receives a proportionable
encrease, and begets still a higher degree of belief or assent to that side, in
which we discover the superiority. If a dye were marked with one figure or
number of spots on four sides, and with another figure or number of spots on the
two remaining sides, it would be more probable, that the former would turn up
than the latter; though, if it had a thousand sides marked in the same manner,
and only one side different, the probability would be much higher, and our
belief or expectation of the event more steady and secure. This process of the
thought or reasoning may seem trivial and obvious; but to those who
PAGE 57
consider it more narrowly,
it may, perhaps, afford matter for curious speculation.
It seems evident, that, when the mind looks forward
to discover the event, which may result from the throw of such a dye, it
considers the turning up of each particular side as alike probable; and this is
the very nature of chance, to render all the particular events, comprehended in
it, entirely equal. But finding a greater number of sides concur in the one
event than in the other, the mind is carried more frequently to that event, and
meets it oftener, in revolving the various possibilities or chances, on which
the ultimate result depends. This concurrence of several views in one particular
event begets immediately, by an inexplicable contrivance of nature, the
sentiment of belief, and gives that event the advantage over its antagonist,
which is supported by a smaller number of views, and recurs less frequently to
the mind. If we allow, that belief is nothing but a firmer and stronger
conception of an object than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination,
this operation may, perhaps, in some measure, be accounted for. The concurrence
of these several views or glimpses imprints the idea more strongly on the
imagination; gives it superior force and vigour; renders its influence on the
passions and affections more sensible; and in a word, begets that reliance or
security, which constitutes the nature of belief and opinion.
The case is the same with the probability of causes,
as with that of chance. There are some causes, which are entirely uniform and
constant in producing a particular effect; and no instance has ever yet been
found of any failure or irregularity in their operation. Fire has always burned,
and water suffocated every human creature: The production of motion by impulse
and gravity is an universal law, which has hitherto admitted of no exception.
But there are other causes, which have been found more irregular and uncertain;
nor has rhubarb always proved a purge, or
PAGE 58
opium a soporific to every
one, who has taken these medicines. It is true, when any cause fails of
producing its usual effect, philosophers ascribe not this to any irregularity in
nature; but suppose, that some secret causes, in the particular structure of
parts, have prevented the operation. Our reasonings, however, and conclusions
concerning the event are the same as if this principle had no place. Being
determined by custom to transfer the past to the future, in all our inferences;
where the past has been entirely regular and uniform, we expect the event with
the greatest assurance, and leave no room for any contrary supposition. But
where different effects have been found to follow from causes, which are to
appearance exactly similar, all these various effects must occur to the
mind in transferring the past to the future, and enter into our consideration,
when we determine the probability of the event. Though we give the preference to
that which has been found most usual, and believe that this effect will exist,
we must not overlook the other effects, but must assign to each of them a
particular weight and authority, in proportion as we have found it to be more or
less frequent. It is more probable, in almost every country of
EUROPE, that there will be frost sometime in
JANUARY, than that the weather will
continue open throughout that whole month; though this probability varies
according to the different climates, and approaches to a certainty in the more
northern kingdoms. Here then it seems evident, that, when we transfer the past
to the future, in order to determine the effect, which will result from any
cause, we transfer all the different events, in the same proportion as they have
appeared in the past, and conceive one to have existed a hundred times, for
instance, another ten times, and another once. As a great number of views do
here concur in one event, they fortify and confirm it to the imagination, beget
that sentiment which we call
belief, and give its object the preference
above the contrary event, which is not supported by an equal number of
PAGE 59
experiments, and recurs not
so frequently to the thought in transferring the past to the future. Let any one
try to account for this operation of the mind upon any of the received systems
of philosophy, and he will be sensible of the difficulty. For my part, I shall
think it sufficient, if the present hints excite the curiosity of philosophers,
and make them sensible how defective all common theories are in treating of such
curious and such sublime subjects.
PAGE 60
SECTION VII. Of the IDEA of NECESSARY CONNEXION.
PART I.
THE great advantage of the mathematical sciences
above the moral consists in this, that the ideas of the former, being sensible,
are always clear and determinate, the smallest distinction between them is
immediately perceptible, and the same terms are still expressive of the same
ideas, without ambiguity or variation. An oval is never mistaken for a circle,
nor an hyperbola for an ellipsis. The isosceles and scalenum are distinguished
by boundaries more exact than vice and virtue, right and wrong. If any term be
defined in geometry, the mind readily, of itself, substitutes, on all occasions,
the definition for the term defined: Or even when no definition is employed, the
object itself may be presented to the senses, and by that means be steadily and
clearly apprehended. But the finer sentiments of the mind, the operations of the
understanding, the various agitations of the passions, though really in
themselves distinct, easily escape us, when surveyed by reflection; nor is it in
our power to recal the original object, as often as we have occasion to
contemplate it. Ambiguity, by this means, is gradually introduced into our
reasonings: Similar objects are readily taken to be the same: And the conclusion
becomes at last very wide of the premises.
One may safely, however, affirm, that, if we consider
these
PAGE 61
sciences in a proper light,
their advantages and disadvantages nearly compensate each other, and reduce both
of them to a state of equality. If the mind, with greater facility, retains the
ideas of geometry clear and determinate, it must carry on a much longer and more
intricate chain of reasoning, and compare ideas much wider of each other, in
order to reach the abstruser truths of that science. And if moral ideas are apt,
without extreme care, to fall into obscurity and confusion, the inferences are
always much shorter in these disquisitions, and the intermediate steps, which
lead to the conclusion, much fewer than in the sciences which treat of quantity
and number. In reality, there is scarcely a proposition in
EUCLID so simple, as not to consist of more
parts, than are to be found in any moral reasoning which runs not into chimera
and conceit. Where we trace the principles of the human mind through a few
steps, we may be very well satisfied with our progress; considering how soon
nature throws a bar to all our enquiries concerning causes, and reduces us to an
acknowledgment of our ignorance. The chief obstacle, therefore, to our
improvement in the moral or metaphysical sciences is the obscurity of the ideas,
and ambiguity of the terms. The principal difficulty in the mathematics is the
length of inferences and compass of thought, requisite to the forming of any
conclusion. And, perhaps, our progress in natural philosophy is chiefly retarded
by the want of proper experiments and phaenomena, which are often discovered by
chance, and cannot always be found, when requisite, even by the most diligent
and prudent enquiry. As moral philosophy seems hitherto to have received less
improvement than either geometry or physics, we may conclude, that, if there be
any difference in this respect among these sciences, the difficulties, which
obstruct the progress of the former, require superior care and capacity to be
surmounted.
There are no ideas, which occur in metaphysics, more
PAGE 62
obscure and uncertain, than
those of
power,
force,
energy, or
necessary
connexion, of which it is every moment necessary for us to treat in all our
disquisitions. We shall, therefore, endeavour, in this section, to fix, if
possible, the precise meaning of these terms, and thereby remove some part of
that obscurity, which is so much complained of in this species of philosophy.
It seems a proposition, which will not admit of much
dispute, that all our ideas are nothing but copies of our impressions, or, in
other words, that it is impossible for us to think of any thing, which we
have not antecedently felt, either by our external or internal senses. I
have endeavoured * to explain and prove this proposition, and have expressed my
hopes, that, by a proper application of it, men may reach a greater clearness
and precision in philosophical reasonings, than what they have hitherto been
able to attain. Complex ideas may, perhaps, be well known by definition, which
is nothing but an enumeration of those parts or simple ideas, that compose them.
But when we have pushed up definitions to the most simple ideas, and find still
some ambiguity and obscurity; what resource are we then possessed of? By what
invention can we throw light upon these ideas, and render them altogether
precise and determinate to our intellectual view? Produce the impressions or
original sentiments, from which the ideas are copied. These impressions are all
strong and sensible. They admit not of ambiguity. They are not only placed in a
full light themselves, but may throw light on their correspondent ideas, which
lie in obscurity. And by this means, we may, perhaps, attain a new microscope or
species of optics, by which, in the moral sciences, the most minute, and most
simple ideas may be so enlarged as to fall readily under our apprehension, and
be equally known with the grossest and most sensible ideas, that can be the
object of our enquiry.
PAGE 63
To be fully acquainted,
therefore, with the idea of power or necessary connexion, let us examine its
impression; and in order to find the impression with greater certainty, let us
search for it in all the sources, from which it may possibly be derived.
When we look about us towards external objects, and
consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to
discover any power or necessary connexion; any quality, which binds the effect
to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We
only find, that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The impulse of
one billiard-ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that
appears to the outward senses. The mind feels no sentiment or
inward impression from this succession of objects: Consequently, there is
not, in any single, particular instance of cause and effect, any thing which can
suggest the idea of power or necessary connexion.
From the first appearance of an object, we never can
conjecture what effect will result from it. But were the power or energy of any
cause discoverable by the mind, we could foresee the effect, even without
experience; and might, at first, pronounce with certainty concerning it, by the
mere dint of thought and reasoning. # In reality, there is no part of matter,
that does ever, by its sensible qualities, discover any power or energy, or give
us ground to imagine, that it could produce any thing, or be followed by any
other object, which we could denominate its effect. Solidity, extension, motion;
these qualities are all complete in themselves, and never point out any other
event which may result from them. The scenes of the universe are continually
shifting, and one object follows another in an uninterrupted succession; but the
power or force, which actuates the whole machine, is entirely concealed from us,
and never discovers itself in any of the sensible
PAGE 64
qualities of body. We know,
that, in fact, heat is a constant attendant of flame; but what is the connexion
between them, we have no room so much as to conjecture or imagine. It is
impossible, therefore, that the idea of power can be derived from the
contemplation of bodies, in single instances of their operation; because no
bodies ever discover any power, which can be the original of this idea
*.
Since, therefore, external objects as they appear to
the senses, give us no idea of power or necessary connexion, by their operation
in particular instances, let us see, whether this idea be derived from
reflection on the operations of our own minds, and be copied from any internal
impression. It may be said, that we are every moment conscious of internal
power; while we feel, that, by the simple command of our will, we can move the
organs of our body, or direct the faculties of our mind. An act of volition
produces motion in our limbs, or raises a new idea in our imagination. This
influence of the will we know by consciousness. Hence we acquire the idea of
power or energy; and are certain, that we ourselves and all other intelligent
beings are possessed of power. This idea, then, is an idea of reflection, since
it arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and on the command
which is exercised by will, both over the organs of the body and faculties of
the soul.
We shall proceed to examine this pretension; and
first with regard to the influence of volition over the organs of the body. This
influence, we may observe, is a fact, which, like all other natural events, can
be known only by experience, and can never be foreseen from any apparent energy
PAGE 65
or power in the cause, which
connects it with the effect, and renders the one an infallible consequence of
the other. The motion of our body follows upon the command of our will. Of this
we are every moment conscious. But the means, by which this is effected; the
energy, by which the will performs so extraordinary an operation; of this we are
so far from being immediately conscious, that it must for ever escape our most
diligent enquiry.
For first; is there any principle in all
nature more mysterious than the union of soul with body; by which a supposed
spiritual substance acquires such an influence over a material one, that the
most refined thought is able to actuate the grossest matter? Were we empowered,
by a secret wish, to remove mountains, or control the planets in their orbit;
this extensive authority would not be more extraordinary, nor more beyond our
comprehension. But if by consciousness we perceived any power or energy in the
will, we must know this power; we must know its connexion with the effect; we
must know the secret union of soul and body, and the nature of both these
substances; by which the one is able to operate, in so many instances, upon the
other.
Secondly, We are not able to move all the
organs of the body with a like authority; though we cannot assign any reason
besides experience, for so remarkable a difference between one and the other.
Why has the will an influence over the tongue and fingers, not over the heart or
liver? This question would never embarrass us, were we conscious of a power in
the former case, not in the latter. We should then perceive, independent of
experience, why the authority of will over the organs of the body is
circumscribed within such particular limits. Being in that case fully acquainted
with the power or force, by which it operates, we should also know, why its
influence reaches precisely to such boundaries, and no farther.
PAGE 66
A man, suddenly struck with
a palsy in the leg or arm, or who had newly lost those members, frequently
endeavours, at first, to move them, and employ them in their usual offices. Here
he is as much conscious of power to command such limbs, as a man in perfect
health is conscious of power to actuate any member which remains in its natural
state and condition. But consciousness never deceives. Consequently, neither in
the one case nor in the other, are we ever conscious of any power. We learn the
influence of our will from experience alone. And experience only teaches us, how
one event constantly follows another; without instructing us in the secret
connexion, which binds them together, and renders them inseparable.
Thirdly, We learn from anatomy, that the
immediate object of power in voluntary motion, is not the member itself which is
moved, but certain muscles, and nerves, and animal spirits, and, perhaps,
something still more minute and more unknown, through which the motion is
successively propagated, ere it reach the member itself whose motion is the
immediate object of volition. Can there be a more certain proof, that the power,
by which this whole operation is performed, so far from being directly and fully
known by an inward sentiment or consciousness, is, to the last degree,
mysterious and unintelligible? Here the mind wills a certain event: Immediately
another event, unknown to ourselves, and totally different from the one
intended, is produced: This event produces another, equally unknown: Till at
last, through a long succession, the desired event is produced. But if the
original power were felt, it must be known: Were it known, its effect must also
be known; since all power is relative to its effect. And vice versa, if
the effect be not known, the power cannot be known nor felt. How indeed can we
be conscious of a power to move our limbs, when we have no such power; but only
that to move certain animal spirits, which, though they produce at last the
motion
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of our limbs, yet operate in
such a manner as is wholly beyond our comprehension?
We may, therefore, conclude from the whole, I hope,
without any temerity, though with assurance; that our idea of power is not
copied from any sentiment or consciousness of power within ourselves, when we
give rise to animal motion, or apply our limbs to their proper use and office.
That their motion follows the command of the will is a matter of common
experience, like other natural events: But the power or energy by which this is
effected, like that in other natural events, is unknown and inconceivable C.
Shall we then assert, that we are conscious of a
power or energy in our own minds, when, by an act or command of our will, we
raise up a new idea, fix the mind to the contemplation of it, turn it on all
sides, and at last dismiss it for some other idea, when we think that we have
surveyed it with sufficient accuracy? I believe the same arguments will prove,
that even this command of the will gives us no real idea of force or energy.
First, It must be allowed, that, when we know
a power, we know that very circumstance in the cause, by which it is
PAGE 68
enabled to produce the
effect: For these are supposed to be synonimous. We must, therefore, know both
the cause and effect, and the relation between them. But do we pretend to be
acquainted with the nature of the human soul and the nature of an idea, or the
aptitude of the one to produce the other? This is a real creation; a production
of something out of nothing: Which implies a power so great, that it may seem,
at first sight, beyond the reach of any being, less than infinite. At least it
must be owned, that such a power is not felt, nor known, nor even conceivable by
the mind. We only feel the event, namely, the existence of an idea, consequent
to a command of the will: But the manner, in which this operation is performed;
the power, by which it is produced; is entirely beyond our comprehension.
Secondly, The command of the mind over itself
is limited, as well as its command over the body; and these limits are not known
by reason, or any acquaintance with the nature of cause and effect; but only by
experience and observation, as in all other natural events and in the operation
of external objects. Our authority over our sentiments and passions is much
weaker than that over our ideas; and even the latter authority is circumscribed
within very narrow boundaries. Will any one pretend to assign the ultimate
reason of these boundaries, or show why the power is deficient in one case not
in another.
Thirdly, This self-command is very different
at different times. A man in health possesses more of it, than one languishing
with sickness. We are more master of our thoughts in the morning than in the
evening: Fasting, than after a full meal. Can we give any reason for these
variations, except experience? Where then is the power, of which we pretend to
be conscious? Is there not here, either in a spiritual or material substance, or
both, some secret mechanism or structure of parts, upon which the effect
depends, and which, being entirely unknown to us, renders
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the power or energy of the
will equally unknown and incomprehensible?
Volition is surely an act of the mind, with which we
are sufficiently acquainted. Reflect upon it. Consider it on all sides. Do you
find any thing in it like this creative power, by which it raises from nothing a
new idea, and with a kind of FIAT,
imitates the omnipotence of its Maker, if I may be allowed so to speak, who
called forth into existence all the various scenes of nature? So far from being
conscious of this energy in the will, it requires as certain experience, as that
of which we are possessed, to convince us, that such extraordinary effects do
ever result from a simple act of volition.
The generality of mankind never find any difficulty
in accounting for the more common and familiar operations of nature; such as the
descent of heavy bodies, the growth of plants, the generation of animals, or the
nourishment of bodies by food: But suppose, that, in all these cases, they
perceive the very force or energy of the cause, by which it is connected with
its effect, and is for ever infallible in its operation. They acquire, by long
habit, such a turn of mind, that, upon the appearance of the cause, they
immediately expect with assurance its usual attendant, and hardly conceive it
possible, that any other event could result from it. It is only on the discovery
of extraordinary phaenomena, such as earthquakes, pestilence, and prodigies of
any kind, that they find themselves at a loss to assign a proper cause, and to
explain the manner, in which the effect is produced by it. It is usual for men,
in such difficulties, to have recourse to some invisible intelligent principle
*, as the immediate cause of that event, which surprises them,
and which, they think, cannot be accounted for from the common powers of nature.
