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A. The distinction between the world of appearance and the world as it is in itself corresponds to the Lockean distinction between the world of objects as experienced by human beings - tables, chairs, badgers, etc and the world of minute corpuscules of which they are made up. |
B. The noumenal world must have come first. | ||
| C. The phenomenal world can't be subject to causality, because in the end we have experience only of constant conjunctions - we never actually see 'necessary connections'. | D. There aren't really two worlds, phenomenal and noumenal, at all - just one world which, when we experience it or think about it, is a world structured by the fundamental categories we bring to it. | ||
D. seems best.
A. sounds interesting, but the corpuscules (or 'atoms') of the Lockean position are in principle seeable, aren't they - it's just that they happen to be too small to be seen human eyes being what they are. And eg they are subject to causality, belong to time and space. This is very different from the Kantian conception of the noumenal world not subject to the fundamental categories we apply in experience.
B. If this makes any sense it is wrong, because the noumenal world is not subject to time and so can't have 'come before' anything.
C mixes up Kant and Hume.
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