On the 3rd September 1943, Allied forces made their first landing on mainland Europe, crossing the Straits of Messina to the toe of Italy. The surrender of the Italian government five days later brought immediate reaction from the Germans who forcibly disarmed Italian forces and seized all strategic points of the country. The German determination to resist was shown in the bitter fighting at Salerno on the 10th September and at subsequent landings. The long slow advance northwards has been well-documented; and justly so, for it was a bloody campaign.

Many details of the landings have attracted close attention, but little has been made of the role of the Royal Navy in supporting the Salerno beach-head. Force Five at Salerno constituted a unique assortment of warships: five `Woolworth' carriers, ten Hunt class destroyers and three anti-aircraft cruisers. Each ship a dwarf of its kind, but contributing to an unusual deployment; the control, from a cruiser, of aircraft flying from five carriers; the race to deliver vital troop reinforcements from North Africa; and the protection of the battleship Warspite, first victim of the Luftwaffe’s radio controlled bombs.

In the three weeks following the enemy’s withdrawal from Sicily, hundreds of ships and craft used in the invasion were regrouped, repaired, completed with stores and ammunition, and made ready for the next combined operation. Because Sicily had been taken with much lower cost in men and landing craft than had been expected, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had urged General Eisenhower to consider a direct assault on Naples.

With the fall of Mussolini, the British had softened their demands for additional resources to support the landing. Even so, they continued to insist upon fighter cover over the beaches. The landing place selected was the Gulf of Salerno, thirty miles south of Naples. This was just within range of Spitfires based in Sicily, but would allow them only thirty minutes over the beaches on each sortie.

For this reason, the Admiralty sent a force of five aircraft carriers; the small fleet carrier Unicorn and the still smaller escort carriers Battler, Attacker, Hunter and Stalker. Admiral Sir Phillip Vian was appointed to command these ships, together with the anti-aircraft light Dido class cruisers Charybdis, Euryalus, and Sylla,, and ten destroyers. He hoisted his flag in Euryalus on the 27th August.

Force Five’s duty was to provide fighter patrols over the beaches throughout daylight hours until the airfield at Montecorvino was captured and R.A.F. fighters established there. This was expected to be on the second day of the assault.

Force Five sailed from Malta on the morning of the 8th September steering for the Straits of Messina. Ahead were the three cruisers, leading the five carriers circled by their destroyers. The carriers were poorly equipped for long-range anti-aircraft defence and it would be the cruisers’ role to provide that cover.

The summit of Mount Etna was hidden in cloud as the squadron passed to port. As Force Five approached the Messina Straits, darkness began to close. Floodlights, great bonfires and fireworks on the Sicilian shore lit up distant buildings. The towns of Messina and San Giovanni were celebrating the Italian surrender, announced that afternoon; but over to starboard, on the Italian mainland, the war went on as the Eighth Army crept up the toe of Italy. The bright flash of distant gunfire and the red glow of verey lights lit up the Italian sky.

As Force Five sailed northward, past the Lipari islands and the volcano island of Stromboli, they appeared to be the only ships at sea. Yet across the Tyrrhenian Sea from bases in Sicily and North Africa the long lines of landing ships and transports were converging upon the Gulf of Salerno.

As the distant hills began to lighten, the great LSTs could be seen wallowing towards the shore and from the sleeping landscape the first enemy guns flashed in the hills. Long lines of Lombardy poplars stretched along the low shore, their tapering forms taking shape in the dawn. On the beach, the black outlines of landing ships were like stranded whales. From their bellies, beetle-like transports crawled up up the shore. Soon, the dust clouds of the advancing vehicles rose above the poplars. The landing had begun.

Force Five moved into the wind and the carriers began their work. From the massed aircraft at their sterns, the first Seafires roared off the decks. Plane after plane formed up in the sky before heading to the beach-head to cover advancing troops.

In shore, the Headquarters ship Hilary was to send out situation reports. Her first signal warned of the stern struggle ahead. The landing force was opposed by a division of the Panzer Grenadiers, supported by a myriad of well-sighted 88-mm gun positions in the surrounding hills. Far inshore their shell bursts sent rolling brown clouds of dust over the country and, now and then, a tower of water showed that some guns were ranging on the beach-head.

By night-fall the beach was firmly held. The port of Reggio was soon in use and, thereafter, a steady stream of vessels kept the army supplied as it advanced north, although its penetration inland was no more than 3 miles.

That afternoon, in order to obtain an accurate fix, Force Five had moved up the Gulf towards the Isle of Capri, into territory well ahead of the land forces, but still there had been no air attack. Guns were first brought to the ready when an Italian Cant sea plane appeared. Then came a Junkers 88, which had sheered off before the guns could fire. Course was altered back towards Salerno.

