ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY IN
CONTEMPORARY MOROCCAN THOUGHT: THE POLITICAL
Juan
A. Macías Amoretti
Universidad de Granada
This article considers the dual
roles that Islam and democracy play within political theories of the most
representative ideological trends in Morocco: political Islam as conceived by
the Islamist leader ʿAbd al-Salām Yāsīn (b. 1928) and Arab
nationalism by the rationalist philosopher, Muḥammad ʿĀbid
al-Jābrī (b. 1935).
Introduction
The perspectives from which
Moroccan elites and intellectuals have analysed contemporary Moroccan
politico-religious thought are wide-ranging, and these perspectives are
mirrored in the consequent evolution of ideologies. The long, structural crisis
that has affected the country, especially since the 1970s and 1980s, has
contributed to an increasingly intense reflection among political thinkers, who
have tried to tackle thorny subjects linked to contemporaneity, both from
diverse standpoints, as well as through different methodologies. There has been
a general tendency for this reflection to express itself in the notion of ‘being’.[1] In terms of identity, this is typically
associated with ideas of being Arab, being Muslim and/or being Moroccan. Such
philosophical reflection has important political implications.
This article
takes an analytical approach to two of the ideological trends that have
marked––and continue to mark––the intellectual debate embedded in contemporary
political thought in
According to the Moroccan scholar Muḥammad Shaqīr,[2] Moroccan political thought presents a series
of particular features that characterise it. The first of these features is its
pragmatic nature, which is an
immediate consequence of the narrow relation of a certain thought with an
author beyond fixed or previously established trends. This pragmatism puts a
burden on the exercise of interpreting a mode of thought because, in several
cases, the personal circumstances of an author have a decisive influence on his
conceptualisation. Nevertheless, the thinking is considered coherent because it
is adapted to historic and socio-political circumstances, and is linked to
questions of political leadership.
To a certain extent, this
was an answer to the existing diversity of trends present in a Moroccan context
that were manifested through the shaping of a series of very different
political organisations, the tools that might put into political practice the
theory expressed in the works by the various thinkers. In this sense, it should
be noted that both, ʿAbd al-Salām Yāsīn and Muḥammad ʿĀbid
al-Jābrī, have taken part in political action (ʿamal siyāsī) through the organisations to which they belong:
al-ʿAdl wa-l-Iḥsān and the PFSU respectively.[3]
Another particular feature of contemporary Moroccan
thought is its discussion of particular politico-religious concepts. The principal
axis of this debate pivots around the epistemological search for key concepts
within a setting of reflection in which the choice of language and
conceptualisation are not arbitrary, but rather are conscious choices that, in
most cases, imply a disjuncture with the past.
Since these are defining trends of a particular
thought structure in contemporary Morocco––and bearing in mind the
interpretation of Islam as a basic methodological foundation, even in a rationalist
thinker as al-Jābrī––it is necessary to mention the influence of taṣawwuf and salafiyya, and especially when
discussing Yāsīn’s works. Obviously, both represent long-term trends
that stand out from one another, and are even in conflict. This is the result
of a particular historical path, as well as of a political interpretation (it
could be even called ‘non-interpretation’
in some cases)[4] of contemporary socio-political contexts that are
quite particular, but that in Morocco are shaped by the omnipresent political
and religious legitimacy of the makhzen.[5] However, both taṣawwuf and salafiyya
have played important roles in contemporary Moroccan political thought putting
a burden on particular characteristics of an ‘Islam’ that has become apparent
in every field: cultural, religious, social and, above all, political.
ʿAbd al-Salām
Yāsīn: democracy versus ‘shūrā-cracy’
Any
approach to the ideology of political Islam in Morocco must take account of the
contribution of ʿAbd al-Salām Yāsīn, who is undeniably
considered the main axis of Islamist thought in the country, the most representative
of its thinkers, and one of the better-known Islamist leaders in the
Arab-Muslim world. The interest in Yāsīn lies, inter alia, in his
charisma which has enabled him to develop and put into practice his own
conceptual system that can be called minhājī through an
associative and activist structure of the Jamāʿat al-ʿAdl
wa-l-Iḥsān of which he is founder, leader, guide and ideologist.
