In spite of the tremendous importance of replenishing Malta, the hard decision had been taken in April that the island would have to hold out without a convoy until mid-June. Never before had the Royal Navy suffered such heavy losses as between December 1941 and May 1942, and to find sufficient ships to provide anything like the escort to fight through these convoys to Malta was to prove an extremely difficult problem. In the end it was decided to run two convoys, one from each end, so as to encourage the enemy to spread his naval and air forces in opposing them.

Plans for the two convoys (operation Harpoon from the west and Vigorous from the east) differed only in matters of detail from the previous ones. Their sailing was to be preceded by the bombing of enemy ports and airfields in Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, North Africa and Crete, and over Cyrenacia. These attacks were to be continued during their passage. To simplify problems of unloading after arrival, Harpoon was to arrive at Malta one day before Victorious. The fast minelayer Welshman, with a load of ammunition, was to accompany the Harpoon convoy as far as the Narrows and then to go alone at 28 knots to reach Malta at first light on the day the convoy was due.

The preliminary planning of the operation took place at the Admiralty between the 23rd May and the 2nd June. Vice-Admiral A.T.B. Curteis, Second-in-Command, Home Fleet, was to command and, with a small staff, he prepared the operational orders. Ten days in which to prepare, draft, type and to distribute orders was insufficient and was to lead to a number of deficiencies.

The first of the conferences was held at Greenock on the 4th June, when Vice-Admiral Curteis met the commanding officers of the Home Fleet ships and explained the details of the operation. In the afternoon of the same day a second conference was attended by the Masters and Naval Liaison Officers of the five merchant ships which were to sail from the Clyde. Commander J.P.W. Pilditch, the Senior N.L.O. was selected as Commodore. As the King’s Harbour Master, Malta, designate, his was to be an odd way of taking up an appointment which, in peacetime, would have had him traveling first class by P and O.

A third conference was to be held at Gibraltar for those unable to attend the first two. It was actually to take place in the morning of the 11th June, while Kenya (Captain A.S. Russell) was oiling, and when it left little time for the commanding officers to assimilate the details.

The six ships of the Harpoon convoy were to be covered as far as the Skeri Channel by the main covering force (Force W). This comprised the ancient battleship Malaya (Captain J.W.A. Waller); the equally antiquated carriers Argus (Captain G.T. Philip, D.S.C.) and Eagle (Captain E.G.N. Rushbrooke), with only 22 fighters between them; the modern cruisers Kenya, Liverpool and Charybdis (Captain L.D. Mackintosh, D.S.C.); and destroyers Antelope (Lieut.-Commdr. E.N. Sinclair), Escapade (Lieut.-Commdr. E.N.V. Curvey), Icarus (Lieut.-Commdr. C.D. Maud), Onslow (Captain H.T. Armstrong), Westcott (Commdr. I.H. Brockett-Pugh), Wishart (Commdr. H.G. Scott), Wrestler (Lieut. R.W.B. Lacon) and Vidette (Lieut.-Commdr. E.M. Warmsley).

From there, under the group command of Captain C.C. Hardy, in the old light cruiser Cairo (converted before the war into an anti-aircraft ship of eight single 4-inch guns), Force X was to continue to Malta. This comprised five Fleet destroyers, Bedouin (Commdr. Scurfield), Marne (Lieut.-Commdr. H.N.A. Richardson), Matchless (Lieut.-Commdr. J. Mowlam), Ithuriel (Lieut.-Commdr. D.H. Maitland-Makgill-Cricton, D.S.C.) and Partridge (Lieut.-Commdr. W.A.F. Hawkins); four Hunt class destroyers, Blankney (Lieut.-Commdr. P.F. Paulett), Middleton (Lieut.-Commdr. D.C. Kinloch), Badsworth (Lieut. G.T.S. Gray) and Kujawiak (Commdr. Lichodziejewski); and four fast Fleet mine-sweepers of the 17th Flotilla, Hebe (Lieut.-Commdr. G. Mowatt), Hythe (Lieut.-Commdr. L.B. Miller), Speedy (Lieut.-Commdr. A.E. Doran) and Rye (Lieut. J.A. Pearson).