Evening came quickly and the cruisers remained at action stations for night attack by torpedo bombers. To the north, flashes of gun fire came from the covering force of battleships and fleet carriers, which seemed to be attracting enemy attention. At intervals, great flares dropped slowly down upon Force Five, but still there came no attack.

Morning broke and with it came signals to confirm that the northern force had been attacked by torpedo bombers, and had replied with heavy-calibre shells. The light of dawn showed Luftwaffe aircrews in dinghies scattered on the sea.

On shore the grim struggle for possession of the airfield continued, and so the Seafires were still required. The town and port of Salerno were occupied; but this was to prove short-lived when, the following day, the enemy’s fire became so heavy that the port was again closed.

By the evening of the 10th, contrary to expectation, Montecorvino airfield still lay behind enemy lines; and so the carrier force prepared to continue its role. Their fighters were now greatly reduced, their losses less from combat, than from landing accidents. There had been little wind which, together with the carriers’ top speed of 17 knots, had demanded exceptional skill from pilots in landing on the limited flight decks. These naval versions of the Spitfire had not been designed for deck-landings and were easily damaged by anything other than perfect landings. Usually they pitched forward as the arrester wires tautened, causing damage to the propellers. An unorthodox solution was suggested by Captain H. McWilliam, commanding Hunter, who proposed that nine inches be sawn off all propeller ends. It worked. Their flying was relatively unimpaired and far fewer were damaged on landing.

By the evening of the 11th, Admiral Vian reported that Force Five had ‘about shot its bolt’ but, as with no landing ground yet in Allied hands, his orders were to stick it out. However, U.S. engineers had gone to work constructing a landing strip near Paestum, a little town close behind the beaches and, by the 12th, it was ready. On Admiral Hewitt’s (U.S.N.) orders, all twenty-six available Seafires were sent to this new base, from where they were to continue operations until the 15th. (Some forty aircraft had been written off, through landing mishaps. Ten more had been lost to enemy fighters and flak. Largely because the Seafires had been too slow to catch the M109Fs, only two enemy fighter bombers had been shot down and four others damaged.)

On Admiral Hewitt’s (U.S.N.) orders, all twenty-six available Seafires were sent to this new base, from where they were to continue operations until the 15th. (Some forty aircraft had been written off, through landing mishaps. Ten more had been lost to enemy fighters and flak. Largely because the Seafires had been too slow to catch the M109Fs, only two enemy fighter bombers had been shot down and four others damaged.)

For the moment, there was nothing more for the carriers to do, and so Force Five was withdrawn, the carriers to Palermo and the cruisers heading for Bizerta. However, the struggle to consolidate the beach-heads remained critical. After four days of heavy fighting, the British beach-head was nowhere more than five miles deep, and great losses had been suffered. Every battleship, cruiser and destroyer was called upon for bombardment.

At Palermo, the five carriers embarked replacements for planes lost, before returning to the beach-head where they found the armies still fighting doggedly for every inch of ground. Montecorvino airfield had been taken and the town of Salerno was still held, but the enemy barred the way over the hills to Naples.

The 13th brought the crisis with a powerful German tank attack down the valley of the River Sele, aimed at the weak junction of the British and American armies. By the following morning the situation was precarious; for the enemy’s penetration was so deep that the American beaches had been brought under heavy artillery fire. Admiral Hewitt then stopped all unloading in the American sector, ordered all ships 'to keep steam at short notice', and sent an urgent telegram to Admiral Cunningham:

‘The Germans have created a salient dangerously near the beach. Am planning to use all available vessels to transfer troops from southern to northern beaches, or the reverse if necessary. Unloading of merchant vessels in southern sector has been stopped. We need heavy aerial and naval bombardment behind enemy positions, using battleships or other naval vessels. Are any such ships available?’

Admiral Cunningham received this message at 1500 hours. Within two hours, he had ordered Admiral Vian to Philippeville (Tripoli) to embark reinforcement troops and to sail direct to Salerno. The three cruisers from Force Five were immediately detached and sent racing south towards the Straits of Messina. On arrival, their destination presented familiar sights, with the gleaming sun-lit buildings of Philippeville contrasting sharply with the burnt-out Italian passenger liner laying gaunt by the jetty.

The cruisers were still secured to an oiler when the first landing craft came alongside, packed with troops. Oiling and embarkation took place at the same time to give a quick turn round. Soon the cruisers' decks were cluttered with khaki figures from many regiments, each man equipped barely, with a rifle, some ammunition and a lifebelt.

On the afternoon of the 14th, the battleships Valiant and Warspite in company with the carrier Illustrious, had left Malta for Britain, to refit in preparation for the invasion of Normandy. They had not sailed far when, at 2000, the battleships received a signal from Admiral Cunningham to head for Salerno, together with their six destroyer escorts of the 14th Flotilla.

