IEP 508: Nature in Romantic and European Thought

AWAYMAVE - The Distance Mode of MA in Values and the Environment at Lancaster University

Week 6. Hegel, Science and Organic Life

I. Hegel’s criticisms of science

First reading:'Introduction' to Hegel's Philosophy of Nature
First read from the beginning of the text up till the start of the section headed ‘The Notion of Nature’.

Hegel begins by commenting on how philosophy of nature has become unpopular due to Schelling’s scientific followers applying his ideas in a rather mechanical and superficial way. He goes on to say that he will try to explain what the philosophy of nature really involves. This requires us to focus on what distinguishes philosophy of nature from science, which he calls ‘natural science in general’ or simply‘physics’.

He notes that one might think that science and philosophy of nature are distinct because philosophy of nature approaches nature from a theoretical perspective, whereas science is wholly empirical. But he points out that science contains a lot of thought and theory itself. The two disciplines must therefore differ instead in the kind of thought or theory with which they operate. What kind of thought they each involve will become clearer as the text goes on.

Hegel goes on to talk about two ways of considering nature: the ‘practical’ and the ‘theoretical’ approaches.

What does Hegel think are the main features of the practical approach to nature? Look particularly at ß245 and the addition to it. Write down your answer, taking care to try to translate Hegel’s complex way of speaking into everyday English (or as close as you can get!)

Hegel now introduces the ‘theoretical’ approach to nature. – a contemplative rather than a practical attitude. This attempts to understand the ‘universal’ aspect of nature. Hegel clarifies that the ‘universal’ element refers to the underlying laws, forces and genera (general kinds or types or species) within nature, behind the multitude of observable phenomena to be found within it.

Next, Hegel goes back to considering the relation between philosophy of nature and science. Both are theoretical approach to nature, i.e. they try to understand its 'universal' element. But science does so by starting out from empirical phenomena and generalising to an account of underlying universal features. On the other hand, philosophy of nature takes up the account of these universal features already provided by science, and tries to reconstruct them in a rational form.

What do you think Hegel might mean by the idea that philosophy of nature reconstructs universals identified by science into a rational form? Think particularly about his later claim that ‘Physics must therefore work into the hands of philosophy, in order that the latter may translate into the notion the abstract universal transmitted to it, by showing how this universal, as an intrinsically necessary whole, proceeds from the notion’ (p.10). How would you put this point if asked to paraphrase it in simple English?

(Don't worry if you don't feel sure you are capturing what Hegel means. There are lots of different interpretations of his claims and there's no one right answer. What's important is to try and find an answer that both makes sense to you and that seems to fit in with the tone of what he is saying.)

Hegel now goes on to say that philosophy of nature uses a different metaphysics from science. Metaphysics refers to our general way of looking at the world, he adds – the most basic way in which we categorise and comprehend the things around us. So one way to understand what Hegel is proposing is this:

(i) Science has a particular metaphysics, a certain way of looking at and defining nature (or the universal features within nature)
(ii) This way of defining nature (or its universal features) is in some way defective or inadequate
(iii) Scientific claims must therefore be reinterpreted in terms of Hegel’s own metaphysics/way of looking at nature, which is preferable.

What then is the scientific way of looking at nature and what’s wrong with it? Hegel answers these two questions simultaneously by saying that the scientific view of nature is abstract.

What does it mean to say that the scientific view of nature is abstract? Look especially at p.11-12 of the text.
You could try to make sense of Hegel’s point in relation to the material on German Romanticism which we looked at before. Perhaps Hegel’s idea that the scientific view is abstract is similar to the German Romantic claim that the scientific approach to nature is narrowly analytical .

What Hegel has said so far suggests that he thinks the philosophy of nature will reintegrate what science has fragmented by looking again at the phenomena identified by science and reinterpreting these phenomena as (in some sense) unified. Firstly, perhaps, in that these phenomena will be reinterpreted as unified in themselves; and secondly in that they will be reinterpreted as internally connected with one another to form an interlocking whole, an ‘intrinsically necessary whole’ as Hegel put it earlier.

In what way might Hegel think that we should regard natural things as unified within themselves? Look especially at p.12 where he talks about seeing natural things as the unity of an ‘infinite’ and a ‘finite’ aspect, or a ‘universal’ and a ‘particular’ aspect. We have seen earlier that he also sees all of nature as containing both a conceptual element, which is unifying, and a material element, which is diverse. Think about how this might bear upon his claims here.

What we've got so far, then, is that Hegel thinks philosophy of nature needs to take the claims of science and reorganise them, in the process reinterpreting the phenomena identified by empirical scientists in a more 'holistic' way. However, amongst scholars of Hegel's thought there is quite a bit of debate about how he proposes to do this. There are two main interpretations: the 'a priori' and the 'a posteriori'. According to the first, Hegel starts by working out rationally what forms exist in nature (e.g. first all the mechanical forms, then all the physical ones, then all the organic ones), then he reinterprets what scientists have said in light of this. According to the 'a posteriori' view, though, Hegel starts by learning from scientists about what exists, then he reinterprets these findings and gets from them the idea that nature undergoes this progression through several stages.

So the first view says that Hegel: 1. works out what nature must be like, then 2. reinterprets science to fit in

The second view says that Hegel: 1. learns from science, 2. reinterprets scientific claims so as to get his theory of how nature progresses.

There is lots of debate as to which of these methods Hegel follows and a clear account of the difference between the methods is given by Stephen Houlgate in his introduction to Hegel and the Philosophy of Nature (SUNY press, 1998).

