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'GEORGE FOX SIX' RE-TRIAL REPORT – by subtext correspondents (in alphabetical order) Lenny Baer, Patrick Hagopian, Mike Hannis, Adrian Mackenzie, Maureen McNeil, Maggie Mort, Celia Roberts, Lucy Suchman and Bronislaw Szerszynski. ***************************************************** Day 1 Monday 13 March Judge Stuart Baker, sitting with two magistrates at Preston Crown Court, heard the charge outlined of aggravated trespass under Section 68 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994. Keith Richardson, Lancaster postgraduate; Matthew Wilson, St Martin's College student; Joanne Moodie, Lancaster postgraduate; Rhiannon Westphal, Lancaster graduate; Rachel Jackson, Lancaster undergraduate and Anthony Ayre, Lancaster undergraduate, were appealing against their conviction and sentence for aggravated trespass at Lancaster University's George Fox Building on 10 September 2004. Neil Addison, prosecuting, told the court that aggravated trespass involved intimidating, obstructing or disrupting people carrying out 'lawful activities'. The lawful activity in this case was a corporate venturing conference, something which was 'somewhat new to academia'. This conference was being addressed by Lord Sainsbury, the Parliamentary Undersecretary of State for Science & Innovation at the Department of Trade & Industry, and Prof Paul Wellings the university's Vice Chancellor. This was, he said, a private event for ticket holders only. As Lord Sainsbury was about to speak the defendants entered the conference hall, unfurled banners and began speaking to the audience, objecting to the conference, the presence of Lord Sainsbury and his association with 'GM food'. When the defendants were ejected the protest continued in the building's foyer where whistles and a loud hailer in siren mode were used. When the protestors were ejected from the building by the police, the demonstration continued lawfully outside the building, he said. The university had the right to close off parts of the campus and restrict access to students, who were 'not owners but have a licence to be there; when that licence is exceeded they become trespassers'. The prosecution would submit that at no time in advance did the defendants indicate their intention to demonstrate. A video of the demonstration made at the time by one of the Six was shown. This was 'agreed evidence' because all the defendants admitted they had entered the George Fox lecture hall. It showed the conference being interrupted by protestors who went onto the stage and addressed the audience. One delegate was heard to shout, 'Why don't you sod off?' at the protestors, which was followed by a joke and general laughter around the hall. More shouting and whistling was heard before the action moved to the foyer. Prosecution witness Richard Crawley, Director of External Relations and Corporate Communications at the university's Management School, described his role in the conference organisation as 'peripheral'. Commenting on his feeling during the protest he said, 'Ironically, at the time I thought it was bad for the reputation of the university that the conference was being disrupted.' Andrew Fitzpatrick, defending, asked whether corporate venturing events and the role of business within educational institutions was controversial and provoked opposition. 'There are people in every university in the country who are opposed', Crawley agreed. But he added that this event was not especially controversial; there were companies coming onto the campus every day. The court heard that universities had a special obligation under the Education (II) Act to ensure freedom of speech was facilitated. Asked if he was aware that universities were obliged under the Act to set up a Code of Practice to maintain freedom of speech, Professor Crawley replied, 'I am now, I wasn't at the time'. Crawley agreed that no tables were knocked over, no-one was physically jostled or pushed, the only physical act by the defendants was passive resistance, no protestor struck out or kicked out and no one had since complained of being assaulted. 'It was not that sort of protest', he said. However, 'The nature of the protest was in a domain which had been the subject of violent protest, so there was anxiety, but that dissipated'. Asked about the tradition of student protest he said, 'If this was 20 or 30 years ago this would have been a common occurrence. We have got out of practice.' Prosecution witness Hilary Barraclough from Lancaster University conference office told the court she was involved in the organisation of the event over the preceding year. This was a high profile event with about 150 delegates, and an important opportunity to showcase the university's facilities. On the day she was to make sure the clients had all they needed and that the facilities were in order. The event wasn't open to the public - delegates had to pre-register, and then register on arrival. There were no signs on the lecture theatre doors, but there may have been some outside put up by the conference organisers. When the protest started the conference organiser asked her to contact security. After doing so she entered the lecture theatre, saw 4-5 protesters, and decided there was nothing she could do, so went outside to stop more people entering. She said she 'felt threatened and intimidated; panicked, not what I expected to see'. Standing on the door she felt vulnerable. She had a discussion with a protester: 'I said "can't you demonstrate peacefully?" he said if it wasn't for people like him I'd still be chained to the kitchen sink'. Shortly afterwards he turned on the siren on the megaphone he was carrying – the noise was terrible and intimidating: 'I felt it wasn't a peaceful demonstration – I felt unsafe in my workplace,' she said. Under cross-examination she said: 'I have no reference to the registrar of meetings and wouldn't be involved with the code of practice about freedom of speech – I do the operational side, including liaison with clients.' The prosecution then called Catherine Mugonyi, at the time a student, working on the conference organisation while on placement to the Management School. Her role included collecting contacts from the university, the Management School and the Alumni Office, creating the website and sending out invitations. She sent out a letter from Dr Luke Pittaway which detailed the attendance fee of £165 +VAT for the day. There were concessions for academics, and some students attended free of charge (by prior arrangement) through their departments. Most companies attending were small or medium sized enterprises from the North West. Outside term time there were only international students and staff on campus, she claimed, and therefore she didn't expect any interruptions. (Addison intervened to say that the prosecution did not dispute that students do use the campus outside term-time, and that the building was open, with other things happening in it.) When the protesters entered the foyer she was at the registration desk, and called out 'there's a conference going on', though not loudly enough to disrupt the proceedings. She said she was sure they had heard her, since she 'saw at least one head turn'. Then she heard noise coming from within the lecture theatre and was shocked: 'there were important people in there and someone might have a grudge against them, they might get hurt'. She called security, which 'seemed to take an age to come'. She went into the women's' toilets