ʿAbd al-Salām
Yāsīn combines epistemological elements of Sufi knowledge with a conceptualisation of the
purest salafī orthodoxy, thus shaping a methodological framework
that is explicitly developed in his concept of minhāj (‘path’
or ‘road’). As for the Sufi element of his thought, this is related to
spirituality as the collective, individual and vital dynamics of the Muslim
individual. On the other hand, salafī thought in Yāsīn
becomes evident mainly in his radical positioning with regard to his political orientation
and to modernity in general.[6] Therefore, this is another temporal element that
affects the political interpretation of his texts and the way they are inserted
within historical and contemporary Moroccan political thought.
The essence of the
thought system formulated by Yāsīn with what could be called ‘minhājī
methodology’. This methodology is the frame within which the discourse of
Yāsīn, as well as the political and social action of the Jamāʿat
al-ʿAdl wa-l-Iḥsān is developed. The concept of minhāj,
which is the title of his most important work, al-Minhāj al-nabawī,[7] summarises the dynamism leading the dialectic
relationship between present and future in Yāsīn’s thought. Minhāj
is a dynamic concept that etymologically expresses movement, given that a path
leads from one place to another and, in order to walk along that path, it is
necessary to move forward through it. Even if we consider it in theological
terms as ‘right guidance’ related to Quranic ṣirāṭ, Yāsīn uses
the concept of minhāj with a very clear meaning of ‘forward movement’ in
political terms. It also expresses the methodology itself since minhāj
refers to ‘method’ or ‘programme’. Thus, the selected term is key not just to
understanding which path to tread, but also the way of doing so. As
Yāsīn states:
We
prefer the word minhāj, Quranic and Prophetic, to denote with it
not only the method (minhāj) that links scientifically the truth in
the Quran and the Sunna with the life of Muslims, but also to express
the strict observance of what God orders in His Book and the loyalty to the
Prophet’s Sunna in an individual and collective, private and public,
spiritual, moral and daily, religious and social, political and economic way:
in one word, in a ‘divine’ (rabbānī) way. However, this does
not mean that we intend to build an organisation that remains static and dreamy
looking into our glorious past, under the aegis of Muḥammad and of the Rāshidūn
Caliphs, but one that intends to establish, generations after them, the
virtuous Caliphate of God and his Prophet on Earth. In this way, education (tarbiyya)
and jihād will be the elements to which to turn with the intention
of restoring the Caliphate following the prophetic method (minhāj
al-nubuwwa) after substitute and tyrannical government in power for long
centuries’.[8]
As for democracy, Yāsīn
expounds a theory according to which it is understood as a system of social and
political organisation that, although established along specific ‘human’ (basharī)
lines, allows the State to rule in peaceful coexistence with its institutions.[9]
Therefore, this is a wide theory that accords with the broad definitions of this
concept in the West. According to Muḥammad Ḍarīf, this first
theoretical approach to democracy outlined by Yāsīn must be observed on
a strictly pragmatic level (bragmāṭī), as there is no
contradiction at all between this definition and Islamic premises, except for
the human origin of legislation.[10]
Nevertheless, in this concept it could be possible to embed rights and freedoms
that, being in line with Islamic tradition, are recognised as universal and
democratic values. Yāsīn adds, however, that these are made on
condition that a) ‘man is not revered as the god of the system’ b) an
Islamic government proceeding from God is guaranteed, and that c) it acts
always according to premises of Islamic law, with special attention to the use
of the shūrā as the fundamental political institution and
moral horizon.[11]
On the other hand, in the
second theory Yāsīn offers, he reveals an aspect he considers fundamental
to democracy in general: from his point of view, in the democratic system there
is a complete negation of God and of the Islamic religious principles as communal,
individual and vital foundations. These are merely reduced to another ‘matter’
(amr) within the system. Thus, from a basic level that concerns the same
principles of the democratic system (mabdaʾī), there is a
clear and unavoidable identification of democracy and laicism, expressed in a pointed
way: lā
dīmuqrāṭiyya illā l-lāʾīkiyya (‘the only democracy is a secular one’), at least when
referring to the Western democratic system and its delegates in the Islamic
world.[12]
The identification of democracy
with secularism remains present in all
Yāsīn’s work given that laicism is assumed to be an inherent
characteristic of democracy and thus inseparable from its theoretical and
practical development. Therefore, if we bear in mind this epistemological
rapprochement, then, according to Yāsīn, the democratic system cannot
be exported to Muslim countries as it stands without distinguishing democratic
practice in Western countries from traditional social and spiritual values
present in the Islamic culture. Furthermore, these values must become apparent
in the political field as well.[13] Thus, shūrā appears as a
recurring and basic point of reference being generally understood as follows:
Shūrā is the