But philosophers, who carry their scrutiny
PAGE 70
a little farther,
immediately perceive, that, even in the most familiar events, the energy of the
cause is as unintelligible as in the most unusual, and that we only learn by
experience the frequent
CONJUNCTION of
objects, without being ever able to comprehend any thing like
CONNEXION between them. Here then, many
philosophers think themselves obliged by reason to have recourse, on all
occasions, to the same principle, which the vulgar never appeal to but in cases,
that appear miraculous and supernatural. They acknowledge mind and intelligence
to be, not only the ultimate and original cause of all things, but the immediate
and sole cause of every event, which appears in nature. They pretend, that those
objects, which are commonly denominated
causes, are in reality nothing
but
occasions; and that the true and direct principle of every effect is
not any power or force in nature, but a volition of the Supreme Being, who
wills, that such particular objects should, for ever, be conjoined with each
other. Instead of saying, that one billiard-ball moves another, by a force,
which it has derived from the author of nature; it is the Deity himself, they
say, who, by a particular volition, moves the second ball, being determined to
this operation by the impulse of the first ball; in consequence of those general
laws, which he has laid down to himself in the government of the universe. But
philosophers advancing still in their enquiries, discover, that, as we are
totally ignorant of the power, on which depends the mutual operation of bodies,
we are no less ignorant of that power, on which depends the operation of mind on
body, or of body on mind; nor are we able, either from our senses or
consciousness, to assign the ultimate principle in one case, more than in the
other. The same ignorance, therefore, reduces them to the same conclusion. They
assert, that the Deity is the immediate cause of the union between soul and
body; and that they are not the organs of sense, which, being agitated by
external objects, produce sensations in the mind;
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but that it is a particular
volition of our omnipotent Maker, which excites such a sensation, in consequence
of such a motion in the organ. In like manner, it is not any energy in the will,
that produces local motion in our members: It is God himself, who is pleased to
second our will, in itself impotent, and to command that motion, which we
erroneously attribute to our own power and efficacy. Nor do philosophers stop at
this conclusion. They sometimes extend the same inference to the mind itself, in
its internal operations. Our mental vision or conception of ideas is nothing but
a revelation made to us by our Maker. When we voluntarily turn our thoughts to
any object, and raise up its image in the fancy; it is not the will which
creates that idea: It is the universal Creator, who discovers it to the mind,
and renders it present to us.
Thus, according to these philosophers, every thing is
full of God. Not content with the principle, that nothing exists but by his
will, that nothing possesses any power but by his concession: They rob nature,
and all created beings, of every power, in order to render their dependence on
the Deity still more sensible and immediate. They consider not, that, by this
theory, they diminish, instead of magnifying, the grandeur of those attributes,
which they affect so much to celebrate. It argues surely more power in the Deity
to delegate a certain degree of power to inferior creatures, than to produce
every thing by his own immediate volition. It argues more wisdom to contrive at
first the fabric of the world with such perfect foresight, that, of itself, and
by its proper operation, it may serve all the purposes of providence, than if
the great Creator were obliged every moment to adjust its parts, and animate by
his breath all the wheels of that stupendous machine.
But if we would have a more philosophical confutation
of this theory, perhaps the two following reflections may suffice.
PAGE 72
First, It seems to
me, that this theory of the universal energy and operation of the Supreme Being,
is too bold ever to carry conviction with it to a man, sufficiently apprized of
the weakness of human reason, and the narrow limits, to which it is confined in
all its operations. Though the chain of arguments, which conduct to it, were
ever so logical, there must arise a strong suspicion, if not an absolute
assurance, that it has carried us quite beyond the reach of our faculties, when
it leads to conclusions so extraordinary, and so remote from common life and
experience. We are got into fairy land, long ere we have reached the last steps
of our theory; and
there we have no reason to trust our common methods of
argument, or to think that our usual analogies and probabilities have any
authority. Our line is too short to fathom such immense abysses. And however we
may flatter ourselves, that we are guided, in every step which we take, by a
kind of verisimilitude and experience; we may be assured, that this fancied
experience has no authority, when we thus apply it to subjects, that lie
entirely out of the sphere of experience. But on this we shall have occasion to
touch afterwards
*.
Secondly, I cannot perceive any force in the
arguments, on which this theory is founded. We are ignorant, it is true, of the
manner in which bodies operate on each other: Their force or energy is entirely
incomprehensible: But are we not equally ignorant of the manner or force by
which a mind, even the supreme mind, operates either on itself or on body?
Whence, I beseech you, do we acquire any idea of it? We have no sentiment or
consciousness of this power in ourselves. We have no idea of the Supreme Being
but what we learn from reflection on our own faculties. Were our ignorance,
therefore, a good reason for rejecting any
PAGE 73
thing, we should be led into
that principle of denying all energy in the Supreme Being as much as in the
grossest matter. We surely comprehend as little the operations of one as of the
other. Is it more difficult to conceive, that motion may arise from impulse,
than that it may arise from volition? All we know is our profound ignorance in
both cases
D.
PART II.
But to hasten to a conclusion of this argument, which
is already drawn out to too great a length: We have sought in vain for an idea
of power or necessary connexion, in all the sources from which we could suppose
it to be derived. It appears, that, in single instances of the operation of
bodies, we never can, by our utmost scrutiny, discover any thing but one event
following another; without being able to comprehend any force or power, by which
the cause
PAGE 74
operates, or any connexion
between it and its supposed effect. The same difficulty occurs in contemplating
the operations of mind on body; where we observe the motion of the latter to
follow upon the volition of the former; but are not able to observe or conceive
the tye, which binds together the motion and volition, or the energy by which
the mind produces this effect. The authority of the will over its own faculties
and ideas is not a whit more comprehensible: So that, upon the whole, there
appears not, throughout all nature, any one instance of connexion, which is
conceivable by us. All events seem entirely loose and separate. One event
follows another; but we never can observe any tye between them. They seem
conjoined, but never
connected. And as we can have no idea of any
thing, which never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment, the
necessary conclusion
seems to be, that we have no idea of connexion or
power at all, and that these words are absolutely without any meaning, when
employed either in philosophical reasonings, or common life.
But there still remains one method of avoiding this
conclusion, and one source which we have not yet examined. When any natural
object or event is presented, it is impossible for us, by any sagacity or
penetration, to discover, or even conjecture, without experience, what event
will result from it, or to carry our foresight beyond that object, which is
immediately present to the memory and senses. Even after one instance or
experiment, where we have observed a particular event to follow upon another, we
are not entitled to form a general rule, or foretel what will happen in like
cases; it being justly esteemed an unpardonable temerity to judge of the whole
course of nature from one single experiment, however accurate or certain. But
when one particular species of event has always, in all instances, been
conjoined with another, we make no longer
PAGE 75
any scruple of foretelling
one upon the appearance of the other, and of employing that reasoning, which can
alone assure us of any matter of fact or existence. We then call the one object,
Cause; the other,
Effect. We suppose, that there is some connexion
between them; some power in the one, by which it infallibly produces the other,
and operates with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity.
It appears, then, that this idea of a necessary
connexion among events arises from a number of similar instances which occur, of
the constant conjunction of these events; nor can that idea ever be suggested by
any one of these instances, surveyed in all possible lights and positions. But
there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single instance,
which is supposed to be exactly similar; except only, that after a repetition of
similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one
event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe, that it will exist. This
connexion, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary
transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the
sentiment or impression, from which we form the idea of power or necessary
connexion. Nothing farther is in the case. Contemplate the subject on all sides;
you will never find any other origin of that idea. This is the sole difference
between one instance, from which we can never receive the idea of connexion, and
a number of similar instances, by which it is suggested. The first time a man
saw the communication of motion by impulse, as by the shock of two
billiard-balls, he could not pronounce that the one event was connected:
but only that it was conjoined with the other. After he has observed
several instances of this nature, he then pronounces them to be
connected. What alteration has happened to give rise to this new idea of
connexion? Nothing but that he now feels these events to
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be
connected in his
imagination, and can readily foretel the existence of one from the appearance of
the other. When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with another, we
mean only, that they have acquired a connexion in our thought, and give rise to
this inference, by which they become proofs of each other's existence: A
conclusion, which is somewhat extraordinary; but which seems founded on
sufficient evidence. Nor will its evidence be weakened by any general diffidence
of the understanding, or sceptical suspicion concerning every conclusion, which
is new and extraordinary. No conclusions can be more agreeable to scepticism
than such as make discoveries concerning the weakness and narrow limits of human
reason and capacity.
And what stronger instance can be produced of the
surprising ignorance and weakness of the understanding, than the present? For
surely, if there be any relation among objects, which it imports to us to know
perfectly, it is that of cause and effect. On this are founded all our
reasonings concerning matter of fact or existence. By means of it alone we
attain any assurance concerning objects, which are removed from the present
testimony of our memory and senses. The only immediate utility of all sciences,
is to teach us, how to control and regulate future events by their causes. Our
thoughts and enquiries are, therefore, every moment, employed about this
relation: Yet so imperfect are the ideas which we form concerning it, that it is
impossible to give any just definition of cause, except what is drawn from
something extraneous and foreign to it. Similar objects are always conjoined
with similar. Of this we have experience. Suitably to this experience,
therefore, we may define a cause to be an object, followed by another, and
where all the objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to
the second. Or in other words, where, if the first object had not been,
the second never had existed. The appearance of a cause always
PAGE 77
conveys the mind, by a
customary transition, to the idea of the effect. Of this also we have
experience. We may, therefore, suitably to this experience, form another
definition of cause; and call it,
an object followed by another, and whose
appearance always conveys the thought to that other. But though both these
definitions be drawn from circumstances foreign to the cause, we cannot remedy
this inconvenience, or attain any more perfect definition, which may point out
that circumstance in the cause, which gives it a connexion with its effect. We
have no idea of this connexion; nor even any distinct notion what it is we
desire to know, when we endeavour at a conception of it. We say, for instance,
that the vibration of this string is the cause of this particular sound. But
what do we mean by that affirmation? We either mean,
that this vibration is
followed by this sound, and that all similar vibrations have been followed by
similar sounds: Or,
that this vibration is followed by this sound, and
that upon the appearance of one, the mind anticipates the senses, and forms
immediately an idea of the other. We may consider the relation of cause and
effect in either of these two lights; but beyond these, we have no idea of it
E.
PAGE 78
To recapitulate, therefore,
the reasonings of this section: Every idea is copied from some preceding
impression or sentiment; and where we cannot find any impression, we may be
certain that there is no idea. In all single instances of the operation of
bodies or minds, there is nothing that produces any impression, nor consequently
can suggest any idea, of power or necessary connexion. But when many uniform
instances appear, and the same object is always followed by the same event; we
then begin to entertain the notion of cause and connexion. We then
feel a
new sentiment or impression, to wit, a customary connexion in the thought or
imagination between one object and its usual attendant; and this sentiment is
the original of that idea which we seek for. For as this idea arises from a
number of similar instances, and not from any single instance; it must arise
from that circumstance, in which the number of instances differ from every
individual instance. But this customary connexion or transition of the
imagination is the only circumstance, in which they differ. In every other
particular they are alike. The first instance which we saw of motion,
communicated by the shock of two billiard-balls (to return to this obvious
illustration) is exactly similar to any instance that may, at present, occur to
us; except only, that we could not, at first,
infer
PAGE 79
one event from the other;
which we are enabled to do at present, after so long a course of uniform
experience. I know not, whether the reader will readily apprehend this
reasoning. I am afraid, that, should I multiply words about it, or throw it into
a greater variety of lights, it would only become more obscure and intricate. In
all abstract reasonings, there is one point of view, which, if we can happily
hit, we shall go farther towards illustrating the subject, than by all the
eloquence and copious expression in the world. This point of view we should
endeavour to reach, and reserve the flowers of rhetoric for subjects which are
more adapted to them.
PAGE 80
SECTION VIII. Of LIBERTY and NECESSITY.
PART I.
IT might reasonably be expected, in questions, which
have been canvassed and disputed with great eagerness, since the first origin of
science and philosophy, that the meaning of all the terms, at least, should have
been agreed upon among the disputants; and our enquiries, in the course of two
thousand years, been able to pass from words to the true and real subject of the
controversy. For how easy may it seem to give exact definitions of the terms
employed in reasoning, and make these definitions, not the mere sound of words,
the object of future scrutiny and examination? But if we consider the matter
more narrowly, we shall be apt to draw a quite opposite conclusion. From this
circumstance alone, that a controversy has been long kept on foot, and remains
still undecided, we may presume, that there is some ambiguity in the expression,
and that the disputants affix different ideas to the terms employed in the
controversy. For as the faculties of the mind are supposed to be naturally alike
in every inidual; otherwise nothing could be more fruitless than to reason or
dispute together; it were impossible, if men affix the same ideas to their
terms, that they could so long form different opinions of the same subject;
especially when they communicate their views, and each party turn themselves on
all sides, in search
PAGE 81
of arguments, which may give
them the victory over their antagonists. It is true; if men attempt the
discussion of questions, which lie entirely beyond the reach of human capacity,
such as those concerning the origin of worlds, or the oeconomy of the
intellectual system or region of spirits, they may long beat the air in their
fruitless contests, and never arrive at any determinate conclusion. But if the
question regard any subject of common life and experience; nothing, one would
think, could preserve the dispute so long undecided, but some ambiguous
expressions, which keep the antagonists still at a distance, and hinder them
from grappling with each other.
This has been the case in the long disputed question
concerning liberty and necessity; and to so remarkable a degree, that, if I be
not much mistaken, we shall find, that all mankind, both learned and ignorant,
have always been of the same opinion with regard to this subject, and that a few
intelligible definitions would immediately have put an end to the whole
controversy. I own, that this dispute has been so much canvassed on all hands,
and has led philosophers into such a labyrinth of obscure sophistry, that it is
no wonder, if a sensible reader indulge his ease so far as to turn a deaf ear to
the proposal of such a question, from which he can expect neither instruction
nor entertainment. But the state of the argument here proposed may, perhaps,
serve to renew his attention; as it has more novelty, promises at least some
decision of the controversy, and will not much disturb his ease by any intricate
or obscure reasoning.
I hope, therefore, to make it appear, that all men
have ever agreed in the doctrine both of necessity and of liberty, according to
any reasonable sense, which can be put on these terms; and that the whole
controversy has hitherto turned merely upon words. We shall begin with examining
the doctrine of necessity.
PAGE 82
It is universally allowed,
that matter, in all its operations, is actuated by a necessary force, and that
every natural effect is so precisely determined by the energy of its cause, that
no other effect, in such particular circumstances, could possibly have resulted
from it. The degree and direction of every motion is, by the laws of nature,
prescribed with such exactness, that a living creature may as soon arise from
the shock of two bodies, as motion, in any other degree or direction than what
is actually produced by it. Would we, therefore, form a just and precise idea of
necessity, we must consider whence that idea arises, when we apply it to
the operation of bodies.
It seems evident, that, if all the scenes of nature
were continually shifted in such a manner, that no two events bore any
resemblance to each other, but every object was entirely new, without any
similitude to whatever had been seen before, we should never, in that case, have
attained the least idea of necessity, or of a connexion among these objects. We
might say, upon such a supposition, that one object or event has followed
another; not that one was produced by the other. The relation of cause and
effect must be utterly unknown to mankind. Inference and reasoning concerning
the operations of nature would, from that moment, be at an end; and the memory
and senses remain the only canals, by which the knowledge of any real existence
could possibly have access to the mind. Our idea, therefore, of necessity and
causation arises entirely from the uniformity, observable in the operations of
nature; where similar objects are constantly conjoined together, and the mind is
determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of the other. These
two circumstances form the whole of that necessity, which we ascribe to matter.
Beyond the constant conjunction of similar objects, and the consequent
inference from one to the other, we have no notion of any necessity, or
connexion.
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If it appear, therefore,
that all mankind have ever allowed, without any doubt or hesitation, that these
two circumstances take place in the voluntary actions of men, and in the
operations of mind; it must follow, that all mankind have ever agreed in the
doctrine of necessity, and that they have hitherto disputed, merely for not
understanding each other.
As to the first circumstance, the constant and
regular conjunction of similar events; we may possibly satisfy ourselves by the
following considerations. It is universally acknowledged, that there is a great
uniformity among the actions of men, in all nations and ages, and that human
nature remains still the same, in its principles and operations. The same
motives always produce the same actions: The same events follow from the same
causes. Ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship, generosity, public
spirit; these passions, mixed in various degrees, and distributed through
society, have been, from the beginning of the world, and still are, the source
of all the actions and enterprizes, which have ever been observed among mankind.
Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the GREEKS and ROMANS? Study well the temper and actions of the FRENCH and ENGLISH: You cannot be much mistaken in transferring to the former
most of the observations, which you have made with regard to the latter.
Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us
of nothing new or strange in this particular. Its chief use is only to discover
the constant and universal principles of human nature, by shewing men in all
varieties of circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with materials,
from which we may form our observations, and become acquainted with the regular
springs of human action and behaviour. These records of wars, intrigues,
factions, and revolutions, are so many collections of experiments, by which the
politician or moral
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philosopher fixes the
principles of his science; in the same manner as the physician or natural
philosopher becomes acquainted with the nature of plants, minerals, and other
external objects, by the experiments, which he forms concerning them. Nor are
the earth, water, and other elements, examined by
ARISTOTLE, and
HIPPOCRATES, more like to those, which at present lie under our
observation, than the men, described by
POLYBIUS and
TACITUS,
are to those who now govern the world.
Should a traveller, returning from a far country,
bring us an account of men, wholly different from any, with whom we were ever
acquainted; men, who were entirely divested of avarice, ambition, or revenge;
who knew no pleasure but friendship, generosity, and public spirit; we should
immediately, from these circumstances, detect the falsehood, and prove him a
liar, with the same certainty as if he had stuffed his narration with stories of
centaurs and dragons, miracles and prodigies. And if we would explode any
forgery in history, we cannot make use of a more convincing argument, than to
prove, that the actions, ascribed to any person, are directly contrary to the
course of nature, and that no human motives, in such circumstances, could ever
induce him to such a conduct. The veracity of QUINTUS CURTIUS is as
much to be suspected, when he describes the supernatural courage of ALEXANDER, by which he was hurried on singly
to attack multitudes, as when he describes his supernatural force and activity,
by which he was able to resist them. So readily and universally do we
acknowledge a uniformity in human motives and actions as well as in the
operations of body.
Hence likewise the benefit of that experience,
acquired by long life and a variety of business and company, in order to
instruct us in the principles of human nature, and regulate our future conduct,
as well as speculation. By means of this guide, we mount up to the knowledge of
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men's inclinations and
motives, from their actions, expressions, and even gestures; and again, descend
to the interpretation of their actions from our knowledge of their motives and
inclinations. The general observations, treasured up by a course of experience,
give us the clue of human nature, and teach us to unravel all its intricacies.