(In the rest of this first reading, Hegel now goes on to discuss some other aspects of nature, including the difference between his view of nature and an evolutionary conception. Please now read the rest of this section; see how what he goes on to say fits in with what you have gleaned so far.)

II. Hegel's views on organic life

Our second reading is a number of paragraphs from Hegel's account of organic life which comes near the end of his philosophy of nature. In reading these, you could bear in mind which interpretation of his method you think these sections support - the a priori or the a posteriori reading? Why? Please keep this in mind as a general question as you work through these sections.

section 337
Hegel defines the living organism as a universal that continuously shapes and develops its material parts so as to manifest itself within them. These material parts of organisms acquire a shape and structure such that they constantly reveal the universal within them. They are therefore not mere parts but are the universal whole's‘members’ (Glieder). Hegel likes to emphasise that members, unlike parts, cannot retain their identity unless they belong to the universality of an organism:
"The single members of the body are what they are only through their unity and in relation to it. So, for instance, a hand that has been hewn from the body is a hand in name only, but not in actual fact, as Aristotle has already remarked". (EL §216A/291)
In existing as members, an organism’s material parts reflect the fact that they depend for their existence and structure upon the universality of that organism. (Notice how this recalls what Kant says about the organism being purposive. Think back to Kant: what do you think are the points of comparison between Kant's claims and those of Hegel in section 337?)

In the addition to this section, Hegel goes on to describe the organism as
the union of the concept with exteriorized existence, in which the concept maintains itself … Life is … the resolution of the opposition between the concept and reality … This reality no longer is in an immediate and independent way …in the abstract concept of the organism, the existence of particularities is compatible with the unity of the concept, for these particularities are posited as transitory moments of a single subject. (EN §337A)
Within living organisms, matter finally manifests the conceptual dimension organising it. As a result, the universals that unify organic matter become what Hegel calls ‘subjects’ (i.e. beings which are at least potentially sentient, aware of the world around them). He says that life is ‘is an elevation into the first ideality of nature, so that it has become a fulfilled and essentially self-centred and subjective unity, as it is self-relating and negative’ (§337).

Hegel believes life to advance through three phases, which he equates with three empirical natural forms:the earth, plants, and animals.

section 338.

Paradoxically, organic life at first exists in the form of the earth - the 'geological organism' - and in this form life is not properly ‘alive’ at all. Within the earth, matter still presents itself as what Hegel calls an 'independent totality' lacking any conceptual interior; as such, life is ‘self-alienated’, estranged from itself (EN §337A). So although the earth does have a kind of unifying structure, this isn't really manifest in its parts. Have a read of 338 and try to see how Hegel is making this claim that the earth is 'self-alienated' life; try to think about what he means by this, how the idea relates to the earth as a whole.

sections 343 and 344

At the second organic stage, the parts of organisms still do not perfectly manifest their dependence on their centre. This means that organic life now exists as plants, the parts of which can always be separated off to start whole new organisms (as when we take cuttings, for example). Thus, plants are also a deficient life form, for Hegel, because:

" [T]he process whereby the vegetable subject articulates and sustains itself is one in which it comes outside itself and falls apart into several individuals [that is, individual organisms] … the process of formation and of reproduction of the singular individual … is a perennial production of new individuals. " (§343-344/3: 45-47)

The parts of plants don't fully depend on the whole, then, and as a result they can always be separated off.

Again, try to think through how this general claim is supported in the details of what Hegel says, and try to think what this means concretely and how plausible you find it as an interpretation of what plants are like.

sections 350 onwards

The last and for Hegel the most perfect organic form possesses the fully developed kind of subjectivity that is present throughout the limbs and organs comprising its body. Hegel equates this with animals. In the Philosophy of Mind he says that the long chain of natural progression is finally ‘perfected through animal life, through its sensibility, since this reveals to us the omnipresence of the one soul in all points of its corporeality, and so reveals the sublatedness of the externality of matter’ (EM §389A).

In section 351 he mentions several features of animals: their freedom of movement, voice, warmth, breathing, and awareness. He thinks that all these features exemplify the general way in which the whole unity of the animal is fully present in all its parts.

Think, with reference to one of these features, about how (according to Hegel in this passage) it reflects the animal's generally holistic nature.

In the remaining sections, Hegel discusses first how the animal develops needs and consumes things in the world around it to satisfy those needs; then he discusses how the animal develops a need to unite with other members of its species through sexual reproduction.

III. Concluding questions

Hegel's theory of nature is very complex - perhaps the most complex of the texts we have looked at so far (which is saying something!) I hope though that you have managed to get something from it. It is a text which it takes a long time to get used to and extract anything meaningful from, partly because of the unfamiliar language and context in which it is written. But it's worth persisting with; once you begin to get used to this I think you'll find some really interesting ideas in it.

There are also intriguing connections with the ideas of other thinkers on the course:

With Kant - the idea of purposiveness. Unlike Kant Hegel thinks organisms really are purposive, though - this isn't just a way we have to think about them.

With German Romanticism - the need to find a conception of nature that doesn't approach it in a narrowly analytical and explanatory way.

And Hegel also looks forward to Nietzsche's theory of nature which is also an attempt to reinterpret the scientific ideas of his time in light of his own philosophy. With Nietzsche some of the same questions arise as for Hegel: what comes first - the philosophy or the science? How much right does the philosopher have to reinterpret scientific claims or propose totally new theories in the light of which scientific discoveries have to be rewritten? is this just philosophical arrogance?

Web notes by Alison Stone updated March 2005