word used within the Qurʾān to convey ‘consultation’ (al-istishāra), that is, the effort
of interpreting, adapting and understanding in order to put into practice the
revealed Law (al-Sharīʿa
al-munzala) that man has no right to amend.[14]
The shūrā,
from a political point of view, is a type of mutual consultation between ruler
and governed people which affects all aspects related to society, politics,
culture or economy that are key factors in the development of a Sunni Muslim
nation, always having the Sharīʿa as its legislative
foundation and as its horizon. At a discursive level, shūrā is
understood as two dimensional: one dimension being reason (ʿaql) and the other, revelation (waʿī). From the approach of the Muslim as a
conscious individual who has also been endowed with reason, and who is necessarily
inserted into the heart of the umma, shūrā is
understood as an individual and communitarian commitment. Once again, theology
and politics come together in the conceptualisation drawn by Yāsīn,
who, when introducing his formulation of the shūrā, starts
from a strictly religious field in order to set out the political connotations
of the term. Thus, the ḥisba–– understood as the link between religious commitment and the political
field––is offered as the moral support for the shūrā, as well
as the guarantor of its compliance.[15] From a
philological standpoint, it should be noted that Yāsīn not only
defends shūrā against democracy from a merely ideological
perspective, but also from a linguistic one. Thus, the Arabic term dīmuqrāṭiyya,
whose root is obviously not Arabic, but Greek, is substituted and superseded in
Yāsīn’s project by the sintagm ḥukm al-shūrā,
which could be translated as ‘the government of the shūrā’, or
indeed, ‘shūrā-cracy’
given that it corresponds to a neologism that intends to define a new
conceptual reality both ideologically and linguistically.
It is significant to
observe that––given the lack of concision
on the practical development of the shūrā in Yāsīn’s
texts, which is left at the
mercy of ijtihād (personal
interpretation), particularly as far as any political and social precision is
concerned––the economy is treated as a basic mainstay for any further political
development. This ‘interim materialism’, which is related to the setting of shūrā-cracy is also tackled through minhājī
methodology with the aim of clarifying previous foundations that will
eventually lead to a divine and prophetic government which, in Yāsīn’s
thought, will be represented by the same system. Therefore, he finds that the shūrā
and the development of shūrā-cracy are not only principles of action
established in the Qurʾān, but also that it is offered as an
historical religious, cultural, political and economic commitment and as the
response of Muslims to Western hegemony as their only producer and exporter of
ideologies and socio-political systems.[16]
Shūrā is a key word in Yāsīn’s discourse and a symbol of the
conceptual and cultural re-appropriation of Islamic society, and of the active
and dynamic principle of the whole political development in the Dār
al-Islām. In order to attain this, ijtihād and jihād
are privileged as methodological tools. On the concept and practice of ijtihād, ʿAbd al-Salām Yāsīn makes two claims. First, that
it has a legal-religious dimension, given that this is one of the sources of fiqh, and thus of interpretation, study and analysis of the sharīʿa. Secondly, that is has a socio-political dimension, in virtue of being
the institution that guarantees that Muslims have access to the political scene
and to social, economic and cultural development. Therefore, he uses it as an distinctive
methodological tool.
This is the way he
understands this concept when he uses it as a privileged method of analysing
contemporary socio-political contexts, in which both dimensions concur
constantly. Likewise, when analysing the context of contemporary Morocco as a
key setting of fitna, ruled by an unlawful and tyrannical government (al-ḥukm
al-jabrī), Yāsīn considers that jihād is
necessary as a method of changing the system once and for all, and for turning
it into a just Islamic system. Nevertheless, in Yāsīn’s political
conceptualisation, jihād is understood as a non-violent ‘struggle’ with
strong spiritual roots and developed in every sphere of the individual and
community life, paying special attention to the educational field. Although jihād is a comprehensive and
global non-violent, but educative, action carried out in several progressive
stages, Yāsīn does not reject the possibility of an armed jihād if the context of
oppression would require so, as happens in Palestine or as happened in Iran in
the late 1970s.
In ʿAbd
al-Salām Yāsīn’s political theory, there is a clear identification
between Islam as a political development throughout the State (dawla) and the mechanisms (siyāsa) described. In this sense,
the number of references to political content in Yāsīn’s works is
remarkable. Such references point out the historical
need of providing an actual Islamic frame of reference, both moral and legal,
to the political practice exerted by the State, in a way that is described as
an Islamic state (dawla Islāmiyya).[17]
Thus, all his political theory is destined to settle the historical and methodological
development of the final transition that begins with the tyrannical and
oppressive state (al-ḥukm al-jabrī) up to the Islamic
caliphate (al-khilāfa al-Islāmiyya), constituted by the union
of several Islamic states.