and called the police on her mobile phone, then called her mother to check she was doing the right thing, then called the police again. She later picked up one of the protesters' leaflets. She told the court that of the 27 companies listed on it, 18 (including the Carlyle Group, Glaxo Smith Kline, BOC, Alvis and Shell) were not in fact there on the day. Under cross examination she said she was not aware of the university's Code of Practice on freedom of speech, or of the Education (II) Act provisions. She had never been asked about these in respect of this conference, because the facilities had been 'hired out by the university as a business, not as an educational institution'. The prosecution objected to this line of questioning and the judge asked the defence how far this point could be taken with this witness. Mugonyi said she was aware that links between universities and business were controversial and that some people opposed them. The conference had paid to hire the facilities free from interruption. It was her understanding that it had exclusive use of the foyer that day as well as the lecture theatres and classrooms rented. She said she had not put up any signs saying 'private' or 'delegates only' because she didn't think they would be necessary, since she said students did not have any right to enter the George Fox building outside term-time anyway. All the time she was at Lancaster it had been her understanding that university buildings were out of bounds outside term time, and that students 'shouldn't really be' in any building where they didn't have a scheduled lecture or seminar. Under cross examination she admitted she 'didn't know the university rules off by heart'. Prosecution witness Andrew Shaw, a Lancaster university bar manager, said he was organising the catering in the foyer when he saw a female conference organiser, agitated and upset, leaving the lecture theatre saying there was a protest going on. A porter asked Shaw to go in with him to remove the protesters. As they entered it was 'very loud with whistles and a loudhailer and so forth'. One protester was on stage, very close to Lord Sainsbury (who was at or near the lectern): he was 'in Sainsbury's personal space', so Shaw asked him to leave three or four times, then took him by the arm to lead him out but he 'span away'. He then went with the porter to remove two other protesters with a banner, who went out quietly. He then came in again, and asked 'a girl blowing a whistle' to leave three or four times: she refused and fell to the floor. Shaw said he and his colleague (Adrian Watkin), picked her up as gently as they could. Shaw took her legs and Watkin took 'the top end'. He said she was still blowing the whistle, kicking out and screaming. They took her out and put her on the floor in the foyer. She tried to go back in so he stood on the door to prevent this. Shaw said it was not clear whether the situation could have 'kicked off'. A few people in the lecture theatre seemed intimidated, though Shaw said he wasn't, because he'd worked in security before. Under cross examination he agreed he had encountered only passive resistance. Asked whether the woman he had carried out could have been screaming in pain he replied 'I'm not sure, there was a lot of noise'. The defence asked whether any of the defendants could have been threatening in view of the way the audience was laughing and jibing at them. Shaw said he could not remember any of this, it may have been the case. The George Fox building (GFB) had been hired out that summer for 'maybe a dozen' conferences. The prosecution called Adrian Watkin, then a student working as a catering assistant providing drinks for the conference. His manager (Shaw) asked him to join him in the lecture theatre. At first Watkin was unclear why they were there, but then he saw protesters on the stage and in the crowd. He and Shaw asked them to leave. He placed his hands on one female's shoulder and escorted her into the foyer; she offered no resistance. He said he went back in and saw a girl blowing a whistle in a porter's face. In an 'act of defiance' she fell to the floor. He and Shaw picked her up and carried her out. As they did so the porter took the whistle out of her mouth, at which point she started screaming. They put her down outside and Watkin was asked to stay on the door. In the foyer a male protester, brought out by Shaw, sat down and turned on a siren. Eventually security turned up and asked him to turn it off. After a while he did so and went outside. Watkin stated that his work had been disrupted – there was 'a big delay in the tea and coffee setup'. He said he felt intimidated, having never experienced anything like this before. ***************************************************** Day 2 Tuesday 14 March The session opened with an announcement by the judge that afternoon session would be cancelled due to a medical appointment, followed by some consultation on how this might affect the defence witnesses. Tony Evans, Head of Security and Registrar of Meetings, told the court a call was received around 9.10am reporting 'disruption' at the GFB. On arrival he found the demonstrators, one with a drum, one with a whistle, departing the lecture theatre, and a man sitting cross-legged on the floor of the foyer with a loud hailer around his neck. He later learned these were Keith Richardson, Rachel Jackson and Matthew Wilson respectively. The loud hailer was connected to a siren and making 'a considerable noise'. He asked Wilson to stop making the noise and to take the protest outside but was ignored. Evans maintained that he told the protestors the university would be content for them to engage in a peaceful protest outside, but 'they ignored me.' He warned Wilson that if he didn't move he would be regarded as a trespasser, and the police would be called. Wilson stayed, so Evans left and called the police. When he returned Wilson was still there; the others were outside. Evans and some of his staff went on a tour of the building 'to secure the access points,' then he went to a nearby avenue to await the police. Wilson had meanwhile left the building. Evans confirmed that the demonstrators then did not re-enter the building. Evans explained his functions, specifically as Registrar of Meetings which he had been for 10 years. He was to ensure freedom of speech to groups wishing to use the university, according to the Education II Act. The court then heard an extended exchange regarding the university code of practice, which contains a list of events exempted from the code as 'non-controversial, routine meetings' not requiring the involvement of the Registrar. The general rule is that meetings not on the exempt list should be reported by the organisers to the Registrar 14 days in advance, to be assessed for their potentially controversial nature. Evans explained that for him 'controversial translated into anybody important.' In this case the only person who he considered to fall within that category was Lord Sainsbury. He said he had taken advice from the police, who reported no threat with regard to Sainsbury. The remainder seemed non-controversial and Richard Crawley had confirmed that assessment. It seemed that this meeting fell within the 'schedule' for exemptions from controversial meetings. Addison asked who would be ensured access to meeting space under the
Education II Act, an anti-GM foods meeting for example? Evans agreed that
would be permitted; the university would be obliged to provide facilities.
