In Piagetian theory, the reconstruction of action on concrete objects in the absence of those objects (cf. object permanence). Mental images are formed as a result of the abbreviation and internalization of action on objects. To construct a mental image (or mental imagery) is to engage in abbreviated actions that are similar to the actions that one would perform if one were actually operating on the object. Mental images are active constructions rather than static mental pictures. Moreover, they should not be restricted to visual mental images, but in principle they can arise from experience gained through other perceptual modalities, and thus the possibility of the likes of auditory and olfactory images. Outside the context of Piagetian theory, debate continues over whether mental images consist of representations of our experiences of the world, a view championed by Steven Pinker and opposed by Jerry Fodor in one cognitive-based way and by the brand of ecological psychology promulgated by neo-Gibsonians in another, markedly different, way. With regard to visual mental imagery, there are conflicting standpoints with regard to whether representational brain states underpin such imagery. Evidence in support of this mapping can be found in the neuroimaging studies of Stephen Kosslyn and colleagues. Another ongoing debate has to do with the issue of whether imagery and perception are categorically different or just differ in degree rather than kind, any issue going back to the writings of David Hume (1711-1776). One resolution proposed is that imagery and perception lie at different ends of a continuum, ranging from stimulus-driven perception at one end to a ‘pure’ form of imagery in which the content of experience is independent of current stimulus input.
See A-not-B task/error, Ecological psychology, Mappings, Mental modules, Object permanence, Piaget’s stage theory, Representational (cultural), Representational (mental), Representational re-description