Muḥammad
ʿĀbid al-Jābrī: Nahḍa and Arab democracy
Muḥammad ʿĀbid
al-Jābrī is one of the most important thinkers in contemporary
Morocco, and one of the most well-known and respected in the wider Arab world
too.[18]
Al-Jābrī is especially important because of his use of a specific
methodology that is fundamentally founded on reason (ʿaql)[19]
beyond any other theoretical or ideological horizon in an attempt to avoid
aprioristic references in his reflection. Thus, reason is understood as the principal
mechanism of analysis and explanation of the world, of history, and of Arab
thought.
Connecting with the wider
framework of Arab thought, al-Jābrī establishes a relationship of
dialectical necessity between the historical development of that thought and a
renovation of contemporary Arab conscience (al-waʿī l-ʿArabī) as the centre of a new development of what he calls ‘Arabness’ (al-ʿArab wa-l-ʿUrūba) in all fields, including the political one. This
renovation is the axis around which his theory of the Arab nahḍawī project is developed, fundamentally anchored in the full use of the
rational potential of the turāth (Arab cultural legacy). Thus, he claims:
When
we talk about the Arab nahḍawī
project (al-mashrūʿ al-nahḍawī l-ʿarabī),
we talk about a complete and general project; a project that tries to upgrade
the Nahḍa in all fields:
economy, society, politics and culture, and to originate ways and means to
carry out its objectives and aspirations, using different types of
readjustments and resources.[20]
This nahḍawī project can be broken down into two parts: theoretical and methodological.
On the one hand, it refers back to the historical Arab Nahḍa of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. On the other, al-Jābrī states that it is
necessary to make a practical and methodological effort to adapt the concepts
and the ideas of the Nahḍa
to contemporary means in order to achieve ‘unity’
and ‘progress’ (al-waḥda
wa-l-taqaddum). From a political,
social, cultural and economic point of view, this is the fundamental purpose of
his project which also distinguishes it from other contemporary socio-political
movements. According to al-Jābrī, Nationalism and the ‘national idea’
(al-fikra al-qawmiyya) are also essentially important in order to tackle
the tricky question of the essence and the identity of the Arabs. In this way, he
argues, Arab nationalism through the notion of the Arab umma, allows the integration
of different peoples and tribes in the same common project. This is a key
component in the expansion of the ‘Arab conscience’ (al-waʿī l-ʿarabī), the necessity of the unity of the umma, and, derived from this necessity,
the settlement of a united Arab State.[21]
However,
al-Jābrī himself claims that it is impossible to establish any kind
of political project in that sense without approaching the question of culture
(al-thaqāfa), since he feels that culture is not only the environment of any
political project, but also one of its foundations. Thus, from the cultural
point of view, Arab unity is represented by the decisive role of Arabic as the
basic tool of communication among diverse Arab peoples and countries.
Therefore, that culture which is denominated ‘national’ by al-Jābrī (al-thaqāfa al-waṭaniyya)[22]
holds an important position in the development of his political thought, since
it constitutes one of the bases of any political and social development in the
Arab world, which should be anchored in the profound recognition of one’s own ‘Arabness’
and the ‘Arab conscience’ (al-waʿī
l-ʿarabī) in general. Society and
the masses are in general considered by al-Jābrī the main subject of
this development, as opposed to the position within the traditional analyses
carried out by the elites.
In short, the basis of
his mashrūʿ nahḍawī (nahḍawī project) are structured around a double project: a
critical project (mashrūʿ
naqdī) and an intellectual
project (mashrūʿ
fikrī)[23]. Starting from an analysis based on three
methodological elements (structure, history and ideology), these seeks to
achieve a break (qaṭīʿa) in the understanding of the turāth as an cultural identity
and political legacy that might eventually allow Arabs access to their own sense
of modernity.
As for the question of
Islam and politics, the most outstanding conclusion that can be extracted from
al-Jābrī’s reading is that political thought cannot truly be critical
except through the independence of reason from the strictly religious sphere,
as well as through the discontinuity (qaṭīʿa) with political elements
preconceived as Islamic. He considers that assuming a series of historical
political institutions as ‘Islamic’ does limit the epistemological exercise of
reflection about the political theory. Thus, Islam is understood in a religious
way, but never in a political one. Nevertheless, al-Jābrī considers
Islam as an ethical development and, therefore, as a possible moral framework
of the State. So he seeks not to sacralise the historical and legal development
of Islamic law, but to recapture its content with a conscious and, above
everything, rational sense once more.