Asked if freedom of speech permits one point of view to disrupt another,
Evans replied that wouldn't be permissible, but strong views could be
managed by negotiating with the organisers to arrange a slot in which
to present an opposing point of view. No-one had approached him regarding
a demonstration in this case, if they had, Evans said he would have negotiated
with Crawley to provide for a peaceful protest; he was sure that Crawley
would have agreed; 'That happens all the time, it's not a problem'. The
court heard that Evans was shocked that he didn't know about the protest
in advance and then found it to be an event that couldn't be channelled
into something acceptable. In previous instances he'd been able to negotiate
with protestors – the protest is registered, and 'normal business
is resumed.' The right to freedom of speech did not include the right
to disrupt events, he said. Under cross examination Evans agreed that the conference had concluded successfully, with no complaints from delegates. Questioned about the relationship between his role as Head of Security and as Registrar of Meetings; it was suggested that on the day he was acting more in the capacity of the former than the latter. Pressed on the amount of his time that he devoted to the Registrar's job and how often he had been called on to rule with respect to controversial meetings, he replied that probably twice in the past 10 years a committee had been convened to assess meetings booked on university premises. Asked about the appropriateness of corporate links to the university, Evans replied, 'We live in a capitalist society', adding that he respected the opposition view being voiced by the Six, and would have supported a peaceful demonstration. Evans confirmed that there were many students and others going in and out of the building that day and there were no signs saying not to enter the lecture theatre. Asked if he was aware of correspondence from the Quaker Society objecting to the use of the building by companies like BAe, Evans replied that he was aware of such a letter in conjunction with a careers fair held there. The court heard that the Society's concern was that as the building was named after the 17th century founder of the Quakers, it wasn't appropriate that it be used to host arms manufacturers. Evans agreed that he could see the link, and confirmed that the university agreed not to hold further careers fairs there. Addison resumed questioning and pointed out that the Quakers had sent a letter, they hadn't disrupted the proceedings. The judge then directed the questions back to the exclusivity of the building, asking about the conference site itself. Evans said 'it would be understood' that the conference would have exclusive rights to the lecture theatre, but the foyer was open for access to other floors. Detective Sergeant Marc Nasser was, the court heard, experienced with respect to animal rights activism and had identified the Six from the video. He had watched the video and summarised it as a text, which he then read out to the court in full. This was followed by a guided viewing of the video, with Nasser pausing it repeatedly to identify members of the Six and who was doing what. The action clearly included an 'unidentified female' in support of the Six, and an unidentified brown dog. ***************************************************** Day 3 Wednesday 15 March The prosecution handed the description of aggravated trespass in Section 68; the University's Code of Practice on Freedom of Speech, and the relevant section of the University Rules on disciplinary matters to the bench. Defence witness Robin Grove-White told the court that at the time of the protest, he was Professor of Environment and Society at Lancaster, and had been on the staff since 1989. When asked what he understood to be the nature of the conference, he said he understood it was a conference about the corporate funding of research, and about relations between corporations and universities. He said the close industrial involvement with universities is a 'fraught issue', and not just for Lancaster. There were issues of academic freedom, about how research is funded, and how the independence and autonomy of research is defended. Asked about the nature of and access to university premises he replied that this was a campus university, outside the city, and that in his experience it had a 'fluid, open and tolerant open access policy', with outsiders welcome on campus, even at academic activities. He added that he had run lots of events – lectures, conferences etc – and generally there were outsiders present by invitation or request. He had not been aware of the University's Code of Practice on freedom of speech, but freedom of speech was 'part of the warp and woof' of the university. The free exchange of ideas was the lifeblood of academic life. The defence asked if he was aware of the Registrar of Meetings and his role in relation to the freedom of speech, he replied, 'I have never come across such a being, no'. Under cross-examination Professor Grove-White was asked about conferences he had organised at Lancaster. The prosecution suggested that outsiders being present by invitation or request was different to them just turning up and protesting. Grove-White said the latter had never happened at one of his events. It was then suggested that people coming to conferences do not expect disruption to which he replied, 'no, but this is part of the spice of life; one has to be thick-skinned'. Asked whether people were surely expected to pay if they turned up at such an event, he replied that universities were more permeable than that. If this was a commercial event, maybe, but generally at events at universities, some outsiders present have paid, and some haven't. He agreed that this was up to the organisers. The witness was then asked about his statement that the commercial involvement in university research was 'fraught' and if he also thought that the use of university premises for commercial purposes, especially common outside term time, was also controversial. He replied, 'yes, but less so. Universities have to make money'. He said this issue was less significant than issues of academic integrity. When asked whether people attending such events are entitled to expect it to go ahead without interference, he agreed, but added, 'in the real world, one would expect dissenting opinions to be expressed'. The Judge asked him about events that he had organised at Lancaster, and what his attitude would have been had they been similarly disrupted. Grove-White said, 'if there had been pushy participants, I might have found it irritating', and agreed that it was conceivable that others might have too. When pressed to say that this was not just conceivable, he said that this depended on the subject matter of the conference. 