Pretexts and appearances no longer deceive us. Public declarations pass for the
specious colouring of a cause. And though virtue and honour be allowed their
proper weight and authority, that perfect disinterestedness, so often pretended
to, is never expected in multitudes and parties; seldom in their leaders; and
scarcely even in individuals of any rank or station. But were there no
uniformity in human actions, and were every experiment, which we could form of
this kind, irregular and anomalous, it were impossible to collect any general
observations concerning mankind; and no experience, however accurately digested
by reflection, would ever serve to any purpose. Why is the aged husbandman more
skilful in his calling than the young beginner, but because there is a certain
uniformity in the operation of the sun, rain, and earth, towards the production
of vegetables; and experience teaches the old practitioner the rules, by which
this operation is governed and directed?
We must not, however, expect, that this uniformity of
human actions should be carried to such a length, as that all men, in the same
circumstances, will always act precisely in the same manner, without making any
allowance for the diversity of characters, prejudices, and opinions. Such a
uniformity in every particular, is found in no part of nature. On the contrary,
from observing the variety of conduct in different men, we are enabled to form a
greater variety of maxims, which still suppose a degree of uniformity and
regularity.
Are the manners of men different in different ages
and
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countries? We learn thence
the great force of custom and education, which mould the human mind from its
infancy, and form it into a fixed and established character. Is the behaviour
and conduct of the one sex very unlike that of the other? It is thence we become
acquainted with the different characters, which nature has impressed upon the
sexes, and which she preserves with constancy and regularity. Are the actions of
the same person much diversified in the different periods of his life, from
infancy to old age? This affords room for many general observations concerning
the gradual change of our sentiments and inclinations, and the different maxims,
which prevail in the different ages of human creatures. Even the characters,
which are peculiar to each individual, have a uniformity in their influence;
otherwise our acquaintance with the persons and our observation of their
conduct, could never teach us their dispositions, or serve to direct our
behaviour with regard to them.
I grant it possible to find some actions, which seem
to have no regular connexion with any known motives, and are exceptions to all
the measures of conduct, which have ever been established for the government of
men. But if we would willingly know, what judgment should be formed of such
irregular and extraordinary actions; we may consider the sentiments, commonly
entertained with regard to those irregular events, which appear in the course of
nature, and the operations of external objects. All causes are not conjoined to
their usual effects, with like uniformity. An artificer, who handles only dead
matter, may be disappointed of his aim, as well as the politician, who directs
the conduct of sensible and intelligent agents.
The vulgar, who take things according to their first
appearance, attribute the uncertainty of events to such an uncertainty in the
causes as makes the latter often fail of their usual influence; though they meet
with no impediment in their operation. But philosophers, observing, that,
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almost in every part of
nature, there is contained a vast variety of springs and principles, which are
hid, by reason of their minuteness or remoteness, find, that it is at least
possible the contrariety of events may not proceed from any contingency in the
cause, but from the secret operation of contrary causes. This possibility is
converted into certainty by farther observation; when they remark, that, upon an
exact scrutiny, a contrariety of effects always betrays a contrariety of causes,
and proceeds from their mutual opposition. A peasant can give no better reason
for the stopping of any clock or watch than to say that it does not commonly go
right: But an artist easily perceives, that the same force in the spring or
pendulum has always the same influence on the wheels; but fails of its usual
effect, perhaps by reason of a grain of dust, which puts a stop to the whole
movement. From the observation of several parallel instances, philosophers form
a maxim, that the connexion between all causes and effects is equally necessary,
and that its seeming uncertainty in some instances proceeds from the secret
opposition of contrary causes.
Thus for instance, in the human body, when the usual
symptoms of health or sickness disappoint our expectation; when medicines
operate not with their wonted powers; when irregular events follow from any
particular cause; the philosopher and physician are not surprized at the matter,
nor are ever tempted to deny, in general, the necessity and uniformity of those
principles, by which the animal oeconomy is conducted. They know, that a human
body is a mighty complicated machine: That many secret powers lurk in it, which
are altogether beyond our comprehension: That to us it must often appear very
uncertain in its operations: And that therefore the irregular events, which
outwardly discover themselves, can be no proof, that the laws of nature are not
observed with the greatest regularity in its internal operations and
government.
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The philosopher, if he be
consistent, must apply the same reasoning to the actions and volitions of
intelligent agents. The most irregular and unexpected resolutions of men may
frequently be accounted for by those, who know every particular circumstance of
their character and situation. A person of an obliging disposition gives a
peevish answer: But he has the toothake, or has not dined. A stupid fellow
discovers an uncommon alacrity in his carriage: But he has met with a sudden
piece of good fortune. Or even when an action, as sometimes happens, cannot be
particularly accounted for, either by the person himself or by others; we know,
in general, that the characters of men are, to a certain degree, inconstant and
irregular. This is, in a manner, the constant character of human nature; though
it be applicable, in a more particular manner, to some persons, who have no
fixed rule for their conduct, but proceed in a continued course of caprice and
inconstancy. The internal principles and motives may operate in a uniform
manner, notwithstanding these seeming irregularities; in the same manner as the
winds, rain, clouds, and other variations of the weather are supposed to be
governed by steady principles; though not easily discoverable by human sagacity
and enquiry.
Thus it appears, not only that the conjunction
between motives and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform, as that between
the cause and effect in any part of nature; but also that this regular
conjunction has been universally acknowledged among mankind, and has never been
the subject of dispute, either in philosophy or common life. Now, as it is from
past experience, that we draw all inferences concerning the future, and as we
conclude, that objects will always be conjoined together, which we find to have
always been conjoined; it may seem superfluous to prove, that this experienced
uniformity in human actions is a source, whence we draw inferences
concerning them. But in order to throw
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the argument into a greater
variety of lights, we shall also insist, though briefly, on this latter topic.
The mutual dependence of men is so great, in all
societies, that scarce any human action is entirely compleat in itself, or is
performed without some reference to the actions of others, which are requisite
to make it answer fully the intention of the agent. The poorest artificer, who
labours alone, expects at least the protection of the magistrate, to ensure him
the enjoyment of the fruits of his labour. He also expects, that, when he
carries his goods to market, and offers them at a reasonable price, he shall
find purchasers; and shall be able, by the money he acquires, to engage others
to supply him with those commodities, which are requisite for his subsistence.
In proportion as men extend their dealings, and render their intercourse with
others more complicated, they always comprehend, in their schemes of life, a
greater variety of voluntary actions, which they expect, from the proper
motives, to co-operate with their own. In all these conclusions, they take their
measures from past experience, in the same manner as in their reasonings
concerning external objects; and firmly believe, that men, as well as all the
elements, are to continue, in their operations, the same, that they have ever
found them. A manufacturer reckons upon the labour of his servants, for the
execution of any work, as much as upon the tools, which he employs, and would be
equally surprized, were his expectations disappointed. In short, this
experimental inference and reasoning concerning the actions of others enters so
much into human life, that no man, while awake, is ever a moment without
employing it. Have we not reason, therefore, to affirm, that all mankind have
always agreed in the doctrine of necessity, according to the foregoing
definition and explication of it?
Nor have philosophers ever entertained a different
opinion from the people in this particular. For not to mention, that almost
every action of their life supposes that opinion; there
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are even few of the
speculative parts of learning, to which it is not essential. What would become
of
history, had we not a dependence on the veracity of the historian,
according to the experience, which we have had of mankind? How could
politics be a science, if laws and forms of government had not a uniform
influence upon society? Where would be the foundation of
morals, if
particular characters had no certain or determinate power to produce particular
sentiments, and if these sentiments had no constant operation on actions? And
with what pretence could we employ our
criticism upon any poet or polite
author, if we could not pronounce the conduct and sentiments of his actors,
either natural or unnatural, to such characters, and in such circumstances? It
seems almost impossible, therefore, to engage, either in science or action of
any kind, without acknowledging the doctrine of necessity, and this
inference from motives to voluntary actions; from characters to conduct.
And indeed, when we consider how aptly natural
and moral evidence link together, and form only one chain of argument, we
shall make no scruple to allow, that they are of the same nature, and derived
from the same principles. A prisoner, who has neither money nor interest,
discovers the impossibility of his escape, as well when he considers the
obstinacy of the gaoler, as the walls and bars, with which he is surrounded;
and, in all attempts for his freedom, chuses rather to work upon the stone and
iron of the one, than upon the inflexible nature of the other. The same
prisoner, when conducted to the scaffold, foresees his death as certainly from
the constancy and fidelity of his guards, as from the operation of the ax or
wheel. His mind runs along a certain train of ideas: The refusal of the soldiers
to consent to his escape; the action of the executioner; the separation of the
head and body; bleeding, convulsive motions, and death. Here is a connected
chain of natural causes and voluntary actions; but the mind feels no difference
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between them, in passing
from one link to another: Nor is less certain of the future event than if it
were connected with the objects present to the memory or senses, by a train of
causes, cemented together by what we are pleased to call a
physical
necessity. The same experienced union has the same effect on the mind, whether
the united objects be motives, volition, and actions; or figure and motion. We
may change the names of things; but their nature and their operation on the
understanding never change.
Were a man, whom I know to be honest and opulent, and
with whom I live in intimate friendship, to come into my house, where I am
surrounded with my servants, I rest assured, that he is not to stab me before he
leaves it, in order to rob me of my silver standish; and I no more suspect this
event, than the falling of the house itself, which is new, and solidly built and
founded. _ But he may have been seized with a sudden and unknown frenzy.
_ So may a sudden earthquake arise, and shake and tumble my house about my ears.
I shall therefore change the suppositions. I shall say, that I know with
certainty, that he is not to put his hand into the fire, and hold it there, till
it be consumed: And this event, I think I can foretell with the same assurance,
as that, if he throw himself out at the window, and meet with no obstruction, he
will not remain a moment suspended in the air. No suspicion of an unknown frenzy
can give the least possibility to the former event, which is so contrary to all
the known principles of human nature. A man who at noon leaves his purse full of
gold on the pavement at Charing-Cross, may as well expect that it will fly away
like a feather, as that he will find it untouched an hour after. Above one half
of human reasonings contain inferences of a similar nature, attended with more
or less degrees of certainty, proportioned to our experience of the usual
conduct of mankind in such particular situations.
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I have frequently
considered, what could possibly be the reason, why all mankind, though they have
ever, without hesitation, acknowledged the doctrine of necessity, in their whole
practice and reasoning, have yet discovered such a reluctance to acknowledge it
in words, and have rather shewn a propensity, in all ages, to profess the
contrary opinion. The matter, I think, may be accounted for, after the following
manner. If we examine the operations of body, and the production of effects from
their causes, we shall find, that all our faculties can never carry us farther
in our knowledge of this relation, than barely to observe, that particular
objects are
constantly conjoined together, and that the mind is carried,
by a
customary transition, from the appearance of one to the belief of
the other. But though this conclusion concerning human ignorance be the result
of the strictest scrutiny of this subject, men still entertain a strong
propensity to believe, that they penetrate farther into the powers of nature,
and perceive something like a necessary connexion between the cause and the
effect. When again they turn their reflections towards the operations of their
own minds, and
feel no such connexion of the motive and the action; they
are thence apt to suppose, that there is a difference between the effects, which
result from material force, and those which arise from thought and intelligence.
But being once convinced, that we know nothing farther of causation of any kind,
than merely the
constant conjunction of objects, and the consequent
inference of the mind from one to another, and finding, that these two
circumstances are universally allowed to have place in voluntary actions; we may
be more easily led to own the same necessity common to all causes. And though
this reasoning may contradict the systems of many philosophers, in ascribing
necessity to the determinations of the will, we shall find, upon reflection,
that they dissent from it in words only, not in their real sentiment. Necessity,
according to the
PAGE 93
sense, in which it is here
taken, has never yet been rejected, nor can ever, I think, be rejected by any
philosopher. It may only, perhaps, be pretended, that the mind can perceive, in
the operations of matter, some farther connexion between the cause and effect;
and a connexion that has not place in the voluntary actions of intelligent
beings. Now whether it be so or not, can only appear upon examination; and it is
incumbent on these philosophers to make good their assertion, by defining or
describing that necessity, and pointing it out to us in the operations of
material causes.
It would seem, indeed, that men begin at the wrong
end of this question concerning liberty and necessity, when they enter upon it
by examining the faculties of the soul, the influence of the understanding, and
the operations of the will. Let them first discuss a more simple question,
namely, the operations of body and of brute unintelligent matter; and try
whether they can there form any idea of causation and necessity, except that of
a constant conjunction of objects, and subsequent inference of the mind from one
to another. If these circumstances form, in reality, the whole of that
necessity, which we conceive in matter, and if these circumstances be also
universally acknowledged to take place in the operations of the mind, the
dispute is at an end; at least, must be owned to be thenceforth merely verbal.
But as long as we will rashly suppose, that we have some farther idea of
necessity and causation in the operations of external objects; at the same time,
that we can find nothing farther, in the voluntary actions of the mind; there is
no possibility of bringing the question to any determinate issue, while we
proceed upon so erroneous a supposition. The only method of undeceiving us, is,
to mount up higher; to examine the narrow extent of science when applied to
material causes; and to convince ourselves, that all we know of them, is, the
constant conjunction and inference above mentioned. We may, perhaps, find, that
it
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is with difficulty we are
induced to fix such narrow limits to human understanding: But we can afterwards
find no difficulty when we come to apply this doctrine to the actions of the
will. For as it is evident, that these have a regular conjunction with motives
and circumstances and characters, and as we always draw inferences from one to
the other, we must be obliged to acknowledge in words, that necessity, which we
have already avowed, in every deliberation of our lives, and in every step of
our conduct and behaviour
F.
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But to proceed in this
reconciling project with regard to the question of liberty and necessity; the
most contentious question, of metaphysics, the most contentious science; it will
not require many words to prove, that all mankind have ever agreed in the
doctrine of liberty as well as in that of necessity, and that the whole dispute,
in this respect also, has been hitherto merely verbal. For what is meant by
liberty, when applied to voluntary actions? We cannot surely mean, that actions
have so little connexion with motives, inclinations, and circumstances, that one
does not follow with a certain degree of uniformity from the other, and that one
affords no inference by which we can conclude the existence of the other. For
these are plain and acknowledged matters of fact. By liberty, then, we can only
mean
a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the
will; that is, if we chuse to remain at rest, we may; if we chuse to move,
we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to
every one, who is not a prisoner and in chains. Here then is no subject of
dispute.
Whatever definition we may give of liberty, we should
be careful to observe two requisite circumstances; first, that it be
consistent with plain matter of fact; secondly, that it be consistent
with itself. If we observe these circumstances, and render our definition
intelligible, I am persuaded that all mankind will be found of one opinion with
regard to it.
It is universally allowed, that nothing exists
without a cause of its existence, and that chance, when strictly examined, is a
mere negative word, and means not any real power, which has any where, a being
in nature. But it is pretended, that some causes are necessary, some not
necessary. Here then is the advantage of definitions. Let any one define
a cause, without comprehending, as a part of the definition, a necessary
connexion with its effect; and let him
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shew distinctly the origin
of the idea, expressed by the definition; and I shall readily give up the whole
controversy. But if the foregoing explication of the matter be received, this
must be absolutely impracticable. Had not objects a regular conjunction with
each other, we should never have entertained any notion of cause and effect; and
this regular conjunction produces that inference of the understanding, which is
the only connexion, that we can have any comprehension of. Whoever attempts a
definition of cause, exclusive of these circumstances, will be obliged, either
to employ unintelligible terms, or such as are synonimous to the term, which he
endeavours to define
G. And if the definition above mentioned be admitted; liberty,
when opposed to necessity, not to constraint, is the same thing with chance;
which is universally allowed to have no existence.
PART II.
There is no method of reasoning more common, and yet
none more blameable, than, in philosophical disputes, to endeavour the
refutation of any hypothesis, by a pretence of its dangerous consequences to
religion and morality. When any opinion leads to absurdities, it is certainly
false; but it is not certain that an opinion is false, because it is of
dangerous consequence. Such topics, therefore, ought entirely to be forborne; as
serving nothing to the discovery of truth, but only to make the person of an
antagonist odious. This I observe in general, without pretending to
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draw any advantage from it.
I frankly submit to an examination of this kind, and shall venture to affirm,
that the doctrines, both of necessity and of liberty, as above explained, are
not only consistent with morality, but are absolutely essential to its support.
Necessity may be defined two ways, conformably to
the two definitions of cause, of which it makes an essential part. It
consists either in the constant conjunction of like objects, or in the inference
of the understanding from one object to another. Now necessity, in both these
senses, (which, indeed, are, at bottom, the same) has universally, though
tacitly, in the schools, in the pulpit, and in common life, been allowed to
belong to the will of man; and no one has ever pretended to deny, that we can
draw inferences concerning human actions, and that those inferences are founded
on the experienced union of like actions, with like motives, inclinations, and
circumstances. The only particular, in which any one can differ, is, that
either, perhaps, he will refuse to give the name of necessity to this property
of human actions: But as long as the meaning is understood, I hope the word can
do no harm: Or that he will maintain it possible to discover something farther
in the operations of matter. But this, it must be acknowledged, can be of no
consequence to morality or religion, whatever it may be to natural philosophy or
metaphysics. We may here be mistaken in asserting, that there is no idea of any
other necessity or connexion in the actions of body: But surely we ascribe
nothing to the actions of the mind, but what every one does, and must readily
allow of. We change no circumstance in the received orthodox system with regard
to the will, but only in that with regard to material objects and causes.
Nothing therefore can be more innocent, at least, than this doctrine.
All laws being founded on rewards and punishments,
it is supposed as a fundamental principle, that these motives
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have a regular and uniform
influence on the mind, and both produce the good and prevent the evil actions.
We may give to this influence what name we please; but, as it is usually
conjoined with the action, it must be esteemed a
cause, and be looked
upon as an instance of that necessity, which we would here establish.