Democracy is also
analysed from a rational point of view. Starting with historical and
etymological ideas, al-Jābrī, rescues the classic meaning of the term
‘democracy’ as ‘the government of the people, by the people and for the people’
(ḥukm al-shaʿb nafsi-hi bi-nafsi-hi). He argues the difficulty of maintaining this
definition without appealing to the ‘State’ (dawla) as a system of
organisation, without which this socio-political development is not possible
because it must have two elements to enable it: the existence of the ruling
part (al-ḥākim) and the governed part (al-maḥkūm), as well as the development of relationships
between them.[24]
The idea, therefore, is acceptable, but it needs a practical political
development that can shape and adapt it to a given society.
Al-Jābrī draws
a distinction between ‘political democracy’ (al-dīmuqrāṭiyya al-siyāsiyya) and ‘social democracy’ (al-dīmuqrāṭiyya al-ijtimāʿiyya), establishing a dialectical relationship between
them, since political democracy cannot be applied correctly as an effective
model of government without dealing with social progress. Nor can issues of
social democracy be settled without having appropriate political structures.[25]
Therefore, both types of democracy are valid and necessary.[26]
The turning point for the change is found by al-Jābrī in the self-awareness
of the people (al-tawʿiyya) and in their subsequent engaging in the fight for
public freedoms, that from political democracy will reach social democracy as
their main objective. This way, once reached, means and ends will constitute
the basis of the whole democratic structure, which is seen as a demand and as a
historical aspiration of the Arab peoples.[27] This process
should begin with an analysis of contemporary Arab reality and recourse to the turāth as a way of finding
their own path.
It is also important to
highlight al-Jābrī’s democratic consideration as a national necessity
(al-dīmuqrāṭiyya ḍarūra waṭaniyya quṭriyya).
Nevertheless, it is as well considered an Arab necessity, since Arab unity (al-waḥda
al-ʿarabiyya), which is the ultimate aim of some trends of Arab
nationalism as Pan-Arabism, and its political program (which al-Jābrī
supports ideologically, but not methodologically), will not be able to be reached
completely until all Arab state structures are controlled by new democratic
elites in each country. In addition, they should guard the basic values of the
democratic system: equality (musāwa) and justice (ʿadl).
The huge distance between
his philosophical conception of the ‘Arab Being’ and the application of a
political system or, according to his own conceptualisation, between ‘thought’
(fikr) and ‘reality’ (wāqiʿ)[28] is evident,
since although the ‘Arab conscience’ (al-waʿī l-ʿArabī) is unique in the variety of its Arab and Islamic components, in
political outline the necessary separation between ‘State’ and ‘religion’ is
imposed as a guarantee of development, freedom and ideological pluralism within
a secular Arab State. The reconciliation of both elements in the theoretical
development of al-Jābrī is made by the application of democracy and
the autonomy of the political field in opposition to any totalitarian
conception, considered as an unquestionable necessity, although with its own
characteristics.[29] Such a
national analysis, always starting from reason, is also essential for the
construction of a specifically Arab democratic model, and seeks to solve the
problems of each country, overcoming any ideological and conceptual divisions.[30]
Yāsīn’s
and al-Jābrī’s political readings compared and contrasted
Starting with the
biographies and works of ʿAbd al-Salām Yāsīn and Muḥammad
ʿĀbid al-Jābrī, there is an obvious convergence in their basic
attitudes in relation to the society to which they belong. Both thinkers assume
a vital responsibility through the interpretation of their own context, where
they were born and where they developed intellectually. It can be also said
that the depth of this first interpretation of contemporary Moroccan
socio-political context is the one responsible for the origin and continuity of
their respective reflections, since it is a critical interpretation that comes
from an evident trauma caused by the crisis this reality is going through.
‘Education’ (tarbiyya,
taʿlīm), ‘culture’ (thaqāfa) and ‘identity’ (huwiyya)
are important concepts in the arguments of Yāsīn and
al-Jābrī. Both thinkers establish different ideological perspectives
to elaborate a dialectical framework that joins these three concepts, and which
becomes a point of reference of their respective positions. While
Yāsīn considers that education is the basis of every socio-political
development towards the construction of a fair Islamic society, supported by
unquestionable Islamic identity, al-Jābrī believes that education is
also indispensable but as a first step along the way to reach the emancipation
of Arab society, as well as being the basis of ‘Arab conscience’ and ‘national
culture’.
