PHIL 100: Mind and Body

I. Dualism

A. What is dualism?

1. The mind is immaterial

2. The body is physical.

3. The mind and the body interact.

B. Cartesian dualism (Rene Descartes (17th c), Meditations, ~1640)

1. Descartes’ method of doubt

2. Meditations I and II

3. Descartes’ first argument for dualism

4. Descartes’ argument for dualism from the Meditation VI: the ‘Divisibility Argument’

5. Causal interaction

II. Strengths of Cartesian dualism

A. Intuitive strength

B. Argument from introspection

C. Argument from irreducibility

III. Weaknesses

A. Problems with the ‘strengths’ of dualism

B. Objections to the mind as an immaterial/spiritual substance

1. Problem of defining mind as immaterial

2. Objections to Descartes’ Divisibility argument

3. Problems of identification and individuation of the mind

C. Problem of causal interaction

D. Problem of Other Minds

IV. Conclusions

A. Dualism is no longer a popular theory.

B. Applying Ockham’s razor

V. Gilbert Ryle’s criticism of dualism

A. The ‘Official Doctrine’

B. Descartes’ dualist myth: the ‘Ghost in the Machine’

C. The ‘Category Mistake’

1. Ryle’s approach

2. What is a category mistake?

3. How does dualism commit the category mistake?

According to dualism:

Mind is: immaterial (not composed of matter); not ‘extended’ (non-spatial, doesn’t take up space and has no spatial location). Sometimes the term ‘spirit’ is used to describe the mind. Body is physical; located in space; governed by physical laws that apply to matter.

Cartesian dualism holds that mind and body are two distinct substances that interact. (NB: ‘substance’ does not mean ‘matter’ or ‘material’!)

One of Descartes’ ‘first principles’ of knowledge is that he exists as a ‘thinking thing’, i.e., I think, therefore I am.

The following argument is then established (this is his first argument for dualism):

My body has the property of being such that its existence can rationally be doubted by me.

My mind does not have the property of being such that its existence can rationally be doubted by me.

_____________________________

My body is not identical to my mind.

The next and more important argument for Cartesian mind-body dualism occurs in Meditation VI. It is often referred to as ‘the divisibility argument’. Your seminar question asks for you to outline this argument (see below).

The following will be helpful in understanding it:

Leibniz’s law (from the 17thc. German philosopher Leibniz): Objects A and B are identical only if all properties of A are properties of B, and if all properties of B are properties of A.

Cartesian dualism takes seriously our intuitive feeling that mind and body are different, and also that the mind is not reducible to the brain or to something physical. More recent non-reductive strategies would cite mental properties such as qualia and intentionality to argue against reducing mind to the material. (This strategy might also be used against the view that computers can think. Do computers have intentionality? Can computers simulate or ‘experience’ qualia?)

However: these points are open to criticism! Further criticism of Cartesian dualism focuses on the problem of defining mind as immaterial. For example, if the mind is immaterial, how could we identify minds and individuate them (e.g. your mind, my mind, Blair’s mind)?

Should Ockham get the final word? William of Ockham, a medieval philosopher, said: ‘Do not multiply entities beyond what is strictly necessary to explain the phenomena.’ This is referred to as ‘Ockham’s razor’. What happens when you apply it to dualism?

Ryle argues against ‘the official doctrine’ that is, dualism’s approach to understanding the mind-body problem, which he says originates in Descartes.

The mind is no ‘ghost in the machine’, no secret or ghostly sort of thing. It is no thing at all. To say there is is to commit a ‘category mistake’. This is the mistake of treating a concept as if it belonged to one system or category of ideas, when in fact it belongs to another.

Seminar question: In one of your reading selections for this week, ‘The Mind as Distinct from the Body’ (Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 175-176), Descartes’ argues that the mind and the body are two distinct things. How does he support this claim? To be precise in answering this question, you should attempt to outline his argument by setting out its premises and conclusion.