'In the case of this particular one, diverse views might be welcome'. The defence resumed by asking what his attitude would have been if protesters had turned up at a conference he had organised. Acknowledging that he would have been annoyed, as one is 'wound up' in those circumstances, he added he would 'try to let them have their say. It's important not to over-react to these things'. He said that would apply equally to protest or other disruptions. When asked by the Judge whether it would not be preferable if protesters were to notify in advance their intention to protest, Professor Grove-White agreed that it would be preferable, but said that it was in the nature of protest sometimes to be unexpected. The defence then called Johann Unger, Lancaster PhD student, who in September 2004 was also teaching pre-sessional courses in English for academic purposes for overseas students. At the time of the protest he was teaching a class of 12 or 13 students upstairs in the GFB. Mr Unger said there may have been other activities going on in the building at that time, but could not be sure. He said he had entered the building by the main entrance at about 9.25am and saw people handing out leaflets, another person sitting on the floor letting off a siren, and others milling about. No one spoke to him. He picked up a leaflet, went up the spiral staircase to the first floor to the classroom. The class went ahead as usual; the siren was not audible when the door was closed. The other students probably used the front entrance too as some of them arrived with leaflets. The next defence witness was Matthew Freeman, a retail sales manager who from 2004 to 2005 had been the President of Lancaster University Students' Union, representing the Union, and all students, to Lancaster University and to external bodies. The role also included membership of the Standing Committee on Freedom of Speech. When asked how often he attended meetings of the committee, he said that to his knowledge, no meetings of the committee occurred that year, although he was in regular communication with members such as Fiona Aiken and Tony Evans about a wide range of issues including safety, security and freedom of speech. He had not heard about the conference in advance, but thought it should have been discussed as a controversial event, since it was likely that students on campus would have protested against the companies present and the wider issues it raised. He said that if the standing committee had met, he would have made representations about the conference, including the likelihood of protest, and whether there should be a platform for students to submit views to the conference. The prosecution asked whether he would expect students wanting to submit their views to let Tony Evans know of this – not to ask permission, but simply so arrangements could be made, and the witness agreed. Joanne Moodie was then called by the defence. She is currently a Learning Support Tutor at a further education college in Lancaster, but until December 2005 was a postgraduate student and part-time teaching assistant. She said she was first aware of the conference two or three days earlier when she received an email from a list, within which someone had copied and pasted information on the conference. She had been 'slightly horrified' by the news. She said lots of people were opposed to the university's relationship with BAe Systems, and staff were concerned about the impact of commercialisation on the integrity and independence of research and on the reputation of the university. She was thus concerned both about the nature of the event and the people attending. When asked who she believed to be attending, she mentioned BAe Systems and Shell Oil, and described her concerns over their specific human rights and environmental records. Ms Moodie said she then talked with friends; they decided to hold a protest, made or found banners and designed a leaflet. When asked what she understood about rights of access to university premises, she said that she understood there to be open access; the GFB in particular was a public building, with a café, toilets, classrooms and notice boards. She acknowledged that there were some spaces on campus such as laboratories that had restricted access for health and safety reasons. Under cross-examination, she said that she was not aware of the Registrar of Meetings or the Head of Security, and did not feel it was necessary to tell the Head of Security or the police if planning to hold a protest. She denied knowing that the conference in question was a commercial event, for which people paid to attend. She had been involved in the organisation of a number of events at Lancaster, and understood that conferences at the university were primarily academic. The Judge accused her of being evasive, but she insisted that she did not think of it as a commercial or private event. Moodie denied that she went in to disrupt the conference; she simply wanted to address it, to represent the views of a number of people on campus. The issues raised by the conference were too important to simply stand outside; it was also important to make attendees aware of the issues. She denied that they disrupted the conference, insisting that they would simply have held a visible but brief protest at the conference, but were denied their rights of freedom of speech and manhandled out. She rejected the idea that they had denied the rights of delegates to hear Lord Sainsbury. She defended not contacting the organisers of the conference, saying that part of the freedom to protest is the right to take people by surprise with spontaneous protests. She insisted that lecture theatres were not out of bounds in this regard. They had the right to protest at an event they found unethical, and their protest should have been tolerated. The megaphone had originally probably been taken to address people with outside the building. Keith Richardson was then called. He said that at the time of the protest he was undertaking his PhD at Lancaster. Because of his own research he had been concerned to hear about the conference, because of its implications for the independence and freedom of research. Such concerns were widely held amongst his colleagues and other scientists. He had understood the conference to have been organised by the Management School, to be concerned with ways of commercialising research, and to be addressed by Lord Sainsbury, a controversial figure because of his support for GMOs at the same time as being Science Minister. He described the events of the morning, insisting that no whistle was blown or drums beaten until they entered the lecture theatre, at which time he blew two blasts on his own whistle to attract attention. He described how within less than a minute people came in and started physically removing them from the theatre. He described Wilson speaking to the audience, heckling, attempts to engage in debate, and laughter, including from Lord Sainsbury. 'On the whole', he said, 'they were quite good humoured'. On being removed from the theatre he and the others continued their protest in the foyer for 5-10 minutes before they felt they'd made their point and moved outside, where they remained for an hour and a half. He understood all academic buildings at the university to be open access to students, staff and public. He said that students generally have access to buildings, to socialise, or just find a quiet room, at all times of year. On being asked about entering the lecture theatre that day, he replied that they didn't give it much thought. They had no reason to suspect it was a private event, and felt that they could just go in, make their protest and leave. He said that this was the culture of the campus; protests are common and tolerated. They did not intend to break up the meeting, just to go in, speak to delegates, hold up their banners, then leave to continue their protest outside. He confirmed that at the time he had known of Tony Evans as Head of Security, but not as Registrar of Meetings. He didn't know the standing committee for meetings existed, or anything about the provisions of the Education (II) Act on freedom of speech. Had the protestors known about the committee, he stated, they would have applied for permission to speak at the conference. They were not, however, aware of any proactive attempts by the university to ensure freedom of speech. Cross-examining, Addison pressed Richardson to agree both that he had disrupted and intended to disrupt the conference. The judge intervened to encourage Richardson to answer and he maintained that he had merely 'caused a temporary stop, an interruption'. The group's intention had been to carry out a protest, which they had done: 'not all consequences of any action are intended'. Addison asked whether anything the group had done that day had gone beyond what they had intended, for instance Richardson blowing the whistle as they entered the lecture theatre. Richardson stated that he blew the whistle to attract attention, not to disrupt. He had been