It is also
important to point out the significance that both ʿAbd al-Salām
Yāsīn and Muḥammad ʿĀbid al-Jābrī confer on
historical readings and to the particular conception of ‘time’ as a recurrent theme
of their ideologies.[31]
In this sense, the conception that each of the authors have with regard to ‘history’
is similar, since it appears in their works as a fundamental parameter of their
interpretations and analyses. ‘History’ is conceived as a series of lineally
positioned events that, depending on each ideological reading, aims towards some
specific point in the future at which the development of their respective
projects will become present. This way, both share the necessity of undertaking
these projects as a historical task (al-waḍīfa
al-tārīkhiyya)[32],
fully inserted into the present.
Methodologically,
some of the elements that differ between the authors have to be highlighted,
bearing in mind that their respective projects arise with the same vocation,
approximately at the same time and, therefore, in a very similar context, and
that they are both constituted as dynamic methods. That is to say, they require
a conscious and committed analysis of reality and a certain setting in
ideological practice. Both projects are also constituted as ‘methodologies of
the change’ which propose a reading of the past and an analysis of the present.
This reading and analysis, generally by means of rupture and continuity
processes, can solve the problems, beginning with the problem of identity and
the reflection on the Arab-Islamic being itself and its situation in the world
and in the immediate socio-political reality. Thus, among the main differences
that separate the methods of Yāsīn and al-Jābrī, that is to
say, the minhājī and the nahḍawī methods,
the following are of particular note:
Epistemological horizons
Yāsīn’s
epistemological horizon is the Islamic Revelation (al-waḥī l-Islāmī).
His conception of the world and of history is mainly spiritual and religious,
since the content of the revelation is considered as the truth in absolute
terms, thus having obvious ideological implications. So, while considering his
thought on the side absolute truth, it is not necessary to argue anything,
given the authority of the Revelation, which constitutes the ultimate and
recurrent reference of his line of argument. On the other hand, Muḥammad ʿĀbid
al-Jābrī’s epistemological horizon is reason (ʿaql). This
being the leit motif of all his reflection, he continues to consider
Islamic spiritual development as an ethical reference of social, political and cultural
evolution of the Arabs.
Ideological
and historical framework
In the case of
Yāsīn, his very framework is the ‘prophetic path’ (al-minhāj
al-nabawī).[33]
His reference model is therefore deeply Islamic, since it is based on emulation
of the Prophet Muḥammad’s conduct as shown through the Revelation. In the
case of al-Jābrī, the ideological framework is also directly related
to the terminology that frames his project, that is, the ‘Arab nahḍawī
project’ (al-mashrūʿ l-nahḍawī l-ʿArabī).[34]
As it happens with the ‘prophetic path’ of Yāsīn, the title of this
work––which can be applied to his project on Morocco and the whole Arabness––suggests
a double ideological and historical dimension. Thus, ‘Islamicity’ and ‘Arabness’
are constituted as basic parameters, respectively, of each one of the
intellectual and political developments of both authors, both represented, in a
symbolic way, by the use of Arabic as their privileged medium of expression.
Methodological tools
From a political point of
view, the methodology and the conceptualisation of ʿAbd al-Salām
Yāsīn’s works are based on religious terms, but by bringing the speech,
terms and language used up to date. Al-Jābrī’s methodology is
strictly based on rationalistic and scientific tools. The difference between
the purely philosophical thought of al-Jābrī and his ideological
reflections on the political field does not only stem from the external expression
of his postulates, but also from his critical positioning.
Socio-political patterns
In the case of ʿAbd
al-Salām Yāsīn, the socio-political pattern that once again has
to be built or rebuilt in real and symbolic terms, makes the development of his
reflections contingent on it, since he takes an ideological position towards
the construction of a particular pattern: the shūrā-cratic
state. On the other hand, al-Jābrī assumes the necessity of
undertaking a process dedicated to establish democracy as the only possible
political framework of development. However, he does not defend an imported
Western democracy subjected to their same rules and premises, but rather––aware
of the diversity and the richness of the Arab civilisation as an idea and a
reality––he seeks to construct a theoretical, Arab model for democracy.
