Homunculus problem

The idea of a little man in our heads that sees the images (and words) we see and understands these words and images for us.  During the 1920s and 1930s, it became a widely used way depicting how the brain worked in popular works, such as children’s dictionaries (see first figure below).  The flaw in this proposal is that it is not an explanation of how we understand some thing like imagery, but just a repetition of the original problem.  It leads to the problem of infinite regression: who or what controls the controller, the answer to which is another homunculus and so on, like a set of Russian dolls (see second figure below). 

A depiction of how the brain works to be found in popular texts in the 1920s and 1930s in which the brain consisted of various ‘offices’ occupied by little men who operated various pieces of machinery concerned with a particular set of functions.

This depiction captures Daniel Dennett‘s succinct comments on the problem of infinite regression: “The fundamental homunculus objection … foresees an infinite regress. If a little man in your head is looking at the little screen using the full powers of human vision, then we have to look at a smaller man in his head looking at a still smaller screen, and so on ad infinitum. That’s what’s wrong with the little man in the head.” In: Pyle, A. (1999). Key philosophers in conversation: the Cogito interviews. London: Routledge, p. 87. Posing the following questions is another way of highlighting the problem: Q. what controls the brain? A. the mind; Q: what controls the mind? A. the self; Q. what controls the self? A. itself.    

See Homunculus, Perception, Preformationism