The only proper object of hatred or vengeance, is a
person or creature, endowed with thought and consciousness; and when any
criminal or injurious actions excite that passion, it is only by their relation
to the person, or connexion with him. Actions are, by their very nature,
temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some cause in
the character and disposition of the person who performed them, they can neither
redound to his honour, if good; nor infamy, if evil. The actions themselves may
be blameable; they may be contrary to all the rules of morality and religion:
But the person is not answerable for them; and as they proceeded from nothing in
him, that is durable and constant, and leave nothing of that nature behind them,
it is impossible he can, upon their account, become the object of punishment or
vengeance. According to the principle, therefore, which denies necessity, and
consequently causes, a man is as pure and untainted, after having committed the
most horrid crime, as at the first moment of his birth, nor is his character any
wise concerned in his actions; since they are not derived from it, and the
wickedness of the one can never be used as a proof of the depravity of the
other.
Men are not blamed for such actions, as they perform
ignorantly and casually, whatever may be the consequences. Why? but because the
principles of these actions are only momentary, and terminate in them alone. Men
are less blamed for such actions as they perform hastily and unpremeditately,
than for such as proceed from deliberation. For what reason? but because a hasty
temper, though a constant
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cause or principle in the
mind, operates only by intervals, and infects not the whole character. Again,
repentance wipes off every crime, if attended with a reformation of life and
manners. How is this to be accounted for? but by asserting, that actions render
a person criminal, merely as they are proofs of criminal principles in the mind;
and when, by an alteration of these principles, they cease to be just proofs,
they likewise cease to be criminal. But, except upon the doctrine of necessity,
they never were just proofs, and consequently never were criminal. # It will be
equally easy to prove, and from the same arguments, that
liberty,
according to that definition above mentioned, in which all men agree, is also
essential to morality, and that no human actions, where it is wanting, are
susceptible of any moral qualities, or can be the objects either of approbation
or dislike. For as actions are objects of our moral sentiment, so far only as
they are indications of the internal character, passions, and affections; it is
impossible that they can give rise either to praise or blame, where they proceed
not from these principles, but are derived altogether from external violence.
I pretend not to have obviated or removed all
objections to this theory, with regard to necessity and liberty. I can foresee
other objections, derived from topics, which have not here been treated of. It
may be said, for instance, that, if voluntary actions be subjected to the same
laws of necessity with the operations of matter, there is a continued chain of
necessary causes, pre-ordained and pre-determined, reaching from the original
cause of all, to every single volition of every human creature. No contingency
any where in the universe; no indifference; no liberty. While we act, we are, at
the same time, acted upon. The ultimate Author of all our volitions is the
Creator of the world, who first bestowed motion on this immense machine, and
placed all beings in that particular position, whence
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every subsequent event, by
an inevitable necessity, must result. Human actions, therefore, either can have
no moral turpitude at all, as proceeding from so good a cause; or if they have
any turpitude, they must involve our Creator in the same guilt, while he is
acknowledged to be their ultimate cause and author. For as a man, who fired a
mine, is answerable for all the consequences whether the train he employed be
long or short; so wherever a continued chain of necessary causes is fixed, that
Being, either finite or infinite, who produces the first, is likewise the author
of all the rest, and must both bear the blame and acquire the praise, which
belong to them. Our clear and unalterable ideas of morality establish this rule,
upon unquestionable reasons, when we examine the consequences of any human
action; and these reasons must still have greater force, when applied to the
volitions and intentions of a Being, infinitely wise and powerful. Ignorance or
impotence may be pleaded for so limited a creature as man; but those
imperfections have no place in our Creator. He foresaw, he ordained, he intended
all those actions of men, which we so rashly pronounce criminal. And we must
therefore conclude, either that they are not criminal, or that the Deity, not
man, is accountable for them. But as either of these positions is absurd and
impious, it follows, that the doctrine, from which they are deduced, cannot
possibly be true, as being liable to all the same objections. An absurd
consequence, if necessary, proves the original doctrine to be absurd; in the
same manner as criminal actions render criminal the original cause, if the
connexion between them be necessary and inevitable.
This objection consists of two parts, which we shall
examine separately; First, that, if human actions can be traced up, by a
necessary chain, to the Deity, they can never be criminal; on account of the
infinite perfection of that Being, from whom they are derived, and who can
intend
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nothing but what is
altogether good and laudable. Or,
Secondly, if they be criminal, we must
retract the attribute of perfection, which we ascribe to the Deity, and must
acknowledge him to be the ultimate author of guilt and moral turpitude in all
his creatures.
The answer to the first objection seems obvious and
convincing. There are many philosophers, who, after an exact scrutiny of all the
phaenomena of nature, conclude, that the WHOLE, considered as one system, is, in every period of its
existence, ordered with perfect benevolence; and that the utmost possible
happiness will, in the end, result to all created beings, without any mixture of
positive or absolute ill and misery. Every physical ill, say they, makes an
essential part of this benevolent system, and could not possibly be removed,
even by the Deity himself, considered as a wise agent, without giving entrance
to greater ill, or excluding greater good, which will result from it. From this
theory, some philosophers, and the ancient Stoics among the rest, derived
a topic of consolation under all afflictions, while they taught their pupils,
that those ills, under which they laboured, were, in reality, goods to the
universe; and that to an enlarged view, which could comprehend the whole system
of nature, every event became an object of joy and exultation. But though this
topic be specious and sublime, it was soon found in practice weak and
ineffectual. You would surely more irritate, than appease a man, lying under the
racking pains of the gout, by preaching up to him the rectitude of those general
laws, which produced the malignant humours in his body, and led them through the
proper canals, to the sinews and nerves, where they now excite such acute
torments. These enlarged views may, for a moment, please the imagination of a
speculative man, who is placed in ease and security; but neither can they dwell
with constancy on his mind, even though undisturbed by the emotions of pain or
passion;
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much less can they
maintain their ground, when attacked by such powerful antagonists. The
affections take a narrower and more natural survey of their object; and by an
oeconomy, more suitable to the infirmity of human minds, regard alone the beings
around us, and are actuated by such events as appear good or ill to the private
system.
The case is the same with moral as with
physical ill. It cannot reasonably be supposed, that those remote
considerations, which are found of so little efficacy with regard to one, will
have a more powerful influence with regard to the other. The mind of man is so
formed by nature, that, upon the appearance of certain characters, dispositions,
and actions, it immediately feels the sentiment of approbation or blame; nor are
there any emotions more essential to its frame and constitution. The characters,
which engage our approbation, are chiefly such as contribute to the peace and
security of human society; as the characters, which excite blame, are chiefly
such as tend to public detriment and disturbance: Whence it may reasonably be
presumed, that the moral sentiments arise, either mediately or immediately, from
a reflection on these opposite interests. What though philosophical meditations
establish a different opinion or conjecture; that every thing is right with
regard to the WHOLE, and that the
qualities, which disturb society, are, in the main, as beneficial, and are as
suitable to the primary intention of nature, as those which more directly
promote its happiness and welfare? Are such remote and uncertain speculations
able to counterbalance the sentiments, which arise from the natural and
immediate view of the objects? A man who is robbed of a considerable sum; does
he find his vexation for the loss any wise diminished by these sublime
reflections? Why then should his moral resentment against the crime be supposed
incompatible with them? Or why should not the acknowledgment of a real
distinction between vice and virtue be reconcileable
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to all speculative systems
of philosophy, as well as that of a real distinction between personal beauty and
deformity? Both these distinctions are founded in the natural sentiments of the
human mind: And these sentiments are not to be controuled or altered by any
philosophical theory or speculation whatsoever.
The second objection admits not of so easy and
satisfactory an answer; nor is it possible to explain distinctly, how the Deity
can be the mediate cause of all the actions of men, without being the author of
sin and moral turpitude. These are mysteries, which mere natural and unassisted
reason is very unfit to handle; and whatever system she embraces, she must find
herself involved in inextricable difficulties, and even contradictions, at every
step which she takes with regard to such subjects. To reconcile the indifference
and contingency of human actions with prescience; or to defend absolute decrees,
and yet free the Deity from being the author of sin, has been found hitherto to
exceed all the power of philosophy. Happy, if she be thence sensible of her
temerity, when she pries into these sublime mysteries; and leaving a scene so
full of obscurities and perplexities, return, with suitable modesty, to her true
and proper province, the examination of common life; where she will find
difficulties enow to employ her enquiries, without launching into so boundless
an ocean of doubt, uncertainty, and contradiction!
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SECTION IX. Of the REASON of ANIMALS.
ALL our reasonings concerning matter of fact are
founded on a species of ANALOGY, which
leads us to expect from any cause the same events, which we have observed to
result from similar causes. Where the causes are entirely similar, the analogy
is perfect, and the inference, drawn from it, is regarded as certain and
conclusive: Nor does any man ever entertain a doubt, where he sees a piece of
iron, that it will have weight and cohesion of parts; as in all other instances,
which have ever fallen under his observation. But where the objects have not so
exact a similarity, the analogy is less perfect, and the inference is less
conclusive; though still it has some force, in proportion to the degree of
similarity and resemblance. The anatomical observations, formed upon one animal,
are, by this species of reasoning, extended to all animals; and it is certain,
that when the circulation of the blood, for instance, is clearly proved to have
place in one creature, as a frog, or fish, it forms a strong presumption, that
the same principle has place in all. These analogical observations may be
carried farther, even to this science, of which we are now treating; and any
theory, by which we explain the operations of the understanding, or the origin
and connexion of the passions in man, will acquire additional authority, if we
find, that the same theory is requisite to explain the same phaenomena in all
other animals. We shall make trial of this, with regard to the
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hypothesis, by which, we
have, in the foregoing discourse, endeavoured to account for all experimental
reasonings; and it is hoped, that this new point of view will serve to confirm
all our former observations.
First, It seems evident, that animals, as
well as men learn many things from experience, and infer, that the same events
will always follow from the same causes. By this principle they become
acquainted with the more obvious properties of external objects, and gradually,
from their birth, treasure up a knowledge of the nature of fire, water, earth,
stones, heights, depths, &c. and of the effects, which result from
their operation. The ignorance and inexperience of the young are here plainly
distinguishable from the cunning and sagacity of the old, who have learned, by
long observation, to avoid what hurt them, and to pursue what gave ease or
pleasure. A horse, that has been accustomed to the field, becomes acquainted
with the proper height, which he can leap, and will never attempt what exceeds
his force and ability. An old greyhound will trust the more fatiguing part of
the chace to the younger, and will place himself so as to meet the hare in her
doubles; nor are the conjectures, which he forms on this occasion, founded in
any thing but his observation and experience.
This is still more evident from the effects of
discipline and education on animals, who, by the proper application of rewards
and punishments, may be taught any course of action, the most contrary to their
natural instincts and propensities. Is it not experience, which renders a dog
apprehensive of pain, when you menace him, or lift up the whip to beat him? Is
it not even experience, which makes him answer to his name, and infer, from such
an arbitrary sound, that you mean him rather than any of his fellows, and intend
to call him, when you pronounce it in a certain manner, and with a certain tone
and accent?
In all these cases, we may observe, that the animal
infers
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some fact beyond what
immediately strikes his senses; and that this inference is altogether founded on
past experience, while the creature expects from the present object the same
consequences, which it has always found in its observation to result from
similar objects.
Secondly, It is impossible, that this
inference of the animal can be founded on any process of argument or reasoning,
by which he concludes, that like events must follow like objects, and that the
course of nature will always be regular in its operations. For if there be in
reality any arguments of this nature, they surely lie too abstruse for the
observation of such imperfect understandings; since it may well employ the
utmost care and attention of a philosophic genius to discover and observe them.
Animals, therefore, are not guided in these inferences by reasoning: Neither are
children: Neither are the generality of mankind, in their ordinary actions and
conclusions: Neither are philosophers themselves, who, in all the active parts
of life, are, in the main, the same with the vulgar, and are governed by the
same maxims. Nature must have provided some other principle, of more ready, and
more general use and application; nor can an operation of such immense
consequence in life, as that of inferring effects from causes, be trusted to the
uncertain process of reasoning and argumentation. Were this doubtful with regard
to men, it seems to admit of no question with regard to the brute creation; and
the conclusion being once firmly established in the one, we have a strong
presumption, from all the rules of analogy, that it ought to be universally
admitted, without any exception or reserve. It is custom alone, which engages
animals, from every object, that strikes their senses, to infer its usual
attendant, and carries their imagination, from the appearance of the one, to
conceive the other, in that particular manner, which we denominate
belief. No other explication can be given of this operation, in all the
higher,
PAGE 107
as well as lower classes
of sensitive beings, which fall under our notice and observation
H.
PAGE 108
But though animals learn
many parts of their knowledge from observation, there are also many parts of it,
which they derive from the original hand of nature; which much exceed the share
of capacity they possess on ordinary occasions; and in which they improve,
little or nothing, by the longest practice and experience. These we denominate
INSTINCTS, and are so apt to admire,
as something very extraordinary, and inexplicable by all the disquisitions of
human understanding. But our wonder will, perhaps, cease or diminish; when we
consider, that the experimental reasoning itself, which we possess in common
with beasts, and on which the whole conduct of life depends, is nothing but a
species of instinct or mechanical power, that acts in us unknown to ourselves;
and in its chief operations, is not directed by any such relations or
comparisons of ideas, as are the proper objects of our intellectual faculties.
Though the instinct be different, yet still it is an instinct, which teaches a
man to avoid the fire; as much as that, which teaches a bird, with such
exactness, the art of incubation, and the whole oeconomy and order of its
nursery.
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SECTION X. Of MIRACLES.
PART I.
THERE is, in Dr. TILLOTSON'S writings, an argument against the real
presence, which is as concise, and elegant, and strong as any argument can
possibly be supposed against a doctrine, so little worthy of a serious
refutation. It is acknowledged on all hands, says that learned prelate, that the
authority, either of the scripture or of tradition, is founded merely in the
testimony of the apostles, who were eye-witnesses to those miracles of our
Saviour, by which he proved his divine mission. Our evidence, then, for the
truth of the Christian religion is less than the evidence for the truth
of our senses; because, even in the first authors of our religion, it was no
greater; and it is evident it must diminish in passing from them to their
disciples; nor can any one rest such confidence in their testimony, as in the
immediate object of his senses. But a weaker evidence can never destroy a
stronger; and therefore, were the doctrine of the real presence ever so clearly
revealed in scripture, it were directly contrary to the rules of just reasoning
to give our assent to it. It contradicts sense, though both the scripture and
tradition, on which it is supposed to be built, carry not such evidence with
them as sense; when they are considered merely as external evidences, and are
not brought home to every one's breast, by the immediate operation of the Holy
Spirit.
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Nothing is so convenient
as a decisive argument of this kind, which must at least
silence the most
arrogant bigotry and superstition, and free us from their impertinent
solicitations. I flatter myself, that I have discovered an argument of a like
nature, which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check
to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently, will be useful as long
as the world endures. For so long, I presume, will the accounts of miracles and
prodigies be found in all history, sacred and profane.
Though experience be our only guide in reasoning
concerning matters of fact; it must be acknowledged, that this guide is not
altogether infallible, but in some cases is apt to lead us into errors. One, who
in our climate, should expect better weather in any week of JUNE than in one of DECEMBER, would reason justly, and
conformably to experience; but it is certain, that he may happen, in the event,
to find himself mistaken. However, we may observe, that, in such a case, he
would have no cause to complain of experience; because it commonly informs us
beforehand of the uncertainty, by that contrariety of events, which we may learn
from a diligent observation. All effects follow not with like certainty from
their supposed causes. Some events are found, in all countries and all ages, to
have been constantly conjoined together: Others are found to have been more
variable, and sometimes to disappoint our expectations; so that, in our
reasonings concerning matter of fact, there are all imaginable degrees of
assurance, from the highest certainty to the lowest species of moral
evidence.
A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the
evidence. In such conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience, he
expects the event with the last degree of assurance, and regards his past
experience as a full proof of the future existence of that event. In
other
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cases, he proceeds with
more caution: He weighs the opposite experiments: He considers which side is
supported by the greater number of experiments: To that side he inclines, with
doubt and hesitation; and when at last he fixes his judgment, the evidence
exceeds not what we properly call
probability. All probability, then,
supposes an opposition of experiments and observations, where the one side is
found to overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence,
proportioned to the superiority. A hundred instances or experiments on one side,
and fifty on another, afford a doubtful expectation of any event; though a
hundred uniform experiments, with only one that is contradictory, reasonably
beget a pretty strong degree of assurance. In all cases, we must balance the
opposite experiments, where they are opposite, and deduct the smaller number
from the greater, in order to know the exact force of the superior evidence.
To apply these principles to a particular instance; we
may observe, that there is no species of reasoning more common, more useful, and
even necessary to human life, than that which is derived from the testimony of
men, and the reports of eye-witnesses and spectators. This species of reasoning,
perhaps, one may deny to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. I shall
not dispute about a word. It will be sufficient to observe, that our assurance
in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than our
observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of
facts to the reports of witnesses. It being a general maxim, that no objects
have any discoverable connexion together, and that all the inferences, which we
can draw from one to another, are founded merely on our experience of their
constant and regular conjunction; it is evident, that we ought not to make an
exception to this maxim in favour of human testimony, whose connexion with any
event seems, in itself, as little necessary as any other.
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Were not the memory
tenacious to a certain degree; had not men commonly an inclination to truth and
a principle of probity; were they not sensible to shame, when detected in a
falsehood: Were not these, I say, discovered by
experience to be
qualities, inherent in human nature, we should never repose the least confidence
in human testimony. A man delirious, or noted for falsehood and villany, has no
manner of authority with us.
And as the evidence, derived from witnesses and human
testimony, is founded on past experience, so it varies with the experience, and
is regarded either as a proof or a probability, according as the
conjunction between any particular kind of report and any kind of object has
been found to be constant or variable. There are a number of circumstances to be
taken into consideration in all judgments of this kind; and the ultimate
standard, by which we determine all disputes, that may arise concerning them, is
always derived from experience and observation. Where this experience is not
entirely uniform on any side, it is attended with an unavoidable contrariety in
our judgments, and with the same opposition and mutual destruction of argument
as in every other kind of evidence. We frequently hesitate concerning the
reports of others. We balance the opposite circumstances, which cause any doubt
or uncertainty; and when we discover a superiority on any side, we incline to
it; but still with a diminution of assurance, in proportion to the force of its
antagonist.