From a strictly
political perspective, the projects of Yāsīn and al-Jābrī
appear as alternatives for change that begin from the political context of
contemporary Morocco but which aim to build a political future based on the
transformation of the relationships of power and the methods of exercising it.
The analysis of the State and its configuration conform to a common framework
in both thinkers because both reach the conclusion that justice, as the main
objective of a political structure, does not take place in the current State
configuration and, what is more, it does not have any possibility to be part of
its future ethical evolution either. As such, a transformation of the political
system is essential, although each thinker assumes a very different programme
of references.
In the analyses
undertaken by Yāsīn and al-Jābrī, Islam, shūrā
and democracy play central roles for they are the concepts around which their
respective political projects are constructed. They also have evident
ideological meanings, since they set up a certain conception of reality from
different epistemological horizons. They are, therefore, used as ideological
emblems, but this does not reduce the validity of their analysis. On the
contrary, ideological commitment is understood as a requirement of the political
project. Their analyses of the role of civil society (al-mujtamaʿ
al-madanī) and of human rights (ḥuqūq al-insān)
are illustrative of their respective theoretical developments, which range from
rejection to critical assimilation. Indeed, the same thing might be observed in
their view on the Palestinian conflict as a symbol of the crisis and hope for
change in the Arab and Islamic world.
[1] The problem of ‘Being’, in philosophical
terms, related to the problem of identity within Arab–Islamic thought can be
found in the origin of contemporary thought in
[2] Muḥammad Shaqīr, Al-Fikr
al-siyāsī l-Maghribī l-muʾāṣir. (Casablanca:
Afrīqiyā l-sharq, 2005), 27.
[3] Al-Ittiḥād al-Ishtirākī
li-l-Quwwāt al-Shaʿbiyya (Popular Forces Socialist Union, PFSU)
[4] This ‘non-interpretation’, as Moroccan
sociologist Abdessamad Dialmy argues, concerns the role of some Sufi brotherhoods
in Moroccan politics. By refusing to take part in political debates, especially
in the colonial and pre-independence period, some of them contributed to
legitimising established power. See Abdessamad Dialmy, ‘L’Islamisme marocain entre
révolution et intégration’, Archives de
Sciences Sociales des Religions 110 (April–June 2000), 5–27.
[5] The makhzen
(Arabic: al-makhzan) etymologically means ‘storehouse’.
Its political meaning is related, in the medieval Maghrib, to the Public
Administration under the control of the Sultan. Nowadays, it refers to the set formed
by the Monarchy and the State establishment, whose networks touch all levels in
contemporary
[6] See ʿAbd al-Salām
Yāsīn, Al-Islām wa-l-ḥadātha (Oujda: Al-Hilāl,
2000).
[7] See ʿAbd al-Salām
Yāsīn, Al-Minhāj al-nabawī: tarbiyya wa-tanẓīm
wa-zaḥf, 4th ed. (S.l: Dār al-afāq, 2001).
[8] Ibid., 12.
[9] ʿAbd al-Salām
Yāsīn, Al-Shūrā wa-l-dīmuqrāṭiyya
(Casablanca: Al-Ufuq, 1996), 43.
[10] Muḥammad Ḍarīf, Al-Islāmiyyūn
al-Maghāriba: ḥisābāt al-siyāsiyya fī-l-ʿamal
al-Islāmī, 1969–1999 (Casablanca: Manshūrāt al-majalla
al-Maghribiyya li-ʿilm al-ijtimāʿ al-siyāsī, 1999), 113.
[11] See ʿAbd al-Salām
Yāsīn, Al-Shūrā, 11.
[12]ʿAbd al-Salām Yāsīn, Ḥiwār maʿa
al-fuḍalāʾ al-dīmuqrāṭiyyīn
(Casablanca: Al-Ufuq, 1994), 62.
[13] Muḥammad Ḍarīf, Al-Islāmiyyūn
al-Maghāriba, 116.
[14] ʿAbd al-Salām
Yāsīn. Al-Islām wa-l-ḥadātha, 300.
[15] The ḥisba institution refers back
to the Quranic commitment: al-amr bi-l-maʿrūf wa-l-nahy ʿan
al-munkar (Qurʾān 3:104, 7:157, 9:71 and others), that is, ‘command
that which is just and forbid which is evil’. This constitutes a moral
framework related to the political action within Islamic thought. See, Cl.
Cahen and M. Talbi, ‘Ḥisba’, EI², vol. 3, 485–489.
[16] Qurʾān 42:38.
