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Introduction to Philosophy |
This shows in the way we hold people responsible for what they do, and balming them for doing bad things and praising them for doing good.
Understands the brain as an information-processing device, controlling behaviour
A test for machines: The Turing Test
How could you tell if the brain was a computer? The Turing test purports to be a test of whether a machine could be said to 'think'.
Could autonomy 'emerge'?
Could what starts as a mechanism turn into something with autonomy?
Two possibilities perhaps:
· True autonomy turns out to be a myth as highly complex mechanisms mimic it successfully. (If the brain is a computer, we are not free after all.)
· True autonomy 'emerges' from high fully determined complexity. (Computers, if they get complicated enough, might get to enjoy free-will.)
1. The theory that human society or societies 'develop' or 'evolve' according to fixed laws of change.
Eg Marxism
2. Popper's criticism: change sometimes depends on the acquisition of new knowledge which necessarily cannot be predicted.
By 'free' we do not mean 'lacking a cause'. What we mean by 'free' is 'not constrained'.
Plenty of actions are not constrained. Therefore plenty of actions are free.
Examples of the contrast between 'constrained and 'unconstrained' actions:
· First example: You can't hang on any longer
· Second example: the kleptomaniac magistrate
· Third example: action under duress
· 'Free' is only meaningful if it is used to make a distinction.
· If 'free' meant 'uncaused', it would apply to nothing (if determinism is right).
· Therefore, 'free' cannot mean 'uncaused'.
Anti-compatibilist: What is important is whether a different decision could have been taken.
Compatibilist response: 'could' means 'would have if circumstances had been different'. A determinist can use 'could' in this sense (the 'hypothetical' sense of 'could')
The anti-compatibilist response: the question is whether we can choose categorically, not hypothetically.
Maybe there are just patterns... Eg the pattern shown by planetary movements.
'Connections' 'forces' or 'compulsions' are not observable when causal sequences are inspected.
When you observe billiard balls colliding, what you see is a sequence of events, but not any actual 'push' or 'force'.
One tempting conclusion: causes are not observable. David Hume's conclusion: talk of 'causes' is to be understood as talk about patterns among events.
As we experience our world and think about it, we bring to bear a set of concepts. The principle of causality is one of these. It is true, because in this sense we make it true.
VP