surprised when Wilson let off the siren in the foyer, he hadn't known that was going to happen, but it had been done to express frustration and displeasure at their having been ejected from the conference without having been able to finish their discussion with the delegates. Addison suggested they could have talked to the delegates on their way in; Richardson replied that this would have been ineffective, and given little chance to get the group's views across. The best approach, which they had tried to take, was to take up a few minutes of conference time and then be available afterwards outside for further discussion. They had no intention to stop the conference. The delegates had 'no right not to be protested at', and no-one could dictate what form protest should take – individuals decide for themselves 'within reason and within the law'. It was their choice to protest in this way. Richardson said he hadn't been aware that delegates were paying to be there, but that would have made no difference to his view that he had a right to protest inside the conference. It was a conference held at a university in a public building with a government minister present. Normally protests at the university by students are tolerated, and 'people don't over-react'. Defendant Rhiannon Westphal was a graduate of the university, the court heard, and hence still a member of it, with rights of access to the campus and facilities, not only for lectures but for general use. She heard about the conference 2 or 3 days before it happened, from an email (containing details of the event, from 'Vickytext', pasted into an email on a 'green issues' list). She was 'concerned about the impact of the privatisation of the university on the objectivity and direction of academic research'. She showed the email to others and joined in the organisation of a protest, painting a banner saying 'Education not Exploitation', and drafting the leaflet which was handed out on the day. When they arrived she didn't see any signs, and no-one spoke to them as they crossed the foyer. They walked into the lecture theatre quietly, and then she held up a banner (with Richardson) for about a minute. During this time Matthew Wilson was speaking to the audience, and some people were holding their hands up to ask him questions. Then a large man grabbed the banner and she let go of it, this was the first she saw or heard of him, he hadn't asked her to leave or spoken to her at all. She let go of the banner and went to hand out leaflets to the audience, then after handing out quite a few, a woman asked her to leave so she tried to go out, but had to wait as the space between the two sets of doors was blocked by Rachel Jackson on the floor who, she said, was crying out in pain with three men standing over her. Once the doors were clear Westphal walked out. In the foyer she engaged in conversation with Richard Crawley who asked her why they were protesting. She then handed out leaflets to people coming into the building and eventually moved outside. Addison asked whether anything the group had done had surprised her: she said no, only the university's reaction had been a surprise. She had never heard of the Registrar of Meetings during her time at the university; in previous protests at the university, such as at a BAe recruitment seminar, she and co-protesters hadn't informed anyone, they just went ahead. In that case the BAe people had quite enjoyed the debate although that wasn't an event where people had paid to attend. Judge Baker asked Westphal what her objection was to Lord Sainsbury. She replied that since the university at the time was engaged in 'independent' research for the Government on the impact of GM crops, the presence on site of not only Sainsbury but also Du Pont (the biggest GM player in Europe) was objectionable and potentially detrimental to the independence of the research. Her concern was to alert the academics present at the conference to this danger. Judge Baker asked her to suppose that the Vice Chancellor of the university was having a private meeting with Sainsbury and a representative of Du Pont, not in his office but in a classroom: would she still have considered she had a right to 'go in and talk at the VC'? She replied that she might well have a right to do so, but this would be different to the conference in question, which was not a private meeting. The information she had did not say people weren't allowed to attend, or that delegates were paying. Going into a private meeting would not have been appropriate, even though there might be a right to do so. She would have respected the privacy of the people in such a meeting. Judge Baker then asked why the video had been made. She said that this was commonly done, and could be useful, for instance, to show to people afterwards to open debate on the issues. In this case though the quality of the video had been so bad it was never used. The defence called Matthew Wilson, currently a third year student studying ethics at St Martin's College, an affiliated institution of Lancaster University. His first recollection of this protest was making a banner the day before the conference. He was chosen to be the one to address the delegates, and felt nervous about this. He didn't remember who brought what 'tools of protest' but accepted that he had a megaphone with him. Once in the lecture theatre he addressed the audience from the stage, explaining why they were there. He spoke briefly to Sainsbury, to ask him whether he was planning to spend any more time talking to 'the other side', since at the time he said he was notorious for having spent only 20 minutes of his four and a half years as science minister talking to environmental groups, while having frequent meetings with the 'biotech industry'. He said Sainsbury gave a wry smile but remained silent. A delegate asked him where he had got his coat, to which he replied 'Barnardo's' and there was general laughter, Wilson observed this was probably at him, rather than with him. By now people were putting their hands up to ask him questions: he pointed to one of them, who said he was in public relations and could perhaps offer Wilson a few tips on getting his message across. It then became apparent that the other protesters had been removed, so Wilson walked out of his own accord. In the foyer he saw Richardson being pushed towards the door and said he turned on the siren in protest at this illegitimate use of force. There was no specific aim to this action; noise is 'an integral mode of protest', as are other tactics such as silence and nudity, a part of protest culture. They had hoped to have a longer discussion with the delegates inside, but once in the foyer resorted to more standard forms of protest such as banners and noise. Wilson was surprised at the response to a protest which had been even briefer than had been planned. In response to Judge Baker's hypothetical example, he said he would have felt the right to protest at a meeting between the VC and Sainsbury, but it was more acceptable to do so in a public forum such as this conference. Academics and others from all over the world had expressed shock at this prosecution and support for the protesters, he said. This was an attack on the culture of openness and public space which traditionally prevailed in universities and as Richard Crawley had said, such events were common in universities (and elsewhere) 20/30 years ago. Addison questioned him about the use of the siren, suggesting that the intent was to disrupt. Wilson accepted that it was irritating to people nearby, but this was not unlawful as such. Protest was often noisy and a nuisance; noise was part of protest culture and an individual actions didn't always have a consciously articulated intent. He didn't intend it to be heard inside the lecture theatre, or he would have faced the megaphone towards the doors (the video clearly showed it pointing away from them). The doors of the