This contrariety of evidence, in the present case, may
be derived from several different causes; from the opposition of contrary
testimony; from the character or number of the witnesses; from the manner of
their delivering their testimony; or from the union of all these circumstances.
We entertain a suspicion concerning any matter of fact, when the witnesses
contradict each other; when they are but few, or of a doubtful character; when
they have an interest
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in what they affirm; when
they deliver their testimony with hesitation, or on the contrary, with too
violent asseverations. There are many other particulars of the same kind, which
may diminish or destroy the force of any argument, derived from human testimony.
Suppose, for instance, that the fact, which the
testimony endeavours to establish, partakes of the extraordinary and the
marvellous; in that case, the evidence, resulting from the testimony, admits of
a diminution, greater or less, in proportion as the fact is more or less
unusual. The reason, why we place any credit in witnesses and historians, is not
derived from any connexion, which we perceive à priori, between
testimony and reality, but because we are accustomed to find a conformity
between them. But when the fact attested is such a one as has seldom fallen
under our observation, here is a contest of two opposite experiences; of which
the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes, and the superior can only
operate on the mind by the force, which remains. The very same principle of
experience, which gives us a certain degree of assurance in the testimony of
witnesses, gives us also, in this case, another degree of assurance against the
fact, which they endeavour to establish; from which contradiction there
necessarily arises a counterpoize, and mutual destruction of belief and
authority.
I should not believe such a story were it told me
by CATO; was a proverbial saying
in ROME, even during the lifetime of
that philosophical patriot *. The incredibility of a fact, it was allowed, might
invalidate so great an authority.
The INDIAN
prince, who refused to believe the first relations concerning the effects of
frost, reasoned justly; and it naturally required very strong testimony to
engage his assent to facts, that arose from a state of nature, with which he was
unacquainted, and which bore so little
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analogy to those events,
of which he had had constant and uniform experience. Though they were not
contrary to his experience, they were not conformable to it
I.
But in order to encrease the probability against the
testimony of witnesses, let us suppose, that the fact, which they affirm,
instead of being only marvellous, is really miraculous; and suppose also, that
the testimony, considered apart and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in
that case, there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must prevail,
but still with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its
antagonist.
A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as
a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against
a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from
experience can possibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable, that all men
must die; that lead cannot, of itself, remain suspended in the air; that fire
consumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless it be, that these events are
found agreeable
PAGE 115
to the laws of nature, and
there is required a violation of these laws, or in other words, a miracle to
prevent them? Nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever happen in the common
course of nature. It is no miracle that a man, seemingly in good health, should
die on a sudden: because such a kind of death, though more unusual than any
other, has yet been frequently observed to happen. But it is a miracle, that a
dead man should come to life; because that has never been observed, in any age
or country. There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every
miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as
an uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full
proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle;
nor can such a proof be destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by an
opposite proof, which is superior
K.
The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim
worthy of our attention), "That no testimony is sufficient
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to establish a miracle,
unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more
miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish: And even in that
case there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives us
an assurance suitable to that degree of force, which remains, after deducting
the inferior." When any one tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I
immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this person
should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should
really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according
to the superiority, which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject
the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous,
than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to
command my belief or opinion.
PART II.
In the foregoing reasoning we have supposed, that the
testimony, upon which a miracle is founded, may possibly amount to an entire
proof, and that the falsehood of that testimony would be a real prodigy: But it
is easy to shew, that we have been a great deal too liberal in our concession,
and that there never was a miraculous event established on so full an
evidence.
For first, there is not to be found, in all
history, any miracle attested by a sufficient number of men, of such
unquestioned good-sense, education, and learning, as to secure us against all
delusion in themselves; of such undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond all
suspicion of any design to deceive others; of such credit and reputation in the
eyes of mankind, as to have a great deal to lose in case of their being detected
in any falsehood; and at the same time, attesting facts, performed in such a
public manner, and in so celebrated a part of the world, as to render the
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detection unavoidable: All
which circumstances are requisite to give us a full assurance in the testimony
of men.
Secondly. We may observe in human nature a
principle, which, if strictly examined, will be found to diminish extremely the
assurance, which we might, from human testimony, have, in any kind of prodigy.
The maxim, by which we commonly conduct ourselves in our reasonings, is, that
the objects, of which we have no experience, resemble those, of which we have;
that what we have found to be most usual is always most probable; and that where
there is an opposition of arguments, we ought to give the preference to such as
are founded on the greatest number of past observations. But though, in
proceeding by this rule, we readily reject any fact which is unusual and
incredible in an ordinary degree; yet in advancing farther, the mind observes
not always the same rule; but when any thing is affirmed utterly absurd and
miraculous, it rather the more readily admits of such a fact, upon account of
that very circumstance, which ought to destroy all its authority. The passion of
surprize and wonder, arising from miracles, being an agreeable
emotion, gives a sensible tendency towards the belief of those events, from
which it is derived. And this goes so far, that even those who cannot enjoy this
pleasure immediately, nor can believe those miraculous events, of which they are
informed, yet love to partake of the satisfaction at second-hand or by rebound,
and place a pride and delight in exciting the admiration of others.
With what greediness are the miraculous accounts of
travellers received, their descriptions of sea and land monsters, their
relations of wonderful adventures, strange men, and uncouth manners? But if the
spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of common
sense; and human testimony, in these circumstances, loses all pretensions to
authority. A religionist may be an enthusiast, and imagine he sees what has no
reality: He may
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know his narrative to be
false, and yet persevere in it, with the best intentions in the world, for the
sake of promoting so holy a cause: Or even where this delusion has not place,
vanity, excited by so strong a temptation, operates on him more powerfully than
on the rest of mankind in any other circumstances; and self-interest with equal
force. His auditors may not have, and commonly have not, sufficient judgment to
canvass his evidence: What judgment they have, they renounce by principle, in
these sublime and mysterious subjects: Or if they were ever so willing to employ
it, passion and a heated imagination disturb the regularity of its operations.
Their credulity encreases his impudence: And his impudence overpowers their
credulity.
Eloquence, when at its highest pitch, leaves little
room for reason or reflection; but addressing itself entirely to the fancy or
the affections, captivates the willing hearers, and subdues their understanding.
Happily, this pitch it seldom attains. But what a TULLY or a DEMOSTHENES
could scarcely effect over a ROMAN or
ATHENIAN audience, every
CAPUCHIN, every itinerant or stationary teacher can perform over the
generality of mankind, and in a higher degree, by touching such gross and vulgar
passions.
The many instances of forged miracles, and
prophecies, and supernatural events, which, in all ages, have either been
detected by contrary evidence, or which detect themselves by their absurdity,
prove sufficiently the strong propensity of mankind to the extraordinary and the
marvellous, and ought reasonably to beget a suspicion against all relations of
this kind. This is our natural way of thinking, even with regard to the most
common and most credible events. For instance: There is no kind of report, which
rises so easily, and spreads so quickly, especially in country places and
provincial towns, as those concerning marriages; insomuch that two young persons
of equal condition never see
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each other twice, but the
whole neighbourhood immediately join them together. The pleasure of telling a
piece of news so interesting, of propagating it, and of being the first
reporters of it, spreads the intelligence. And this is so well known, that no
man of sense gives attention to these reports, till he find them confirmed by
some greater evidence. Do not the same passions, and others still stronger,
incline the generality of mankind to believe and report, with the greatest
vehemence and assurance, all religious miracles?
Thirdly. It forms a strong presumption against
all supernatural and miraculous relations, that they are observed chiefly to
abound among ignorant and barbarous nations; or if a civilized people has ever
given admission to any of them, that people will be found to have received them
from ignorant and barbarous ancestors, who transmitted them with that inviolable
sanction and authority, which always attend received opinions. When we peruse
the first histories of all nations, we are apt to imagine ourselves transported
into some new world; where the whole frame of nature is disjointed, and every
element performs its operations in a different manner, from what it does at
present. Battles, revolutions, pestilence, famine, and death, are never the
effect of those natural causes, which we experience. Prodigies, omens, oracles,
judgments, quite obscure the few natural events, that are intermingled with
them. But as the former grow thinner every page, in proportion as we advance
nearer the enlightened ages, we soon learn, that there is nothing mysterious or
supernatural in the case, but that all proceeds from the usual propensity of
mankind towards the marvellous, and that, though this inclination may at
intervals receive a check from sense and learning, it can never be thoroughly
extirpated from human nature.
It is strange, a judicious reader is apt to
say, upon the perusal of these wonderful historians, that such prodigious
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events never happen in
our days. But it is nothing strange, I hope, that men should lie in all
ages. You must surely have seen instances enow of that frailty. You have
yourself heard many such marvellous relations started, which, being treated with
scorn by all the wise and judicious, have at last been abandoned even by the
vulgar. Be assured, that those renowned lies, which have spread and flourished
to such a monstrous height, arose from like beginnings; but being sown in a more
proper soil, shot up at last into prodigies almost equal to those which they
relate.
It was a wise policy in that false prophet, ALEXANDER, who, though now forgotten, was
once so famous, to lay the first scene of his impostures in PAPHLAGONIA, where, as LUCIAN tells us, the people were extremely
ignorant and stupid, and ready to swallow even the grossest delusion. People at
a distance, who are weak enough to think the matter at all worth enquiry, have
no opportunity of receiving better information. The stories come magnified to
them by a hundred circumstances. Fools are industrious in propagating the
imposture; while the wise and learned are contented, in general, to deride its
absurdity, without informing themselves of the particular facts, by which it may
be distinctly refuted. And thus the impostor above-mentioned was enabled to
proceed, from his ignorant PAPHLAGONIANS, to the enlisting of votaries, even among the GRECIAN philosophers, and men of the most
eminent rank and distinction in ROME:
Nay, could engage the attention of that sage emperor MARCUS AURELIUS; so far
as to make him trust the success of a military expedition to his delusive
prophecies.
The advantages are so great, of starting an imposture
among an ignorant people, that, even though the delusion should be too gross to
impose on the generality of them (which, though seldom, is sometimes the
case) it has a much better chance for succeeding in remote countries, than
if the first scene had been laid in a city renowned for arts and
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knowledge. The most
ignorant and barbarous of these barbarians carry the report abroad. None of
their countrymen have a large correspondence, or sufficient credit and authority
to contradict and beat down the delusion. Men's inclination to the marvellous
has full opportunity to display itself. And thus a story, which is universally
exploded in the place where it was first started, shall pass for certain at a
thousand miles distance. But had
ALEXANDER fixed his residence at
ATHENS, the philosophers of that renowned mart of learning had
immediately spread, throughout the whole
ROMAN empire, their sense of the matter; which, being supported by
so great authority, and displayed by all the force of reason and eloquence, had
entirely opened the eyes of mankind. It is true;
LUCIAN, passing by chance through
PAPHLAGONIA, had an opportunity of performing this good office.
But, though much to be wished, it does not always happen, that every
ALEXANDER meets with a
LUCIAN, ready to expose and detect his
impostures.
I may add as a fourth reason, which diminishes
the authority of prodigies, that there is no testimony for any, even those which
have not been expressly detected, that is not opposed by an infinite number of
witnesses; so that not only the miracle destroys the credit of testimony, but
the testimony destroys itself. To make this the better understood, let us
consider, that, in matters of religion, whatever is different is contrary; and
that it is impossible the religions of ancient ROME, of TURKEY, of
SIAM, and of CHINA should, all of them, be established on
any solid foundation. Every miracle, therefore, pretended to have been wrought
in any of these religions (and all of them abound in miracles), as its direct
scope is to establish the particular system to which it is attributed; so has it
the same force, though more indirectly, to overthrow every other system. In
destroying a rival system, it likewise destroys the credit of those miracles, on
which that system
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was established; so that
all the prodigies of different religions are to be regarded as contrary facts,
and the evidences of these prodigies, whether weak or strong, as opposite to
each other. According to this method of reasoning, when we believe any miracle
of
MAHOMET or his successors, we have
for our warrant the testimony of a few barbarous
ARABIANS: And on the other hand, we are to regard the authority of
TITUS LIVIUS,
PLUTARCH,
TACITUS, and, in short, of all the authors
and witnesses,
GRECIAN,
CHINESE, and
ROMAN CATHOLIC, who have
related any miracle in their particular religion; I say, we are to regard their
testimony in the same light as if they had mentioned that
MAHOMETAN miracle, and had in express terms
contradicted it, with the same certainty as they have for the miracle they
relate. This argument may appear over subtile and refined; but is not in reality
different from the reasoning of a judge, who supposes, that the credit of two
witnesses, maintaining a crime against any one, is destroyed by the testimony of
two others, who affirm him to have been two hundred leagues distant, at the same
instant when the crime is said to have been committed.
One of the best attested miracles in all profane
history, is that which TACITUS reports
of VESPASIAN, who cured a blind man in
ALEXANDRIA, by means of his spittle,
and a lame man by the mere touch of his foot; in obedience to a vision of the
god SERAPIS, who had enjoined them to
have recourse to the Emperor, for these miraculous cures. The story may be seen
in that fine historian *; where every circumstance seems to add weight to the
testimony, and might be displayed at large with all the force of argument and
eloquence, if any one were now concerned to enforce the evidence of that
exploded and idolatrous superstition.
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The gravity, solidity,
age, and probity of so great an emperor, who, through the whole course of his
life, conversed in a familiar manner with his friends and courtiers, and never
affected those extraordinary airs of divinity assumed by
ALEXANDER and
DEMETRIUS. The historian, a cotemporary writer, noted for candour
and veracity, and withal, the greatest and most penetrating genius, perhaps, of
all antiquity; and so free from any tendency to credulity, that he even lies
under the contrary imputation, of atheism and profaneness: The persons, from
whose authority he related the miracle, of established character for judgment
and veracity, as we may well presume; eye-witnesses of the fact, and confirming
their testimony, after the
FLAVIAN
family was despoiled of the empire, and could no longer give any reward, as the
price of a lie.
Utrumque, qui interfuere, nunc quoque memorant, postquam
nullum mendacio pretium. To which if we add the public nature of the facts,
as related, it will appear, that no evidence can well be supposed stronger for
so gross and so palpable a falsehood.
There is also a memorable story related by Cardinal
DE RETZ, which may well deserve our consideration. When that
intriguing politician fled into SPAIN,
to avoid the persecution of his enemies, he passed through SARAGOSSA, the capital of ARRAGON, where he was shewn, in the
cathedral, a man, who had served seven years as a door-keeper, and was well
known to every body in town, that had ever paid his devotions at that church. He
had been seen, for so long a time, wanting a leg; but recovered that limb by the
rubbing of holy oil upon the stump; and the cardinal assures us that he saw him
with two legs. This miracle was vouched by all the canons of the church; and the
whole company in town were appealed to for a confirmation of the fact; whom the
cardinal found, by their zealous devotion, to be thorough believers of the
miracle. Here the relater was also cotemporary to the supposed
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prodigy, of an incredulous
and libertine character, as well as of great genius; the miracle of so
singular a nature as could scarcely admit of a counterfeit, and the
witnesses very numerous, and all of them, in a manner, spectators of the fact,
to which they gave their testimony. And what adds mightily to the force of the
evidence, and may double our surprize on this occasion, is, that the cardinal
himself, who relates the story, seems not to give any credit to it, and
consequently cannot be suspected of any concurrence in the holy fraud. He
considered justly, that it was not requisite, in order to reject a fact of this
nature, to be able accurately to disprove the testimony, and to trace its
falsehood, through all the circumstances of knavery and credulity which produced
it. He knew, that, as this was commonly altogether impossible at any small
distance of time and place; so was it extremely difficult, even where one was
immediately present, by reason of the bigotry, ignorance, cunning, and roguery
of a great part of mankind. He therefore concluded, like a just reasoner, that
such an evidence carried falsehood upon the very face of it, and that a miracle,
supported by any human testimony, was more properly a subject of derision than
of argument.
There surely never was a greater number of miracles
ascribed to one person, than those, which were lately said to have been wrought
in FRANCE upon the tomb of Abbé PARIS, the famous JANSENIST, with whose sanctity the people
were so long deluded. The curing of the sick, giving hearing to the deaf, and
sight to the blind, were every where talked of as the usual effects of that holy
sepulchre. But what is more extraordinary; many of the miracles were immediately
proved upon the spot, before judges of unquestioned integrity, attested by
witnesses of credit and distinction, in a learned age, and on the most eminent
theatre that is now in the world. Nor is this all: A relation of them was
published and dispersed every where; nor were
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the
Jesuits, though
a learned body, supported by the civil magistrate, and determined enemies to
those opinions, in whose favour the miracles were said to have been wrought,
ever able distinctly to refute or detect them
L. Where shall we find such a number of circumstances, agreeing
to the corroboration of one fact? And what have we to oppose to such a cloud of
witnesses, but the absolute impossibility or miraculous nature of the events,
which they relate? And this surely, in the eyes of all reasonable people, will
alone be regarded as a sufficient refutation.
Is the consequence just, because some human testimony
has the utmost force and authority in some cases, when it relates the battle of
PHILIPPI or PHARSALIA for instance; that therefore all
kinds of testimony must, in all cases, have equal force and authority? Suppose
that the CAESAREAN and POMPEIAN factions had, each of them, claimed
the victory in these battles, and that the historians of each party had
uniformly ascribed the advantage to their own side; how could mankind, at this
distance, have been able to determine between them? The contrariety is equally
strong between the miracles related by HERODOTUS or PLUTARCH,
and those delivered by MARIANA, BEDE, or any monkish historian.
The wise lend a very academic faith to every report
which favours the passion of the reporter; whether it magnifies his country, his
family, or himself, or in any other way strikes in with his natural inclinations
and propensities. But what greater temptation than to appear a missionary, a
prophet, an ambassador from heaven? Who would not encounter many dangers and
difficulties, in order to attain so sublime a character? Or if, by the help of
vanity and a heated imagination, a man has first made a convert of himself, and
entered seriously into the delusion; who ever scruples to make use of pious
frauds, in support of so holy and meritorious a cause?