The tanker Brown Ranger (Master D.B.C. Ralph) with her own escort - Force Y: the corvettes Coltsfoot (Lieut. the Hon. W.K. Rous) and Geranium (Lieut.-Commdr. A. Foxall) - would not accompany the convoy but cruise independently along its route, to refuel the smaller warships, particularly those of Force X. Six mine-sweeping motor-launches of the 6th Flotilla - M.L. 121, 134, 135, 168, 459 and 462 (Lieut.-Commdr. E.J. Stowlger) - were also to be included in the convoy. Finally four submarines were to be stationed in a line between Cagliari in Sardinia and the western end of Sicily to report and to attack the enemy if sighted.

Kenya wore the flag of Vice-Admiral Curteis. Although his forces were weak in comparison with those of the previous July and September, they had been assembled with difficulty, for since the closing months of 1941 the Royal Navy had lost many ships and had shouldered many new responsibilities. However, there were grounds for hoping that the escort would be strong enough. The main units of the Italian Fleet, which were at Taranto, were more likely to dispute the passage of the convoy from the east, and the enemy’s air effort would be divided between the two convoys and the battle in the desert.

On the 3rd June, Liverpool had sailed from Scapa Flow to Greenock, from where she had left on the following day for Malta. Barely three weeks earlier, she had been off northern Norway amidst snow flurries and within sight of the ice edge, and many found this change from the Arctic to the Mediterranean rather abrupt! Although the crew had been unaware of their eventual destination, the fact that an R.C. chaplain had joined the ship gave them notice of a difficult time ahead. A press correspondent also had come aboard.

Liverpool entered Gibraltar around midnight, oiled, and left the following morning (the 12th) at about 0700. Shortly following this passage into the Mediterranean, a cinema show on board included a newsreel showing an earlier Malta convoy under attack. Comfort and reassurance!

The merchantmen of the Harpoon convoy - the Blue Funnel Line’s Troilus of 7,500 tons; Burdwan, 6,000 tons, belonging to the Hain Line; the 5,500 ton American Chant; the Orari, 10,500 tons, belonging to the New Zealand Shipping Line; and the Dutch Tanimbar of 8,619 tons - had left the Clyde in the afternoon of the 4th June, soon after the second conference. As a precautionary measure, the merchant ships had been routed to Freetown and the Masters had been told that they would probably go on to the Cape. However, the attempt at deception was unsuccessful, for it was common knowledge on board the ships that their destination was Malta.

The first ships entered the Mediterranean during the night of the 11th/12th. The sixth, Kentucky (9,300 tons) - one of the very few fast tankers made available from the United States - joined from Gibraltar soon after dark on the 11th, and was escorted by four Fleet minesweepers and six minelayers.

On first signs of the operation, two Italian submarine groups, Bronzo, Emo, Malachite, Velella and Zaffiro, and Acciaio, Alagi, Giada, Otario and Uarsciek, were stationed north of the Algerian coast. A third group (Aradam, Ascianghi, Corallo, Dessie, and Onice) was placed in the Malta - Lampedusa area. A forth (Atropo, Axum, Micca, Platino and Zoea) was stationed in the Ionian Sea, while Galatea, Sirena, and the German U77, U81, U205, U431, U453, and U559 operated further to the east.

It had been hoped to maintain a speed of 14 knots on the passage, and the orders had been worked out accordingly. Troilus had been selected as the Commodore’s ship as she had been thought to be the slowest, but it soon became evident that neither Chant nor Burdwan could keep station at more than 13 knots. To complicate matters still further, Tanimbar, a motor ship, could not proceed at speeds of more than 12 knots for any but short periods. Since to cut the convoy speed to 12 knots was out of the question, Tanimbar was instructed to do the best she could. By cutting off corners, the convoy had managed to keep to its time schedule to Gibraltar.

None of the escorts saw either the Spanish or African coasts in making the passage through the Straits. An elaborate refueling plan went forward without a hitch during the night, with the ships reforming at daylight, far to the east to escape the notice of Axis agents in Spain. Although this covert activity did not deceive the enemy, it was not totally unproductive. It showed that the dockyard resources had borne a heavy strain and that they required to be enhanced for the larger convoy planned for August (Pedestal). All of the escorts had left Gibraltar by about 0300, and the whole party was at full strength by 0700, and was steaming east, with a combined capacity of 43,000 tons of cargo.