lecture theatre were in any case effectively soundproof. Addison asked whether he accepted the university had a right in principle to close off spaces for private purposes. He agreed that this would be appropriate, for instance, when holding exams, but said he would question the university's right as a public institution to close off spaces for private meetings for the purposes of making money. In any case he had not thought of this conference as private, it was organised by the university and he felt he had a right to protest there. He stated that he preferred to think about the positive consequences of his actions when protesting, i.e. restricting the activities of those he was protesting against: he had never thought 'am I going to disrupt this conference'. Asked whether as a student he believed he had a right to have the lectures on his own course proceed uninterrupted, he said no, and would in fact approve if people came in to disrupt one of his lectures as a protest, even if it was for a cause he didn't agree with. This was 'one of the sacrifices we make to live in a pluralist democratic society'. Freedom of speech depended on the right to be heard, so protesting outside would have had little impact. The availability of alternative modes of protest was irrelevant; the group chose to protest in this way. The State shouldn't prescribe how people should protest; that would contravene article 10 (of the European Convention on Human Rights). ***************************************************** Day 4 Thursday 16 March The session began with testimony from two defendants, Anthony Ayre and Rachel Jackson. In both, the prosecution suggested they had known that their actions would disrupt the corporate venturing conference in the GFB on 10 September 2004. Both denied this saying they had made their point of view known to the participants in the event and had left after briefly interrupting the conference. Ayre was asked if he was responsible for an internet report which was headlined that the protesters disrupted a corporate event. Ayre denied having been the author of that report and said that web sites had editorialised a report that the George Fox Six had sent out. Jackson was asked why she had blown a whistle; she said she had done so to draw attention to being manhandled when someone tried to force her off the premises. The prosecution suggested that her banging a drum outside the lecture theatre was an attempt to disrupt the event inside. She denied this, saying that it was an attempt to draw attention to the protest. The court then heard the prosecution and defence legal arguments. The prosecution drew attention to the apparent conflict between Article 10 (European Convention on Human Rights) and Section 68 (defining the crime of aggravated trespass), being raised by the defence. Article 10 protects the right to free speech, including protest, but the prosecutor stated that it was not an unqualified right and that Section 68 placed limits on the exercise of free speech by protesters: they had a right to protest but not in any way or in any place they saw fit. The defendants' protest had not respected the rights of the conference attendees. The judge interrupted the prosecutor in such a way as to indicate that the judge regarded the rights protected by Article 10 as ones qualified by Section 68. The prosecution went on to discuss the Education (II) Act, which establishes that universities must install codes of practice to protect free speech. He stated that Lancaster University had complied with its code of practice on the day of the corporate venturing event. Addison stated that the demonstrators were trespassers within the terms of the law on aggravated trespass. Although they had a license to be on university premises, they exceeded the terms of the license by protesting in a way that interfered with the rights of the delegates. For the defence Andrew Fitzpatrick stated that the conference had been held in contravention of the university's own code since Section 43 of the 1986 Education Act intended to protect freedom of speech and required universities to draw up a code of practice to make freedom of speech more than a slogan; making it meaningful in practice. The university's Registrar of Meetings, however, had not undertaken the notifications required under the code (making it a 'Schedule 1 Exception'), believing that the meeting was uncontroversial. The organiser of the event was unaware of the code. As soon as the protest began, the students were bundled away from the conference, thus extinguishing their rights of free speech. The result, he continued, was two-fold. Failing to adhere to the university's own code meant that the conference organisers were trespassers as much as the students were and the university approached the law 'with dirty hands' when it regarded the protesters as trespassers. Furthermore, if the code had been applied, an area should have been set aside in which the protesters could make their views known but this was not done. Instead, the Head of Security, Tony Evans, acted as a suppressor and censor as soon as the students began to protest. The defence described the protesters' activity as legitimate and peaceful. One of the protesters approached Lord Sainsbury and queried his approach to GM crops in a polite and 'democratic' manner but received no response. Fitzpatrick made a distinction between the protesters' behaviour inside the George Fox lecture theatre and outside. When they were outside, the latter stage of activity took place at a time when their right to protest had been violated. Addressing the relationship between Section 68 and Article 10, the defence argued that the two laws had to be considered together since the European Convention on Human Rights had been incorporated into UK domestic law. When balancing the rights of the appellants against the rights of the conference attendees, any interference with the rights of the protesters had to be very narrowly construed. Fitzpatrick cited Handyside and other cases to show that the literal interpretation of Section 68, that any interference constituted a de facto disruption, would fail to have regard to Article 10. Section 68 must be construed so as to avoid the literal interpretation, in order to be compatible with Article 10 and thereby protect the right to freedom of speech. This would be a matter of degree. Judge Baker queried exactly what restriction of Article 10 rights was being alleged here and exactly how this was relevant to the present exercise of examining whether the actions of the appellants fell within Article 68 (and thus whether an offence of aggravated trespass had been committed). This exercise required the assessment of their intent, and this meant assessing events before the protest began, and thus before any alleged interference with their rights. Fitzpatrick replied that it was not alleged that there was any interference with the appellants' Article 10 rights before their removal from the lecture theatre. His point had been that Article 10 rights needed to be considered in the process (of deciding whether actions fell with Section 68) at the point of deciding whether what had occurred (or was intended) constituted disruption. He agreed with the judge's subsequent formulation that 'when we are looking to see what Section 68 proscribes we must have regard to the fact that the way in which the disruption occurred was as an exercise of Article 10 rights.' When considering disruption in this context Article 10, including article 10 (2), should also be considered. It was not being suggested that Section 68 was in itself incompatible with Article 10. Case law (including Handyside) established that in order to comply with the European Convention on Human Rights the penalty or sanction imposed must be proportionate to the aim pursued. In this case was conviction under Section 68 a legitimate and proportional response to the actions of the appellants? The