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The smallest spark may
here kindle into the greatest flame; because the materials are always prepared
for it. The
avidum genus auricularum *, the gazing populace, receive greedily, without examination,
whatever sooths superstition, and promotes wonder.
How many stories of this nature have, in all ages,
been detected and exploded in their infancy? How many more have been celebrated
for a time, and have afterwards sunk into neglect and oblivion? Where such
reports, therefore, fly about, the solution of the phaenomenon is obvious; and
we judge in conformity to regular experience and observation, when we account
for it by the known and natural principles of credulity and delusion. And shall
we, rather than have a recourse to so natural a solution, allow of a miraculous
violation of the most established laws of nature?
I need not mention the difficulty of detecting a
falsehood in any private or even public history, at the place, where it is said
to happen; much more when the scene is removed to ever so small a distance. Even
a court of judicature, with all the authority, accuracy, and judgment, which
they can employ, find themselves often at a loss to distinguish between truth
and falsehood in the most recent actions. But the matter never comes to any
issue, if trusted to the common method of altercation and debate and flying
rumours; especially when men's passions have taken part on either side.
In the infancy of new religions, the wise and learned
commonly esteem the matter too inconsiderable to deserve their attention or
regard. And when afterwards they would willingly detect the cheat, in order to
undeceive the deluded multitude, the season is now past, and the records and
witnesses, which might clear up the matter, have perished beyond recovery.
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No means of detection
remain, but those which must be drawn from the very testimony itself of the
reporters: And these, though always sufficient with the judicious and knowing,
are commonly too fine to fall under the comprehension of the vulgar.
Upon the whole, then, it appears, that no testimony
for any kind of miracle has ever amounted to a probability, much less to a
proof; and that, even supposing it amounted to a proof, it would be opposed by
another proof; derived from the very nature of the fact, which it would
endeavour to establish. It is experience only, which gives authority to human
testimony; and it is the same experience, which assures us of the laws of
nature. When, therefore, these two kinds of experience are contrary, we have
nothing to do but substract the one from the other, and embrace an opinion,
either on one side or the other, with that assurance which arises from the
remainder. But according to the principle here explained, this substraction,
with regard to all popular religions, amounts to an entire annihilation; and
therefore we may establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can have such
force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any such system
of religion.
I beg the limitations here made may be remarked, when
I say, that a miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a
system of religion. For I own, that otherwise, there may possibly be miracles,
or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit of proof
from human testimony; though, perhaps, it will be impossible to find any such in
all the records of history. Thus, suppose, all authors, in all languages, agree,
that, from the first of JANUARY 1600,
there was a total darkness over the whole earth for eight days: Suppose that the
tradition of this extraordinary event is still strong and lively among the
people: That all travellers, who return from foreign countries, bring us
accounts of the same
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tradition, without the
least variation or contradiction: It is evident, that our present philosophers,
instead of doubting the fact, ought to receive it as certain, and ought to
search for the causes whence it might be derived. The decay, corruption, and
dissolution of nature, is an event rendered probable by so many analogies, that
any phaenomenon, which seems to have a tendency towards that catastrophe, comes
within the reach of human testimony, if that testimony be very extensive and
uniform.
But suppose, that all the historians who treat of
ENGLAND, should agree, that, on the
first of JANUARY 1600, Queen ELIZABETH died; that both before and after
her death she was seen by her physicians and the whole court, as is usual with
persons of her rank; that her successor was acknowledged and proclaimed by the
parliament; and that, after being interred a month, she again appeared, resumed
the throne, and governed ENGLAND for
three years: I must confess that I should be surprized at the concurrence of so
many odd circumstances, but should not have the least inclination to believe so
miraculous an event. I should not doubt of her pretended death, and of those
other public circumstances that followed it: I should only assert it to have
been pretended, and that it neither was, nor possibly could be real. You would
in vain object to me the difficulty, and almost impossibility of deceiving the
world in an affair of such consequence; the wisdom and solid judgment of that
renowned queen; with the little or no advantage which she could reap from so
poor an artifice: All this might astonish me; but I would still reply, that the
knavery and folly of men are such common phaenomena, that I should rather
believe the most extraordinary events to arise from their concurrence, than
admit of so signal a violation of the laws of nature.
But should this miracle be ascribed to any new system
of religion; men, in all ages, have been so much imposed on
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by ridiculous stories of
that kind, that this very circumstance would be a full proof of a cheat, and
sufficient, with all men of sense, not only to make them reject the fact, but
even reject it without farther examination. Though the Being to whom the miracle
is ascribed, be, in this case, Almighty, it does not, upon that account, become
a whit more probable; since it is impossible for us to know the attributes or
actions of such a Being, otherwise than from the experience which we have of his
productions, in the usual course of nature. This still reduces us to past
observation, and obliges us to compare the instances of the violation of truth
in the testimony of men, with those of the violation of the laws of nature by
miracles, in order to judge which of them is most likely and probable. As the
violations of truth are more common in the testimony concerning religious
miracles, than in that concerning any other matter of fact; this must diminish
very much the authority of the former testimony, and make us form a general
resolution, never to lend any attention to it, with whatever specious pretence
it may be covered.
Lord BACON
seems to have embraced the same principles of reasoning. "We ought, says he, to
make a collection or particular history of all monsters and prodigious births or
productions, and in a word of every thing new, rare, and extraordinary in
nature. But this must be done with the most severe scrutiny, lest we depart from
truth. Above all, every relation must be considered as suspicious, which depends
in any degree upon religion, as the prodigies of LIVY: And no less so, every thing that is to be found in the
writers of natural magic or alchimy, or such authors, who seem, all of them, to
have an unconquerable appetite for falsehood and fable *."
I am the better pleased with the method of reasoning
here delivered, as I think it may serve to confound those
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dangerous friends or
disguised enemies to the
Christian Religion, who have undertaken to
defend it by the principles of human reason. Our most holy religion is founded
on
Faith, not on reason; and it is a sure method of exposing it to put it
to such a trial as it is, by no means, fitted to endure. To make this more
evident, let us examine those miracles, related in scripture; and not to lose
ourselves in too wide a field, let us confine ourselves to such as we find in
the
Pentateuch, which we shall examine, according to the principles of
these pretended Christians, not as the word or testimony of God himself, but as
the production of a mere human writer and historian. Here then we are first to
consider a book, presented to us by a barbarous and ignorant people, written in
an age when they were still more barbarous, and in all probability long after
the facts which it relates, corroborated by no concurring testimony, and
resembling those fabulous accounts, which every nation gives of its origin. Upon
reading this book, we find it full of prodigies and miracles. It gives an
account of a state of the world and of human nature entirely different from the
present: Of our fall from that state: Of the age of man, extended to near a
thousand years: Of the destruction of the world by a deluge: Of the arbitrary
choice of one people, as the favourites of heaven; and that people the
countrymen of the author: Of their deliverance from bondage by prodigies the
most astonishing imaginable: I desire any one to lay his hand upon his heart,
and after a serious consideration declare, whether he thinks that the falsehood
of such a book, supported by such a testimony, would be more extraordinary and
miraculous than all the miracles it relates; which is, however, necessary to
make it be received, according to the measures of probability above established.
What we have said of miracles may be applied, without
any variation, to prophecies; and indeed, all prophecies are
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real miracles, and as such
only, can be admitted as proofs of any revelation. If it did not exceed the
capacity of human nature to foretel future events, it would be absurd to employ
any prophecy as an argument for a divine mission or authority from heaven. So
that, upon the whole, we may conclude, that the
Christian Religion not
only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be
believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to
convince us of its veracity: And whoever is moved by
Faith to assent to
it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all
the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe
what is most contrary to custom and experience.
PAGE 132
SECTION XI. Of a PARTICULAR PROVIDENCE and of a FUTURE STATE.
I WAS
lately engaged in conversation with a friend who loves sceptical paradoxes;
where, though he advanced many principles, of which I can by no means approve,
yet as they seem to be curious, and to bear some relation to the chain of
reasoning carried on throughout this enquiry, I shall here copy them from my
memory as accurately as I can, in order to submit them to the judgment of the
reader.
Our conversation began with my admiring the singular
good fortune of philosophy, which, as it requires entire liberty above all other
privileges, and chiefly flourishes from the free opposition of sentiments and
argumentation, received its first birth in an age and country of freedom and
toleration, and was never cramped, even in its most extravagant principles, by
any creeds, confessions, or penal statutes. For, except the banishment of PROTAGORAS, and the death of SOCRATES, which last event proceeded partly
from other motives, there are scarcely any instances to be met with, in ancient
history, of this bigotted jealousy, with which the present age is so much
infested. EPICURUS lived at ATHENS to an advanced age, in peace and
tranquillity: EPICUREANS *were even admitted to receive the sacerdotal character, and to
officiate at the altar, in the most sacred rites of the established religion:
And the public encouragement *of pensions and
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salaries was afforded
equally, by the wisest of all the
ROMAN emperors
†, to the professors of every sect of philosophy. How requisite
such kind of treatment was to philosophy, in her early youth, will easily be
conceived, if we reflect, that, even at present, when she may be supposed more
hardy and robust, she bears with much difficulty the inclemency of the seasons,
and those harsh winds of calumny and persecution, which blow upon her.
You admire, says my friend, as the singular good
fortune of philosophy, what seems to result from the natural course of things,
and to be unavoidable in every age and nation. This pertinacious bigotry, of
which you complain, as so fatal to philosophy, is really her offspring, who,
after allying with superstition, separates himself entirely from the interest of
his parent, and becomes her most inveterate enemy and persecutor. Speculative
dogmas of religion, the present occasions of such furious dispute, could not
possibly be conceived or admitted in the early ages of the world; when mankind,
being wholly illiterate, formed an idea of religion more suitable to their weak
apprehension, and composed their sacred tenets of such tales chiefly as were the
objects of traditional belief, more than of argument or disputation. After the
first alarm, therefore, was over, which arose from the new paradoxes and
principles of the philosophers; these teachers seem ever after, during the ages
of antiquity, to have lived in great harmony with the established superstition,
and to have made a fair partition of mankind between them; the former claiming
all the learned and wise, the latter possessing all the vulgar and
illiterate.
It seems then, say I, that you leave politics
entirely out of the question, and never suppose, that a wise magistrate can
justly be jealous of certain tenets of philosophy, such as those of EPICURUS, which, denying a divine existence,
and consequently a providence and a future state, seem to loosen,
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in a great measure, the
ties of morality, and may be supposed, for that reason, pernicious to the peace
of civil society.
I know, replied he, that in fact these persecutions
never, in any age, proceeded from calm reason, or from experience of the
pernicious consequences of philosophy; but arose entirely from passion and
prejudice. But what if I should advance farther, and assert, that, if EPICURUS had been accused before the people,
by any of the sycophants or informers of those days, he could easily have
defended his cause, and proved his principles of philosophy to be as salutary as
those of his adversaries, who endeavoured, with such zeal, to expose him to the
public hatred and jealousy?
I wish, said I, you would try your eloquence upon so
extraordinary a topic, and make a speech for EPICURUS, which might satisfy, not the mob of ATHENS, if you will allow that ancient and
polite city to have contained any mob, but the more philosophical part of his
audience, such as might be supposed capable of comprehending his arguments.
The matter would not be difficult, upon such
conditions, replied he: And if you please, I shall suppose myself EPICURUS for a moment, and make you stand
for the ATHENIAN people, and shall
deliver you such an harangue as will fill all the urn with white beans, and
leave not a black one to gratify the malice of my adversaries.
Very well: Pray proceed upon these suppositions.
I come hither, O ye ATHENIANS, to justify in your assembly what I maintained in my
school, and I find myself impeached by furious antagonists, instead of reasoning
with calm and dispassionate enquirers. Your deliberations, which of right should
be directed to questions of public good, and the interest of the commonwealth,
are diverted to the disquisitions of speculative philosophy; and these
magnificent, but perhaps fruitless enquiries, take place of your more familiar
PAGE 135
but more useful
occupations. But so far as in me lies, I will prevent this abuse. We shall not
here dispute concerning the origin and government of worlds. We shall only
enquire how far such questions concern the public interest. And if I can
persuade you, that they are entirely indifferent to the peace of society and
security of government, I hope that you will presently send us back to our
schools, there to examine, at leisure, the question, the most sublime, but, at
the same time, the most speculative of all philosophy.
The religious philosophers, not satisfied with the
tradition of your forefathers, and doctrine of your priests (in which I
willingly acquiesce), indulge a rash curiosity, in trying how far they can
establish religion upon the principles of reason; and they thereby excite,
instead of satisfying, the doubts, which naturally arise from a diligent and
scrutinous enquiry. They paint, in the most magnificent colours, the order,
beauty, and wise arrangement of the universe; and then ask, if such a glorious
display of intelligence could proceed from the fortuitous concourse of atoms, or
if chance could produce what the greatest genius can never sufficiently admire.
I shall not examine the justness of this argument. I shall allow it to be as
solid as my antagonists and accusers can desire. It is sufficient, if I can
prove, from this very reasoning, that the question is entirely speculative, and
that, when, in my philosophical disquisitions, I deny a providence and a future
state, I undermine not the foundations of society, but advance principles, which
they themselves, upon their own topics, if they argue consistently, must allow
to be solid and satisfactory.
You then, who are my accusers, have acknowledged,
that the chief or sole argument for a divine existence (which I never
questioned) is derived from the order of nature; where there appear such marks
of intelligence and design, that you think it extravagant to assign for its
cause, either chance, or the blind and unguided force of matter. You allow, that
this
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is an argument drawn from
effects to causes. From the order of the work, you infer, that there must have
been project and forethought in the workman. If you cannot make out this point,
you allow, that your conclusion fails; and you pretend not to establish the
conclusion in a greater latitude than the phaenomena of nature will justify.
These are your concessions. I desire you to mark the consequences.
When we infer any particular cause from an effect, we
must proportion the one to the other, and can never be allowed to ascribe to the
cause any qualities, but what are exactly sufficient to produce the effect. A
body of ten ounces raised in any scale may serve as a proof, that the
counterbalancing weight exceeds ten ounces; but can never afford a reason that
it exceeds a hundred. If the cause, assigned for any effect, be not sufficient
to produce it, we must either reject that cause, or add to it such qualities as
will give it a just proportion to the effect. But if we ascribe to it farther
qualities, or affirm it capable of producing other effects, we can only indulge
the licence of conjecture, and arbitrarily suppose the existence of qualities
and energies, without reason or authority.
The same rule holds, whether the cause assigned be
brute unconscious matter, or a rational intelligent being. If the cause be known
only by the effect, we never ought to ascribe to it any qualities, beyond what
are precisely requisite to produce the effect: Nor can we, by any rules of just
reasoning, return back from the cause, and infer other effects from it, beyond
those by which alone it is known to us. No one, merely from the sight of one of
ZEUXIS'S pictures, could know, that he
was also a statuary or architect, and was an artist no less skilful in stone and
marble than in colours. The talents and taste, displayed in the particular work
before us; these we may safely conclude the workman to be possessed of. The
cause must be proportioned to the effect; and if
PAGE 137
we exactly and precisely
proportion it, we shall never find in it any qualities, that point farther, or
afford an inference concerning any other design or performance. Such qualities
must be somewhat beyond what is merely requisite for producing the effect, which
we examine.
Allowing, therefore, the gods to be the authors of
the existence or order of the universe; it follows, that they possess that
precise degree of power, intelligence, and benevolence, which appears in their
workmanship; but nothing farther can ever be proved, except we call in the
assistance of exaggeration and flattery to supply the defects of argument and
reasoning. So far as the traces of any attributes, at present, appear, so far
may we conclude these attributes to exist. The supposition of farther attributes
is mere hypothesis; much more the supposition, that, in distant regions of space
or periods of time, there has been, or will be, a more magnificent display of
these attributes, and a scheme of administration more suitable to such imaginary
virtues. We can never be allowed to mount up from the universe, the effect, to
JUPITER, the cause; and then descend
downwards, to infer any new effect from that cause; as if the present effects
alone were not entirely worthy of the glorious attributes, which we ascribe to
that deity. The knowledge of the cause being derived solely from the effect,
they must be exactly adjusted to each other; and the one can never refer to any
thing farther, or be the foundation of any new inference and conclusion.
You find certain phaenomena in nature. You seek a
cause or author. You imagine that you have found him. You afterwards become so
enamoured of this offspring of your brain, that you imagine it impossible, but
he must produce something greater and more perfect than the present scene of
things, which is so full of ill and disorder. You forget, that this superlative
intelligence and benevolence are entirely imaginary, or, at least, without any
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foundation in reason; and
that you have no ground to ascribe to him any qualities, but what you see he has
actually exerted and displayed in his productions. Let your gods, therefore, O
philosophers, be suited to the present appearances of nature: And presume not to
alter these appearances by arbitrary suppositions, in order to suit them to the
attributes, which you so fondly ascribe to your deities.
When priests and poets, supported by your authority,
O ATHENIANS, talk of a golden or
silver age, which preceded the present state of vice and misery, I hear them
with attention and with reverence. But when philosophers, who pretend to neglect
authority, and to cultivate reason, hold the same discourse, I pay them not, I
own, the same obsequious submission and pious deference. I ask; who carried them
into the celestial regions, who admitted them into the councils of the gods, who
opened to them the book of fate, that they thus rashly affirm, that their
deities have executed, or will execute, any purpose beyond what has actually
appeared? If they tell me, that they have mounted on the steps or by the gradual
ascent of reason, and by drawing inferences from effects to causes, I still
insist, that they have aided the ascent of reason by the wings of imagination;
otherwise they could not thus change their manner of inference, and argue from
causes to effects; presuming, that a more perfect production than the present
world would be more suitable to such perfect beings as the gods, and forgetting
that they have no reason to ascribe to these celestial beings any perfection or
any attribute, but what can be found in the present world.