[17] The categorical terms ḍarūrī
(‘necessary’) and tārīkhī (‘historical’) are used by
Yāsīn to refer to his project as a historical imperative which must
be put into practice. See ʿAbd al-Salām Yāsīn, Naẓarāt
fī-l-fiqh
wa-l-tārīkh (Tanta: Dār al-bashīr,
1995).
[18] Certain intellectual movements and
contemporary thinkers claim that the philosophical legacy (falsafa) of
the Arab thought (fikr), such as al-Jābrī and other Moroccan
thinkers, can be referred to as ‘The Philosophical School of Rabat’. See Chikh Bouamrane and Louis Gardet, Panorama de la pensée islamique
(Paris: Sindbad, 1984).
[19] The rediscovery of classical Arab
philosophical thought, in which reason (ʿaql) is considered the
fundamental axis, is the starting point of al-Jābrī’s political
thought. See Juan Antonio Pacheco Paniagua. El pensamiento árabe contemporáneo
(Seville: Mergablum, 1999); and Miguel Cruz Hernández. Historia
del pensamiento en el mundo islámico, 3rd vol. (Madrid:
Alianza, 1996), 785–789.
[20] Muḥammad ʿĀbid
al-Jābrī, Al-Mashrūʿ al-nahḍawī l-ʿArabī. Murājaʿa naqdiyya, 2nd ed. (Beirut:
Markaz dirāsāt al-waḥda al-ʿArabiyya, 2000), 12.
[21] Ibid.,
[22] Cultural crisis is considered by
al-Jābrī as the same crisis of Arab reason. Muḥammad ʿĀbid
al-Jābrī, Ishkāliyyāt al-fikr al-ʿarabī l-muʿāṣir
(Casablanca:
Muʾasasa bi-nashra li-l-ṭabāʿa wa-l-nashr, 1989), 57. On
the influence of the crisis of Arab and Islamic culture in the socio-political
development of the contemporary Arab world, see Hichem Djaït,
[23] Nelly Lahoud, Political Thought in Islam. A
Study in Intellectual Boundaries (
[24] Muḥammad ʿĀbid
al-Jābrī, Al-Dīmuqrāṭiyya wa-ḥuqūq
al-insān (Beirut:
Markaz dirāsāt al-waḥda al-ʿArabiyya, 1994), 15.
[25] This dialectical relationship between both
types of democracy makes al-Jābrī remember, in a very illustrative
way, the unfathomable riddle of ‘the chicken and the egg’, for which it is very
difficult to know which is the type of democracy that can engender the other, pointing
out the necessity of complementing each other. Ibid., 26.
[26] Ibid., 25
[27] Ibid., 31.
[28] Muḥammad ʿĀbid
al-Jābrī, Ishkāliyyāt al-fikr, 13.
[29] One of these nuances is the Arab ideological
basis, and the turāthī and nahḍawī analyses
of contemporary and future Arab reality, which would give sense to the whole democratic
development in the Arab countries. See Muḥammad ʿĀbid
al-Jābrī, Al-Khiṭāb al-ʿArabī l-muʿāṣir: dirāsa taḥlīliyya
naqdiyya,
6th ed. (Beirut: Markaz dirāsāt al-waḥda al-ʿArabiyya,
1999), 83.
[30] Muḥammad ʿĀbid
al-Jābrī, Wijha naẓar: naḥwa iʿāda
bināʾ qaḍāyā l-fikr al-ʿarabī l-muʿāṣir, 3rd ed. (Beirut: Markaz
dirāsāt al-waḥda al-ʿArabiyya, 2004), 95–115.
[31] The historicity of thought and ideological
speeches is not an exclusive concern of both authors, but rather one of the
most pressing questions in contemporary Arab thought, especially in relation to
the importance of the turāth and the salafiyya as central
concepts. In this sense, see Naṣr Ḥāmid Abū Zayd, Naqd
al-khiṭāb al-dīnī (
[32] The concept of al-waḍīfa al-tārīkhiyya
(‘the historical task’) is specific to al-Jābrī’s thought, although
the historical importance of the action at the present time to modify the
future as a necessity is also present in Yāsīn. See Muḥammad ʿĀbid
al-Jābrī, Wijha naẓar, 114.
[33] See ʿAbd al-Salām Yāsīn,
Al-Minhāj, 11-13.
[34] See Muḥammad ʿĀbid
al-Jābrī, Al-Mashrūʿ al-nahḍawī, 12-15.