judge must look very carefully at the nature and form of the protest, and the nature of any disruption he might find. The actions of the appellants were modest, legitimate and proportionate to the environment they were in, it was argued. The restriction of their rights, on the other hand, was disproportionate in the extreme. Pressing a button on a pelican crossing, Fitzpatrick argued, was not an action resulting from an intention to stop the traffic, but from an intention to cross the road. The judge was not convinced by this, and suggested that actions could have both primary and secondary objectives, and be given rise to by both primary and secondary intentions. Fitzpatrick replied that nonetheless in order to convict there must be evidence of 'a specific intent to disrupt'. The appellants had all been individually summoned, even though evidence of joint enterprise had been brought. There was therefore a need to look carefully at the actions of each of them. Anthony Ayre, for instance, had no case to answer (having only acted as cameraman), and the same arguably applied to Rhiannon Westphal, who had not held up any banners, did nothing but hand out leaflets inside the lecture theatre, and had left when asked to. Fitzpatrick quoted Judge Sedley, who said (in the case of Redmond-Bate v DPP 1999) that 'Freedom only to speak inoffensively is not worth having … Free speech includes not only the inoffensive, but the irritating, the contentious, the eccentric, the heretical, the unwelcome and the provocative, provided it does not tend to provoke violence.' The prosecution rejected the suggestion that any of the defendants could be individually found not guilty. Since they had all testified that they were not surprised by anything the group did on the day, it was clear that they had all intended to disrupt the conference. Ayre, though he had only acted as cameraman, had had a role comparable to a 'burglar's lookout'. He was still part of the intention and purpose of the trespass. Addison continued that all the cases cited by the defence related to situations in which something had not been allowed. This was not the case here, since the defendants were allowed to (and did) continue protesting, outside the building. There was no interference with their right to express their views: on the contrary, they had interfered with the right of the conference delegates to express theirs. Redmond-Bate (a fundamentalist preacher who successfully appealed against her arrest for a breach of the peace while preaching outside Wakefield cathedral), had not prevented people entering the cathedral. Another important difference was that 'he' had been arrested for what he was saying. (In fact Redmond-Bate was a woman.) Article 10(2) clearly allows freedom of speech to be restricted by proper rules. Fitzpatricks's argument would legalise trespass. It was important to note that it was not the protest but the disruption of the conference that was the problem in this case. Regarding compliance with the university's Code of Practice on freedom of speech, the defence claimed that no arrangements had been made to allow the protestors to enter the conference and express their views. But they had never asked or applied to do so: Evans had clearly said that if they had done, this could have been arranged. This was a unilateral action; the defendants chose not to consult the university but to impose their view on others. Spontaneous protest is not wrong in itself, but must be balanced against the rights of others. Addison invited the judge to consider that, potentially, there could have been any number of other groups also wanting to protest spontaneously against the conference. If they had all been allowed to do so as the defence argued, the conference would have become impossible. Fitzpatrick was given the opportunity by the judge to have the last word. In answer to a question from the judge, he clarified that the defence was not arguing the appeal must succeed simply because Article 10 always made prosecution for an offence committed in a moderate way disproportionate. The question was whether, on the facts of the case, prosecution constituted a disproportionate overreaction. He reminded the judge of the evidence of Richard Crawley, who had said that 'we've got out of practice' in tolerating protest. ***************************************************** Day 5 Friday 17 March In addition to counsel, there were fifteen observers and a single police officer (two others joined him at the end of the session) attending. The Judgement Judge Baker explained that the burden of proof lay with the prosecution to prove the guilt of each appellant. He pointed out that the assessment was of the guilt of each of the appellants individually, as well as being about their collective responsibility. He reviewed the prosecution's case: the framing of the charges in relation to the offence of aggravated trespass (according to the 1994 Act) and the claim that the protestors were trespassing in the George Fox Building (GFB) and attempting to disrupt lawful activity there. He reviewed the appellants' case: their denial that they were trespassing or disrupting lawful activity in the GFB. He recalled their contention that the corporate meeting being held there at the time of their entry was unlawful. He registered their claim that Lancaster University had not made provision for them to exercise their freedom of speech and that, since the conference itself was unlawful, it was the delegates who were the trespassers. Freedom of Speech Judge Baker noted that the university had a Code of Practice (1986) that pertained to protests and controversial events. Tony Evans (as Head of Security) was the registrar of meetings and he had assessed that the conference in question was not controversial, having consulted regarding the security risk involved. The judge noted that Lord Sainsbury was a controversial figure, given his corporate involvement and his role as government Minister of Science. However, the judge reiterated that Evans had made the assessment that the event in question was not a controversial one. The appellants had made no effort to approach the organisers to secure an opportunity to express their views or protest. He indicated that they could have approached Richard Crawley for such a purpose. He registered that the university culture did seem to include the right to protest. Nevertheless, he maintained that the protesters had not pursued the channels open to them and they entered the meeting without warning or negotiation. Based on this evidence, Judge Baker concluded that the university and the conference organisers were not in breach of the Education II Act (1986). The judge and the justices deemed that the event was not unlawful and that the conference delegates were not there illegally. They accepted that the university had allocated the lecture theatre as a private venue to the conference organisers, that the delegates and organisers were participating in a lawful activity and the delegates were 'invitees not trespassers'. Turning to the evidence concerning the appellants' rights, the judge recalled that they had maintained their right to enter all parts of the GFB. He highlighted, in particular that, the claims of one of the appellants (Ms Moodie) that the right to protest was an 'absolute right'. He contended that the appellants, as students, had a 'license of permission' to enter certain parts of the GFB. However, the judge and the magistrates rejected that they had an 'absolute right' to enter the lecture theatre to protest. Judge Baker framed the issues in relation to two sets of rights covered
by existing legislation: the human rights legislation pertaining to freedom
of speech and protest (covered by section 10 of the European Convention
on Human Rights) vs. the right to carry on lawful activity without interruption
(covered by section 68 of the 1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act).