Hence all the fruitless industry to account for the
ill appearances of nature, and save the honour of the gods; while we must
acknowledge the reality of that evil and disorder, with which the world so much
abounds. The obstinate and intractable qualities of matter, we are told,
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or the observance of
general laws, or some such reason, is the sole cause, which controlled the power
and benevolence of
JUPITER, and
obliged him to create mankind and every sensible creature so imperfect and so
unhappy. These attributes, then, are, it seems, beforehand, taken for granted,
in their greatest latitude. And upon that supposition, I own, that such
conjectures may, perhaps, be admitted as plausible solutions of the ill
phaenomena. But still I ask; Why take these attributes for granted, or why
ascribe to the cause any qualities but what actually appear in the effect? Why
torture your brain to justify the course of nature upon suppositions, which, for
aught you know, may be entirely imaginary, and of which there are to be found no
traces in the course of nature?
The religious hypothesis, therefore, must be
considered only as a particular method of accounting for the visible phaenomena
of the universe: But no just reasoner will ever presume to infer from it any
single fact, and alter or add to the phaenomena, in any single particular. If
you think, that the appearances of things prove such causes, it is allowable for
you to draw an inference concerning the existence of these causes. In such
complicated and sublime subjects, every one should be indulged in the liberty of
conjecture and argument. But here you ought to rest. If you come backward, and
arguing from your inferred causes, conclude, that any other fact has existed, or
will exist, in the course of nature, which may serve as a fuller display of
particular attributes; I must admonish you, that you have departed from the
method of reasoning, attached to the present subject, and have certainly added
something to the attributes of the cause, beyond what appears in the effect;
otherwise you could never, with tolerable sense or propriety, add any thing to
the effect, in order to render it more worthy of the cause.
Where, then, is the odiousness of that doctrine,
which
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I teach in my school, or
rather, which I examine in my gardens? Or what do you find in this whole
question, wherein the security of good morals, or the peace and order of society
is in the least concerned?
I deny a providence, you say, and supreme governour
of the world, who guides the course of events, and punishes the vicious with
infamy and disappointment, and rewards the virtuous with honour and success, in
all their undertakings. But surely, I deny not the course itself of events,
which lies open to every one's enquiry and examination. I acknowledge, that, in
the present order of things, virtue is attended with more peace of mind than
vice, and meets with a more favourable reception from the world. I am sensible,
that, according to the past experience of mankind, friendship is the chief joy
of human life, and moderation the only source of tranquillity and happiness. I
never balance between the virtuous and the vicious course of life; but am
sensible, that, to a well disposed mind, every advantage is on the side of the
former. And what can you say more, allowing all your suppositions and
reasonings? You tell me, indeed, that this disposition of things proceeds from
intelligence and design. But whatever it proceeds from, the disposition itself,
on which depends our happiness or misery, and consequently our conduct and
deportment in life, is still the same. It is still open for me, as well as you,
to regulate my behaviour, by my experience of past events. And if you affirm,
that, while a divine providence is allowed, and a supreme distributive justice
in the universe, I ought to expect some more particular reward of the good, and
punishment of the bad, beyond the ordinary course of events; I here find the
same fallacy, which I have before endeavoured to detect. You persist in
imagining, that, if we grant that divine existence, for which you so earnestly
contend, you may safely infer consequences from it, and add something
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to the experienced order
of nature, by arguing from the attributes which you ascribe to your gods. You
seem not to remember, that all your reasonings on this subject can only be drawn
from effects to causes; and that every argument, deduced from causes to effects,
must of necessity be a gross sophism; since it is impossible for you to know any
thing of the cause, but what you have antecedently, not inferred, but discovered
to the full, in the effect.
But what must a philosopher think of those vain
reasoners, who, instead of regarding the present scene of things as the sole
object of their contemplation, so far reverse the whole course of nature, as to
render this life merely a passage to something farther; a porch, which leads to
a greater, and vastly different building; a prologue, which serves only to
introduce the piece, and give it more grace and propriety? Whence, do you think,
can such philosophers derive their idea of the gods? From their own conceit and
imagination surely. For if they derived it from the present phaenomena, it would
never point to any thing farther, but must be exactly adjusted to them. That the
divinity may possibly be endowed with attributes, which we have never
seen exerted; may be governed by principles of action, which we cannot discover
to be satisfied: All this will freely be allowed. But still this is mere
possibility and hypothesis. We never can have reason to infer any
attributes, or any principles of action in him, but so far as we know them to
have been exerted and satisfied.
Are there any marks of a distributive justice in
the world? If you answer in the affirmative, I conclude, that, since justice
here exerts itself, it is satisfied. If you reply in the negative, I conclude,
that you have then no reason to ascribe justice, in our sense of it, to the
gods. If you hold a medium between affirmation and negation, by
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saying, that the justice
of the gods, at present, exerts itself in part, but not in its full extent; I
answer, that you have no reason to give it any particular extent, but only so
far as you see it,
at present, exert itself.
Thus I bring the dispute, O ATHENIANS, to a short issue with my
antagonists. The course of nature lies open to my contemplation as well as to
theirs. The experienced train of events is the great standard, by which we all
regulate our conduct. Nothing else can be appealed to in the field, or in the
senate. Nothing else ought ever to be heard of in the school, or in the closet.
In vain would our limited understanding break through those boundaries, which
are too narrow for our fond imagination. While we argue from the course of
nature, and infer a particular intelligent cause, which first bestowed, and
still preserves order in the universe, we embrace a principle, which is both
uncertain and useless. It is uncertain; because the subject lies entirely beyond
the reach of human experience. It is useless; because our knowledge of this
cause being derived entirely from the course of nature, we can never, according
to the rules of just reasoning, return back from the cause with any new
inference, or making additions to the common and experienced course of nature,
establish any new principles of conduct and behaviour.
I observe (said I, finding he had finished his
harangue) that you neglect not the artifice of the demagogues of old; and as you
were pleased to make me stand for the people, you insinuate yourself into my
favour by embracing those principles, to which, you know, I have always
expressed a particular attachment. But allowing you to make experience (as
indeed I think you ought) the only standard of our judgment concerning this, and
all other questions of fact; I doubt not but, from the very same experience, to
which you appeal, it may be possible to
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refute this reasoning,
which you have put into the mouth of
EPICURUS. If you saw, for instance, a half-finished building,
surrounded with heaps of brick and stone and mortar, and all the instruments of
masonry; could you not
infer from the effect, that it was a work of
design and contrivance? And could you not return again, from this inferred
cause, to infer new additions to the effect, and conclude, that the building
would soon be finished, and receive all the further improvements, which art
could bestow upon it? If you saw upon the sea-shore the print of one human foot,
you would conclude, that a man had passed that way, and that he had also left
the traces of the other foot, though effaced by the rolling of the sands or
inundation of the waters. Why then do you refuse to admit the same method of
reasoning with regard to the order of nature? Consider the world and the present
life only as an imperfect building, from which you can infer a superior
intelligence; and arguing from that superior intelligence, which can leave
nothing imperfect; why may you not infer a more finished scheme or plan, which
will receive its completion in some distant point of space or time? Are not
these methods of reasoning exactly similar? And under what pretence can you
embrace the one, while you reject the other?
The infinite difference of the subjects, replied he,
is a sufficient foundation for this difference in my conclusions. In works of
human art and contrivance, it is allowable to advance from the effect to
the cause, and returning back from the cause, to form new inferences concerning
the effect, and examine the alterations, which it has probably undergone, or may
still undergo. But what is the foundation of this method of reasoning? Plainly
this; that man is a being, whom we know by experience, whose motives and designs
we are acquainted with, and whose projects and inclinations have a certain
connexion and
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coherence, according to
the laws which nature has established for the government of such a creature.
When, therefore, we find, that any work has proceeded from the skill and
industry of man; as we are otherwise acquainted with the nature of the animal,
we can draw a hundred inferences concerning what may be expected from him; and
these inferences will all be founded in experience and observation. But did we
know man only from the single work or production which we examine, it were
impossible for us to argue in this manner; because our knowledge of all the
qualities, which we ascribe to him, being in that case derived from the
production, it is impossible they could point to any thing farther, or be the
foundation of any new inference. The print of a foot in the sand can only prove,
when considered alone, that there was some figure adapted to it, by which it was
produced: But the print of a human foot proves likewise, from our other
experience, that there was probably another foot, which also left its
impression, though effaced by time or other accidents. Here we mount from the
effect to the cause; and descending again from the cause, infer alterations in
the effect; but this is not a continuation of the same simple chain of
reasoning. We comprehend in this case a hundred other experiences and
observations, concerning the
usual figure and members of that species of
animal, without which this method of argument must be considered as fallacious
and sophistical.
The case is not the same with our reasonings from the
works of nature. The Deity is known to us only by his productions, and is a
single being in the universe, not comprehended under any species or genus, from
whose experienced attributes or qualities, we can, by analogy, infer any
attribute or quality in him. As the universe shews wisdom and goodness, we infer
wisdom and goodness. As it shews a particular degree of these perfections,
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we infer a particular
degree of them, precisely adapted to the effect which we examine. But farther
attributes or farther degrees of the same attributes, we can never be authorised
to infer or suppose, by any rules of just reasoning. Now, without some such
licence of supposition, it is impossible for us to argue from the cause, or
infer any alteration in the effect, beyond what has immediately fallen under our
observation. Greater good produced by this Being must still prove a greater
degree of goodness: A more impartial distribution of rewards and punishments
must proceed from a greater regard to justice and equity. Every supposed
addition to the works of nature makes an addition to the attributes of the
Author of nature; and consequently, being entirely unsupported by any reason or
argument, can never be admitted but as mere conjecture and hypothesis
M.
The great source of our mistake in this subject, and
of the unbounded licence of conjecture, which we indulge, is, that we tacitly
consider ourselves, as in the place of the Supreme Being, and conclude, that he
will, on every
PAGE 146
occasion, observe the same
conduct, which we ourselves, in his situation, would have embraced as reasonable
and eligible. But, besides that the ordinary course of nature may convince us,
that almost every thing is regulated by principles and maxims very different
from ours; besides this, I say, it must evidently appear contrary to all rules
of analogy to reason, from the intentions and projects of men, to those of a
Being so different, and so much superior. In human nature, there is a certain
experienced coherence of designs and inclinations; so that when, from any fact,
we have discovered one intention of any man, it may often be reasonable, from
experience, to infer another, and draw a long chain of conclusions concerning
his past or future conduct. But this method of reasoning can never have place
with regard to a Being, so remote and incomprehensible, who bears much less
analogy to any other being in the universe than the sun to a waxen taper, and
who discovers himself only by some faint traces or outlines, beyond which we
have no authority to ascribe to him any attribute or perfection. What we imagine
to be a superior perfection, may really be a defect. Or were it ever so much a
perfection, the ascribing of it to the Supreme Being, where it appears not to
have been really exerted, to the full, in his works, savours more of flattery
and panegyric, than of just reasoning and sound philosophy. All the philosophy,
therefore, in the world, and all the religion, which is nothing but a species of
philosophy, will never be able to carry us beyond the usual course of
experience, or give us measures of conduct and behaviour different from those
which are furnished by reflections on common life. No new fact can ever be
inferred from the religious hypothesis; no event foreseen or foretold; no reward
or punishment expected or dreaded, beyond what is already known by practice and
observation. So that my apology for
EPICURUS will still appear solid and
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satisfactory; nor have the
political interests of society any connexion with the philosophical disputes
concerning metaphysics and religion.
There is still one circumstance, replied I, which you
seem to have overlooked. Though I should allow your premises, I must deny your
conclusion. You conclude, that religious doctrines and reasonings can
have no influence on life, because they ought to have no influence; never
considering, that men reason not in the same manner you do, but draw many
consequences from the belief of a divine Existence, and suppose that the Deity
will inflict punishments on vice, and bestow rewards on virtue, beyond what
appear in the ordinary course of nature. Whether this reasoning of theirs be
just or not, is no matter. Its influence on their life and conduct must still be
the same. And, those, who attempt to disabuse them of such prejudices, may, for
aught I know, be good reasoners, but I cannot allow them to be good citizens and
politicians; since they free men from one restraint upon their passions, and
make the infringement of the laws of society, in one respect, more easy and
secure.
After all, I may, perhaps, agree to your general
conclusion in favour of liberty, though upon different premises from those, on
which you endeavour to found it. I think, that the state ought to tolerate every
principle of philosophy; nor is there an instance, that any government has
suffered in its political interests by such indulgence. There is no enthusiasm
among philosophers; their doctrines are not very alluring to the people; and no
restraint can be put upon their reasonings, but what must be of dangerous
consequence to the sciences, and even to the state, by paving the way for
persecution and oppression in points, where the generality of mankind are more
deeply interested and concerned.
But there occurs to me (continued I) with regard to
your
PAGE 148
main topic, a difficulty,
which I shall just propose to you, without insisting on it; lest it lead into
reasonings of too nice and delicate a nature. In a word, I much doubt whether it
be possible for a cause to be known only by its effect (as you have all along
supposed) or to be of so singular and particular a nature as to have no parallel
and no similarity with any other cause or object, that has ever fallen under our
observation. It is only when two
species of objects are found to be
constantly conjoined, that we can infer the one from the other; and were an
effect presented, which was entirely singular, and could not be comprehended
under any known
species, I do not see, that we could form any conjecture
or inference at all concerning its cause. If experience and observation and
analogy be, indeed, the only guides which we can reasonably follow in inferences
of this nature; both the effect and cause must bear a similarity and resemblance
to other effects and causes, which we know, and which we have found, in many
instances, to be conjoined with each other. I leave it to your own reflection to
pursue the consequences of this principle. I shall just observe, that, as the
antagonists of
EPICURUS always suppose
the universe, an effect quite singular and unparalleled, to be the proof of a
Deity, a cause no less singular and unparalleled; your reasonings, upon that
supposition, seem, at least, to merit our attention. There is, I own, some
difficulty, how we can ever return from the cause to the effect, and, reasoning
from our ideas of the former, infer any alteration on the latter, or any
addition to it.
PAGE 149
SECTION XII. Of the ACADEMICAL or SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY.
PART I.
THERE is not a greater number of philosophical
reasonings, displayed upon any subject, than those, which prove the existence of
a Deity, and refute the fallacies of Atheists; and yet the most religious
philosophers still dispute whether any man can be so blinded as to be a
speculative atheist. How shall we reconcile these contradictions? The
knights-errant, who wandered about to clear the world of dragons and giants,
never entertained the least doubt with regard to the existence of these
monsters.
The Sceptic is another enemy of religion, who
naturally provokes the indignation of all divines and graver philosophers;
though it is certain, that no man ever met with any such absurd creature, or
conversed with a man, who had no opinion or principle concerning any subject,
either of action or speculation. This begets a very natural question; What is
meant by a sceptic? And how far it is possible to push these philosophical
principles of doubt and uncertainty?
There is a species of scepticism, antecedent
to all study and philosophy, which is much inculcated by DES CARTES and others, as a sovereign preservative against error and
precipitate judgment. It recommends an universal doubt, not only of all our
former opinions and principles, but also of our very faculties; of whose
veracity, say they, we must
PAGE 150
assure ourselves, by a
chain of reasoning, deduced from some original principle, which cannot possibly
be fallacious or deceitful. But neither is there any such original principle,
which has a prerogative above others, that are self-evident and convincing: Or
if there were, could we advance a step beyond it, but by the use of those very
faculties, of which we are supposed to be already diffident. The
CARTESIAN doubt, therefore, were it ever
possible to be attained by any human creature (as it plainly is not) would be
entirely incurable; and no reasoning could ever bring us to a state of assurance
and conviction upon any subject.
It must, however, be confessed, that this species of
scepticism, when more moderate, may be understood in a very reasonable sense,
and is a necessary preparative to the study of philosophy, by preserving a
proper impartiality in our judgments, and weaning our mind from all those
prejudices, which we may have imbibed from education or rash opinion. To begin
with clear and self-evident principles, to advance by timorous and sure steps,
to review frequently our conclusions, and examine accurately all their
consequences; though by these means we shall make both a slow and a short
progress in our systems; are the only methods, by which we can ever hope to
reach truth, and attain a proper stability and certainty in our
determinations.
There is another species of scepticism,
consequent to science and enquiry, when men are supposed to have
discovered, either the absolute fallaciousness of their mental faculties, or
their unfitness to reach any fixed determination in all those curious subjects
of speculation, about which they are commonly employed. Even our very senses are
brought into dispute, by a certain species of philosophers; and the maxims of
common life are subjected to the same doubt as the most profound principles or
conclusions of metaphysics and theology. As these paradoxical tenets
PAGE 151
(if they may be called
tenets) are to be met with in some philosophers, and the refutation of them in
several, they naturally excite our curiosity, and make us enquire into the
arguments, on which they may be founded.
I need not insist upon the more trite topics,
employed by the sceptics in all ages, against the evidence of sense; such
as those which are derived from the imperfection and fallaciousness of our
organs, on numberless occasions; the crooked appearance of an oar in water; the
various aspects of objects, according to their different distances; the double
images which arise from the pressing one eye; with many other appearances of a
like nature. These sceptical topics, indeed, are only sufficient to prove, that
the senses alone are not implicitly to be depended on; but that we must correct
their evidence by reason, and by considerations, derived from the nature of the
medium, the distance of the object, and the disposition of the organ, in order
to render them, within their sphere, the proper criteria of truth and
falsehood. There are other more profound arguments against the senses, which
admit not of so easy a solution.
It seems evident, that men are carried, by a natural
instinct or prepossession, to repose faith in their senses; and that, without
any reasoning, or even almost before the use of reason, we always suppose an
external universe, which depends not on our perception, but would exist, though
we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated. Even the animal
creation are governed by a like opinion, and preserve this belief of external
objects, in all their thoughts, designs, and actions.
It seems also evident, that, when men follow this
blind and powerful instinct of nature, they always suppose the very images,
presented by the senses, to be the external objects, and never entertain any
suspicion, that the one are nothing but representations of the other. This very
table, which we see white, and which we feel hard, is believed to
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exist, independent of our
perception, and to be something external to our mind, which perceives it. Our
presence bestows not being on it: Our absence does not annihilate it. It
preserves its existence uniform and entire, independent of the situation of
intelligent beings, who perceive or contemplate it.