Admiral Cunningham told Admiral Hewitt that, if necessary, Nelson and Rodney, which he had ordered from Malta to have close at hand, would be sent as well. The destroyers already off Salerno had been heavily engaged with enemy troop and tank concentrations, and the strategic and tactical air force together flew over 1,900 sorties during the day and the following night.

Arriving off Salerno in the afternoon of the 15th, all three cruisers soon brought their three forward turrets into action. As the 1,500 reinforcement troops (10th Corps of the Fifth Army) were disembarked into landing craft, each was handed a tot of rum. Once ashore, the troops gained contact with the leading troops of the Eighth Army.

Valiant and Warspite arrived and were ready for action by 1000. A magnificent sight in their war paint, they showed an air of disdain towards the lesser ships. However, the briefing of their gunnery officers took a long time and it was 1752 before a shot was fired.

Warspite’s Captain of Marines had been landed to spot for her, and fire was extremely accurate. Of thirty rounds of 15-inch shell fired into the Altaville area, excited radio operators signalled back that nineteen had fallen on target. This was naval gunnery at its best. The battleships were firing at ranges between 19,500 and 23,800 yards, and the effect of those heavy shells upon the enemy emplacements was horrific.

The enemy now sent in his utmost strength, including aircraft fitted to operate new radio controlled bombs. The evening of the 15th was calm and clear, with a bright moon. Soon after dark, the first German torpedo bombers arrived and Warspite’s anti-aircraft guns were in action as she steamed up and down outside the bay. Action against air attack occurred on and off for the whole of the night

Early on the 16th, Warspite and Valient returned to their bombarding positions, half-a-mile or so off-shore. Fifteen-inch shells ranged all day round German positions far inland. Just after 1300, fire was opened on enemy traffic concentrations and ammunition dumps. Thirty-two rounds were fired, again with great accuracy; but the Navy was not allowed to have matters all its own way. Effective shelling by the two British battleships and the U.S. cruisers Philadelphia and Boise had caused Marshall Kesselring to authorise a disengagement on the coastal front; but, at the same time, bombing attacks were intensified.

Shortly after 1400, Warspite was underway after completing a bombardment when twelve fighter-bombers (FW 190s) attacked straight out of the sun. They were engaged by Warspite’s anti-aircraft guns and did no damage but, if their purpose was to divert attention from a more dangerous form of attack then developing, they succeeded only too well.

At 1427, only a few minutes after the fighter-bombers had disappeared, the ship’s look-outs sighted a group of high level bombers, from which were launched three of the feared FX 1400 glider bombs. Short tubby projectiles with dim blue lights shining from each tail to guide the aimer, they trailed streamers of blue smoke. They were controlled from aircraft far out of range. Tracer shells and anti-aircraft bursts raced out from the assembled ships. Abruptly, each glider bomb dived sharply and, a few moments later, a cloud of smoke erupted from Warspite.

"1425 hours. Attacked by five FW 190s - one shot down by Dehli (pom-pom) - this coincided with rocket bomb attack on Warspite. I was the first to observe the vapour trial of the three bombs at some 15,000 feet turn together into the vertical with the result known."

Of the three glider bombs launched, two found their target. From the time of sighting to the time of the bombs' arrival was some seven to ten seconds. Warspite was making about 10 knots at the time, and in the congested area avoiding action was impossible. One bomb came straight for the ship and penetrated to No.4 boiler-room, where it burst. A second was a near-miss amidships abreast the bulge on the starboard side, where it burst under water. This bomb had looked like missing by 400 yards, but about two-thirds of its way down it curved towards the ship. The third bomb was a near-miss on the starboard side aft.

The direct hit from the 3,000 pound bomb had penetrated six decks to hit her double bottom before exploding. The near-miss had made a long gash in her starboard bulge compartments. Astonishing, only nine men were dead with fourteen injured. One boiler-room had been completely demolished, and four of the other five were soon flooded. All steam was lost and the ship could not steer. All communications were temporarily out of action and some 5,000 tons of flood-water had increased her draught by about five feet. Just a few miles from Salerno, she was liable to attack at any moment. Radar was out of action, and it was known that submarines were in the area. Only four destroyers were in company.

En route to Bizerta, Euryalus intercepted the signal that Warspite was damaged. Course was reversed in order to provide escort.

As Warspite prepared to be taken in tow, Captain Parker signalled Dehli to provide anti-aircraft protection. By 1615, the U.S. tug Hopi had a line on her. Two more U.S. salvage tugs, Moreno and Narragansett, soon arrived and course was set for the Straits of Messina at 4 knots.