There was a fine balance to be maintained between the right to protest
and the right to carry on lawful activity without interruption. However,
he insisted that there was no necessary incompatibility between these
principles. The appellants had a qualified right to freedom of speech
under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The relevant
qualification here was 'for the protection of the rights of others'. Section
68 (of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, as amended by the
Anti Social Behaviour Act 2003) strikes a fair balance between the rights
of protesters and the rights of others going about their normal business,
he said. It is a clear piece of legislation which is compatible with Article
10(2) as it is 'necessary in a democratic society for the protection of
the rights of others'. To apply it in a way which preserves this compatibility
will however require that in considering whether an act falls within Section
68 the words 'obstruct' and 'disrupt' must be narrowly interpreted: the
obstruction or disruption in question must be more than trivial. The judge acknowledged that the appellants had an implied right to enter
the foyer and other parts of the GFB. He also noted that, with permission,
they could enter the various lecture rooms. However, he maintained that
they had no right to enter the designated lecture theatre with the intention
of obstructing or disrupting activities lawfully licensed by the university.
He highlighted the importance of the appellants' choice not to seek permission
for their protest. He observed that the absence of any notices regarding
the illegality of entry without permission did not alter the court's view,
underlining that there was no implied right to enter the meeting. He concluded
that entry into a meeting of this kind without authority constituted trespass.
Judge Baker described the protestors' methods of entry: 'briskly, straight in, with whistles, banners .... etc. interrupting the speaker'. He contended that they had no intention of listening or generating dialogue but rather, that they sought to impose their views. Referring to the GF lecture theatre, he commented that this was 'not Hyde Park corner or any political hustings' and contended that the students had disregarded the delegates' need to get on with their work. He outlined other options available to them: expressing themselves outside of the building; displaying their banner and distributing leaflets in the foyer, until they would be told to leave; seeking the opportunity to address the delegates. He concluded that each appellant had trespassed by entering the lecture theatre in the circumstances outlined and had jointly entered into acts designed to disrupt the meeting. He added that Mr Ayre's use of the camera to record the event supported the others and contributed to their activities. Judge Baker rejected the appellants' contention that their intention was not to disrupt but to 'interrupt temporarily', reviewing some of the English usage of 'disruption' and 'obstruction'. He insisted that 'what happened and what was intended to happen' was disruption and obstruction of a lawful activity. Judge Baker alluded to the video evidence concluding that the protestors had behaved as outlined in the schedule produced by Det Sgt Nasser. When the students left the lecture theatre, they continued their protest outside and one of the students, Mr Wilson, had stayed on in the foyer after he had been asked to leave by Tony Evans and used a megaphone, which the judge contended was a further attempt to disrupt the conference, thereby continuing the offence. Judge Baker returned to the relationship between English and European Court law in Section 68 and Article 10. He explained that Section 68 does not render Article 10 redundant, but that it limits the way it can realised, indicating the need to find a proportionate balance between the rights of those who wish to protest and those who wish to conduct their lawful activities undisturbed. He and the magistrates rejected the appeal and upheld the original judgement in finding the appellants guilty of aggravated trespass. Consequent of the judgement each recived a conditional discharge for two years, and a further £300 costs were awarded against each of them (in addition to the £300 costs from the original trial). After a brief exchange between the judge and the barristers it was clarified that the six months already 'served' would count, leaving 18 months of the sentences to be served. ***************************************************** The legislation Article 10, European Convention on Human Rights 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.
This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. Section 68, Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (subsections 1 & 2) (1) A person commits the offence of aggravated trespass if he trespasses on land in the open air and, in relation to any lawful activity which persons are engaging in or are about to engage in on that or adjoining land in the open air, does there anything which is intended by him to have the effect
(2) Activity on any occasion on the part of a person or persons on land is 'lawful' for the purposes of this section if he or they may engage in the activity on the land on that occasion without committing an offence or trespassing on the land. NB Section 68.1 was amended by the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 (section 59(ii)) to remove the words 'in the open air'. The official explanatory notes to the 2003 Act state that:
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