Event Details

Accounting and Finance, Finance seminar presented by Professor Michelle Lowry, Drexel Universtity LeBow College of Business. Paper title: Corporate Lobbying of Bureaucrats

Michelle Lowry, PhD | Drexel University's LeBow College of Business

Abstract

We find that 80% of companies that lobby Congress also lobby executive agencies. Although

executive agencies are not beholden to companies for campaign contributions, the agencies are

nevertheless influenced by lobbying: companies’ lobbying leads to more favorable rules, more

special exemptions, more government contracts, and more favorable decisions on enforcement

actions. Agencies’ bestowment of favors appears to be motivated by opportunities within the

private sector: lobbying is significantly greater among agencies that have stronger revolving door

relations with the private sector. Following a negative exogenous shock to agency power, the

Supreme Court’s Chevron decision, firms engaged in agency lobbying experienced negative

abnormal returns, underscoring the strategic value of lobbying agencies.

Keywords: lobbying, rulemaking, Chevron decision, regulations, revolving door