By 2000 hours, Warspite was still dangerously near to the scene of operations. At 2300 Euryalus was on the scene, to find Warspite drifting sidewards, despite the best efforts of the tugs. With the agreement of Captain Parker, Admiral Vian ordered Euryalus abreast of the battleship’s bulky bows to pick up her towing hawser. As soon as this was secured, Euryalus went to dead slow ahead. Unfortunately the salvage tugs had cast off their own tows and Warspite had become a water-logged dead-weight.

The hawser came up dripping out of the water. Momentarily it was held bar taut and quivering, before falling back into the sea. Warspite might have been secured to the land, for all the effect it had on her. A second time the engines were put ahead, but with the same result. Once more, Captain Bush gave the order, this time leaving the engines turning slowly ahead as the wire came taut; but the hawser parted, whipping viciously along the quarter deck as it vanished through the fairlead, breaking both of the quarterdeck officer’s legs as it went. All that had been achieved was a delay of two-and-a-half hours before her former tugs had her underway once more.

Valient passed Warspite during the night a few miles to the westward and in a blaze of tracer; but the enemy aircraft were searching too far to the south to find Warspite.

A speed of 4 knots was maintained all that night and, by next morning, Warspite’s list had increased to 4.5 degrees. Still she was still no more than 45 miles from the Salerno beaches and making very slow progress. By now her diesel dynamos were providing electric power which enabled her pumps to prevent the flood-water spreading. Two more tugs, the British Nimble and Oriana, joined and, although the towing hawsers parted many times, speed was gradually worked up to 6 knots.

In the Messina Straits, the salvage ship Salveda joined the cortege; but the southward current was so strong that all towing wires except one parted, and the water-logged ship went through the Straits broadside on. Warspite drifted on rapidly through the night, between Sylla, and Charybdis (in classic style!), sometimes stern first but mostly beam on to the current.

Eventually she emerged at the southern exit of Straits, where the tow was resumed. She could be pointed in the correct direction and given steerage-way only by three tugs towing ahead, two lashed alongside on either quarter, and the salvage ship pulling backwards from astern.

Warspite finally made it to Malta on the 19th, where she was patched up and made ready to give further service, most notably in the Normandy landings.

With the enemy’s withdrawal from the Salerno beach head, Force Five’s role had ceased and the ships were required elsewhere. In particular, the carriers were required for the convoy escort duties for which they had been designed. Chrarybdis, Euryalus and Sylla, put into Bizerta on the 19th September and, the following day, Admiral Vian struck his flag in Euryalus, and returned to London.

Several hundred of the troops who had been rushed from Philippeville to re-enforce the beach-head at Salerno, had staged a sit down, refusing to join the front-line units. Sitting on the sand and surrounded by military police, they had been warned of the consequences of a mutiny in the face of the enemy. After their refusal, three times, to pick up their weapons and kit, the Corps Commander, General McCreery, made one last attempt.

He understood their main complaint that, having been promised that they would be rejoining their old regiments. They had been switched to the Fifth Army at the last moment. He promised that as soon as the situation had improved, he would hasten the return to their units.

After he had finished, General McCreery left the beach and, shortly after, was informed that, with the exception of 192 men, the troops had responded to his plea. The recalcitrants were then placed under arrest and sent back to Constantine where, after trial, 191 received sentences of between five to twenty years penal servitude. A handful of ring-leaders received death sentences.

All sentences were immediately suspended, and the troops posted to the Eighth Army. Many years later, allegations were to be voiced that those men received deliberate continuous exposure in the front line.

Bibliography

Bush, E. (1958) Bless Our Ship. London. George Allen and Unwin.
Cunningham of Hyndhope, Viscount (1951) A Sailor’s Odyssey. London. Hutchinson and Son.
Forbes D. (1957) Two Small Ships. London. Hutchinson and Co. (Publishers) Ltd.
Hughes, R. (1956) Through the Waters. London. William Kimber and Co. Ltd.
Jackson, R. (1970) Strike from the Sea. A Survey of British Naval Air Operations, 1909-69. London. Arthur Barker Ltd.
Playfair, I.S.O. (1954) The Mediterranean and the Middle East, Vol. III. London. HMSO Ltd.
Pond, H. (1961) Salerno. London. William Kimber and Co. Ltd. Ltd.
Roskill, S.W. (1954) The War at Sea 1939-1945, Vols. I-V. London. HMS Ltd.
Roskill, S.W. (1957) H.M.S. Warspite. London. Willam Collins and Sons Ltd. Ltd.
Vian, P. (1960) Action this Day. London. Frederick Mueller Ltd.

Photographs not to be reproduced without the permission of the Inmperial War Museum, London.

Dedicated to the memory of my father, Warrant Telegraphist A.W.G. Steele, commications officer on the fighter direction cruiser H.M.S. Euryalus, 9th - 19th September 1943.