But this universal and primary opinion of all men is
soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us, that nothing can
ever be present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the senses are
only the inlets, through which these images are conveyed, without being able to
produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the object. The table,
which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove farther from it: But the real
table, which exists independent of us, suffers no alteration: It was, therefore,
nothing but its image, which was present to the mind. These are the obvious
dictates of reason; and no man, who reflects, ever doubted, that the existences,
which we consider, when we say, this house and that tree, are
nothing but perceptions in the mind, and fleeting copies or representations of
other existences, which remain uniform and independent.
So far, then, are we necessitated by reasoning to
contradict or depart from the primary instincts of nature, and to embrace a new
system with regard to the evidence of our senses. But here philosophy finds
herself extremely embarrassed, when she would justify this new system, and
obviate the cavils and objections of the sceptics. She can no longer plead the
infallible and irresistible instinct of nature: For that led us to a quite
different system, which is acknowledged fallible and even erroneous. And to
justify this pretended philosophical system, by a chain of clear and convincing
argument, or even any appearance of argument, exceeds the power of all human
capacity.
By what argument can it be proved, that the
perceptions
PAGE 153
of the mind must be caused
by external objects, entirely different from them, though resembling them (if
that be possible) and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself,
or from the suggestion of some invisible and unknown spirit, or from some other
cause still more unknown to us? It is acknowledged, that, in fact, many of these
perceptions arise not from any thing external, as in dreams, madness, and other
diseases. And nothing can be more inexplicable than the manner, in which body
should so operate upon mind as ever to convey an image of itself to a substance,
supposed of so different, and even contrary a nature.
It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of
the senses be produced by external objects, resembling them: How shall this
question be determined? By experience surely; as all other questions of a like
nature. But here experience is, and must be entirely silent. The mind has never
any thing present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any
experience of their connexion with objects. The supposition of such a connexion
is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning.
To have recourse to the veracity of the supreme
Being, in order to prove the veracity of our senses, is surely making a very
unexpected circuit. If his veracity were at all concerned in this matter, our
senses would be entirely infallible; because it is not possible that he can ever
deceive. Not to mention, that, if the external world be once called in question,
we shall be at a loss to find arguments, by which we may prove the existence of
that Being or any of his attributes.
This is a topic, therefore, in which the profounder
and more philosophical sceptics will always triumph, when they endeavour to
introduce an universal doubt into all subjects of human knowledge and enquiry.
Do you follow the instincts and propensities of nature, may they say, in
PAGE 154
assenting to the veracity
of sense? But these lead you to believe, that the very perception or sensible
image is the external object. Do you disclaim this principle, in order to
embrace a more rational opinion, that the perceptions are only representations
of something external? You here depart from your natural propensities and more
obvious sentiments; and yet are not able to satisfy your reason, which can never
find any convincing argument from experience to prove, that the perceptions are
connected with any external objects.
There is another sceptical topic of a like nature,
derived from the most profound philosophy; which might merit our attention, were
it requisite to dive so deep, in order to discover arguments and reasonings,
which can so little serve to any serious purpose. It is universally allowed by
modern enquirers, that all the sensible qualities of objects, such as hard,
soft, hot, cold, white, black, &c. are merely secondary, and exist
not in the objects themselves, but are perceptions of the mind, without any
external archetype or model, which they represent. If this be allowed, with
regard to secondary qualities, it must also follow, with regard to the supposed
primary qualities of extension and solidity; nor can the latter be any more
entitled to that denomination than the former. The idea of extension is entirely
acquired from the senses of sight and feeling; and if all the qualities,
perceived by the senses, be in the mind, not in the object, the same conclusion
must reach the idea of extension, which is wholly dependent on the sensible
ideas or the ideas of secondary qualities. Nothing can save us from this
conclusion, but the asserting, that the ideas of those primary qualities are
attained by Abstraction; an opinion, which, if we examine it accurately,
we shall find to be unintelligible, and even absurd. An extension, that is
neither tangible nor visible, cannot possibly be conceived: And a tangible or
visible extension,
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which is neither hard nor
soft, black nor white, is equally beyond the reach of human conception. Let any
man try to conceive a triangle in general, which is neither
Isosceles nor
Scalenum, nor has any particular length or proportion of sides; and he
will soon perceive the absurdity of all the scholastic notions with regard to
abstraction and general ideas
N.
Thus the first philosophical objection to the
evidence of sense or to the opinion of external existence consists in this, that
such an opinion, if rested on natural instinct, is contrary to reason, and if
referred to reason, is contrary to natural instinct, and at the same time
carries no rational evidence with it, to convince an impartial enquirer. The
second objection goes farther, and represents this opinion as contrary to
reason: at least, if it be a principle of reason, that all sensible qualities
are in the mind, not in the object. Bereave matter of all its intelligible
qualities, both primary and secondary, you in a manner annihilate it, and leave
only a certain unknown, inexplicable something, as the cause of our
perceptions; a notion so imperfect, that no sceptic will think it worth while to
contend against it.
PART II.
It may seem a very extravagant attempt of the
sceptics to destroy reason by argument and ratiocination; yet is this the
grand scope of all their enquiries and disputes.
PAGE 156
They endeavour to find
objections, both to our abstract reasonings, and to those which regard matter of
fact and existence.
The chief objection against all abstract
reasonings is derived from the ideas of space and time; ideas, which, in common
life and to a careless view, are very clear and intelligible, but when they pass
through the scrutiny of the profound sciences (and they are the chief object of
these sciences) afford principles, which seem full of absurdity and
contradiction. No priestly dogmas, invented on purpose to tame and subdue
the rebellious reason of mankind, ever shocked common sense more than the
doctrine of the infinite divisibility of extension, with its consequences; as
they are pompously displayed by all geometricians and metaphysicians, with a
kind of triumph and exultation. A real quantity, infinitely less than any finite
quantity, containing quantities infinitely less than itself, and so on in
infinitum; this is an edifice so bold and prodigious, that it is too weighty
for any pretended demonstration to support, because it shocks the clearest and
most natural principles of human reason O. But what renders the matter more extraordinary, is, that
these seemingly absurd opinions are supported by a chain of reasoning, the
clearest and most natural; nor is it possible for us to allow the premises
without admitting the consequences. Nothing can be more convincing and
satisfactory than all the conclusions
PAGE 157
concerning the properties
of circles and triangles; and yet, when these are once received, how can we
deny, that the angle of contact between a circle and its tangent is infinitely
less than any rectilineal angle, that as you may increase the diameter of the
circle
in infinitum, this angle of contact becomes still less, even
in
infinitum, and that the angle of contact between other curves and their
tangents may be infinitely less than those between any circle and its tangent,
and so on,
in infinitum? The demonstration of these principles seems as
unexceptionable as that which proves the three angles of a triangle to be equal
to two right ones, though the latter opinion be natural and easy, and the former
big with contradiction and absurdity. Reason here seems to be thrown into a kind
of amazement and suspence, which, without the suggestions of any sceptic, gives
her a diffidence of herself, and of the ground on which she treads. She sees a
full light, which illuminates certain places; but that light borders upon the
most profound darkness. And between these she is so dazzled and confounded, that
she scarcely can pronounce with certainty and assurance concerning any one
object.
The absurdity of these bold determinations of the
abstract sciences seems to become, if possible, still more palpable with regard
to time than extension. An infinite number of real parts of time, passing in
succession, and exhausted one after another, appears so evident a contradiction,
that no man, one should think, whose judgment is not corrupted, instead of being
improved, by the sciences, would ever be able to admit of it.
Yet still reason must remain restless, and unquiet,
even with regard to that scepticism, to which she is driven by these seeming
absurdities and contradictions. How any clear, distinct idea can contain
circumstances, contradictory to itself, or to any other clear, distinct idea, is
absolutely incomprehensible; and is, perhaps, as absurd as any
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proposition, which can be
formed. So that nothing can be more sceptical, or more full of doubt and
hesitation, than this scepticism itself, which arises from some of the
paradoxical conclusions of geometry or the science of quantity
P.
The sceptical objections to moral evidence,
or to the reasonings concerning matter of fact, are either popular or
philosophical. The popular objections are derived from the natural
weakness of human understanding; the contradictory opinions, which have been
entertained in different ages and nations; the variations of our judgment in
sickness and health, youth and old age, prosperity and adversity; the perpetual
contradiction of each particular man's opinions and sentiments; with many other
topics of that kind. It is needless to insist farther on this head. These
objections are but weak. For as, in common life, we reason every moment
concerning fact and existence, and cannot possibly subsist, without continually
employing this species of argument, any popular objections, derived from thence,
must be insufficient to destroy that evidence. The great subverter of
Pyrrhonism or the excessive principles of
PAGE 159
scepticism, is action, and
employment, and the occupations of common life. These principles may flourish
and triumph in the schools; where it is, indeed, difficult, if not impossible,
to refute them. But as soon as they leave the shade, and by the presence of the
real objects, which actuate our passions and sentiments, are put in opposition
to the more powerful principles of our nature, they vanish like smoke, and leave
the most determined sceptic in the same condition as other mortals.
The sceptic, therefore, had better keep within his
proper sphere, and display those philosophical objections, which arise
from more profound researches. Here he seems to have ample matter of triumph;
while he justly insists, that all our evidence for any matter of fact, which
lies beyond the testimony of sense or memory, is derived entirely from the
relation of cause and effect; that we have no other idea of this relation than
that of two objects, which have been frequently conjoined together; that
we have no argument to convince us, that objects, which have, in our experience,
been frequently conjoined, will likewise, in other instances, be conjoined in
the same manner; and that nothing leads us to this inference but custom or a
certain instinct of our nature; which it is indeed difficult to resist, but
which, like other instincts, may be fallacious and deceitful. While the sceptic
insists upon these topics, he shews his force, or rather, indeed, his own and
our weakness; and seems, for the time at least, to destroy all assurance and
conviction. These arguments might be displayed at greater length, if any durable
good or benefit to society could ever be expected to result from them.
For here is the chief and most confounding objection
to excessive scepticism, that no durable good can ever result from it;
while it remains in its full force and vigour. We need only ask such a sceptic,
What his meaning is? And what he proposes by all these curious
researches? He is
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immediately at a loss, and
knows not what to answer. A
COPERNICAN
or
PTOLEMAIC, who supports each his
different system of astronomy, may hope to produce a conviction, which will
remain constant and durable, with his audience. A
STOIC or
EPICUREAN
displays principles, which may not only be durable, but which have an effect on
conduct and behaviour. But a
PYRRHONIAN cannot expect, that his philosophy will have any
constant influence on the mind: Or if it had, that its influence would be
beneficial to society. On the contrary, he must acknowledge, if he will
acknowledge any thing, that all human life must perish, were his principles
universally and steadily to prevail. All discourse, all action would immediately
cease; and men remain in a total lethargy, till the necessities of nature,
unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence. It is true; so fatal an
event is very little to be dreaded. Nature is always too strong for principle.
And though a
PYRRHONIAN may throw
himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound
reasonings; the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his
doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every point of action and
speculation, with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never
concerned themselves in any philosophical researches. When he awakes from his
dream, he will be the first to join in the laugh against himself, and to
confess, that all his objections are mere amusement, and can have no other
tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind, who must act and
reason and believe; though they are not able, by their most diligent enquiry, to
satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these operations, or to remove
the objections, which may be raised against them.
PAGE 161
PART III.
There is, indeed, a more mitigated scepticism
or academical philosophy, which may be both durable and useful, and which
may, in part, be the result of this PYRRHONISM, or excessive scepticism, when its
undistinguished doubts are, in some measure, corrected by common sense and
reflection. The greater part of mankind are naturally apt to be affirmative and
dogmatical in their opinions; and while they see objects only on one side, and
have no idea of any counterpoising argument, they throw themselves precipitately
into the principles, to which they are inclined; nor have they any indulgence
for those who entertain opposite sentiments. To hesitate or balance perplexes
their understanding, checks their passion, and suspends their action. They are,
therefore, impatient till they escape from a state, which to them is so uneasy;
and they think, that they can never remove themselves far enough from it, by the
violence of their affirmations and obstinacy of their belief. But could such
dogmatical reasoners become sensible of the strange infirmities of human
understanding, even in its most perfect state, and when most accurate and
cautious in its determinations; such a reflection would naturally inspire them
with more modesty and reserve, and diminish their fond opinion of themselves,
and their prejudice against antagonists. The illiterate may reflect on the
disposition of the learned, who, amidst all the advantages of study and
reflection, are commonly still diffident in their determinations: And if any of
the learned be inclined, from their natural temper, to haughtiness and
obstinacy, a small tincture of PYRRHONISM might abate their pride, by shewing them, that the few
advantages, which they may have attained over their fellows, are but
inconsiderable, if compared with the universal perplexity and confusion, which
is inherent in human nature. In
PAGE 162
general, there is a degree
of doubt, and caution, and modesty, which, in all kinds of scrutiny and
decision, ought for ever to accompany a just reasoner.
Another species of mitigated scepticism,
which may be of advantage to mankind, and which may be the natural result of the
PYRRHONIAN doubts and scruples, is the
limitation of our enquiries to such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow
capacity of human understanding. The imagination of man is naturally
sublime, delighted with whatever is remote and extraordinary, and running,
without controul, into the most distant parts of space and time in order to
avoid the objects, which custom has rendered too familiar to it. A correct
Judgment observes a contrary method, and avoiding all distant and high
enquiries, confines itself to common life, and to such subjects as fall under
daily practice and experience; leaving the more sublime topics to the
embellishment of poets and orators, or to the arts of priests and politicians.
To bring us to so salutary a determination, nothing can be more serviceable,
than to be once thoroughly convinced of the force of the PYRRHONIAN doubt, and of the impossibility,
that any thing, but the strong power of natural instinct, could free us from it.
Those who have a propensity to philosophy, will still continue their researches;
because they reflect, that, besides the immediate pleasure, attending such an
occupation, philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of common
life, methodized and corrected. But they will never be tempted to go beyond
common life, so long as they consider the imperfection of those faculties which
they employ, their narrow reach, and their inaccurate operations. While we
cannot give a satisfactory reason, why we believe, after a thousand experiments,
that a stone will fall, or fire burn; can we ever satisfy ourselves concerning
any determination, which we may form, with regard to the origin of worlds, and
the situation of nature, from, and to eternity?
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This narrow limitation,
indeed, of our enquiries, is, in every respect, so reasonable, that it suffices
to make the slightest examination into the natural powers of the human mind, and
to compare them with their objects, in order to recommend it to us. We shall
then find what are the proper subjects of science and enquiry.
It seems to me, that the only objects of the
abstract sciences or of demonstration are quantity and number, and that all
attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds
are mere sophistry and illusion. As the component parts of quantity and number
are entirely similar, their relations become intricate and involved; and nothing
can be more curious, as well as useful, than to trace, by a variety of mediums,
their equality or inequality, through their different appearances. But as all
other ideas are clearly distinct and different from each other, we can never
advance farther, by our outmost scrutiny, than to observe this diversity, and,
by an obvious reflection, pronounce one thing not to be another. Or if there be
any difficulty in these decisions, it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate
meaning of words, which is corrected by juster definitions. That the square
of the hypothenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides, cannot be
known, let the terms be ever so exactly defined, without a train of reasoning
and enquiry. But to convince us of this proposition, that where there is no
property, there can be no injustice, it is only necessary to define the
terms, and explain injustice to be a violation of property. This proposition is,
indeed, nothing but a more imperfect definition. It is the same case with all
those pretended syllogistical reasonings, which may be found in every other
branch of learning, except the sciences of quantity and number; and these may
safely, I think, be pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and
demonstration.
All other enquiries of men regard only matter of
fact and
PAGE 164
existence; and these are
evidently incapable of demonstration. Whatever
is may
not be. No
negation of a fact can involve a contradiction. The non-existence of any being,
without exception, is as clear and distinct an idea as its existence. The
proposition, which affirms it not to be, however false, is no less conceivable
and intelligible, than that which affirms it to be. The case is different with
the sciences, properly so called. Every proposition, which is not true, is there
confused and unintelligible. That the cube root of 64 is equal to the half of
10, is a false proposition, and can never be distinctly conceived. But that
CAESAR, or the angel
GABRIEL, or any being never existed, may be
a false proposition, but still is perfectly conceivable, and implies no
contradiction.
The existence, therefore, of any being can only be
proved by arguments from its cause or its effect; and these arguments are
founded entirely on experience. If we reason à priori, any thing may
appear able to produce any thing. The falling of a pebble may, for ought we
know, extinguish the sun; or the wish of a man controul the planets in their
orbits. It is only experience, which teaches us the nature and bounds of cause
and effect, and enables us to infer the existence of one object from that of
another Q. Such is the foundation of moral reasoning, which forms the
greater part of human knowledge, and is the source of all human action and
behaviour.
Moral reasonings are either concerning particular or
general facts. All deliberations in life regard the former; as also all
disquisitions in history, chronology, geography, and astronomy.
PAGE 165
The sciences, which treat
of general facts, are politics, natural philosophy, physic, chymistry,
&c. where the qualities, causes and effects of a whole species of
objects are enquired into.
Divinity or Theology, as it proves the existence of
a Deity, and the immortality of souls, is composed partly of reasonings
concerning particular, partly concerning general facts. It has a foundation in
reason, so far as it is supported by experience. But its best and most
solid foundation is faith and divine revelation.
Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of
the understanding as of taste and sentiment. Beauty, whether moral or natural,
is felt, more properly than perceived. Or if we reason concerning it, and
endeavour to fix its standard, we regard a new fact, to wit, the general taste
of mankind, or some such fact, which may be the object of reasoning and
enquiry.
When we run over libraries, persuaded of these
principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of
divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any
abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any
experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit
it then to the flames: For it can contain nothing but sophistry and
illusion.
A DISSERTATION on the PASSIONS
[In production]
An ENQUIRY Concerning the PRINCIPLES of
MORALS
[In production]
The NATURAL HISTORY of RELIGION
[In production]
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