Next day German reconnaissance aircraft located the convoy south of the Balearics. It was shadowed from the air and reported by submarine. Oiling at sea took place, but was started late owing to navigational errors. The first two destroyers had parted company before daylight. Badsworth and Blankney had started from opposite sides of the screen, but the latter failed to find Brown Ranger. In contrast, Badsworth found her just where she had been expected! To make up for lost time, Liverpool was ordered to refuel some of the destroyers. The first alongside was Kujawiak, but her commanding officer had had little experience of this manoeuvre and was unable to keep station. The attempt had to be abandoned. Bedouin, Ithuriel and Vidette did refuel from Liverpool while Cairo and 11 destroyers refueled from Brown Ranger.

The Brown Ranger was to loiter for a further four days in this area, to be at hand should any ship have required refueling on the return. It is remarkable that she went undetected.

Westcott (Commdr. I.H. Brockett-Pugh, D.S.C.) was the last destroyer to refuel from the tanker, and she did not finish until after dark, so delayed rejoining until she thought it was light enough on the morning of the 14th. In spite of this caution, she was fired upon by Escapade. Coming up from astern in the dim light of a Mediterranean summer morning, she was mistaken for a U-boat on the surface. Fortunately, no damage was done.

On the 13th German and Italian aircraft again located the convoy but Italian torpedo aircraft from Cagliari - one of the enemy’s main air bases in Sardinia, where there were based twenty bombers and fifty torpedo-bombers - failed to find it. Italian submarines Giada and Uarsciek were unsuccessful with an attack on the convoy. The 7th Italian Division (cruisers Eugenio di Savoia and Montecuccoli and the destroyers Ascari, Oriani, and Gioberti) sailed from Cagliari to attack the convoy in the area off Cape Bon, but put into Palermo after being reported by two British submarines.

By the morning of the 14th, which was fine and calm, the convoy was within 145 miles of Cagliari. With daylight, the convoy was reformed from its night time (anti-submarine) formation to its day-time formation which was designed to be both anti-aircraft and anti-submarine. Kenya led the port column and Liverpool the starboard, with the carriers to windward of the merchant ships and inside the destroyer screen. Old and slow, both Eagle and Argus were handicapped in working their aircraft, because what little wind there was, was blowing was from the west. If they were to haul right round to fly off their fighters, they would leave the safety of their destroyer screen; and after flying operations it was certain to be a slow business for them to overtake the convoy.

Eagle carried sixteen Hurricanes of No. 801 Squadron and four Fulmars of No. 801 Squadron which were subsequently transferred to Argus. The latter carried eighteen Swordfish of No. 824 Squadron and two Fulmars of No. 813 Squadron. Argus carried out all the anti-submarine work and provided low cover with the Fulmars, while Eagle took care of the high cover. However, at the height of the attacks there were never more than six Hurricanes and four Fulmars airborne. This did not constitute a very formidable defense force for, at one time, there were to be as many as sixty aircraft attacking the convoy. Nevertheless, thirteen enemy aircraft of various types were to be brought down, for the loss of three Hurricanes and four Fulmars. Two of the latter were, in fact, brought down by the convoy’s fire.

Liverpool went to action stations sometime during the early part of the forenoon watch. Things were quiet for a while, but at 1030 air attacks began, with shallow dive-bombing on the carriers by two groups of Italian fighter bombers. This was the first appearance of the Ju.87 dive-bomber with Italian crews. These had recently been trained in dive-bombing by the Luftwaffe in return for torpedo-bomber facilities for the newly formed Heinkel 111 squadrons being formed in Germany. The Italians had evidently not gained the same proficiency as had the Luftwaffe and they did no harm. Two were shot down by fighters. With this attack over, a second developed at 1108, when twenty-eight Savoia S79’s torpedo-bombers, escorted by twenty Macchi fighters, attacked in two groups. There was also a high level bombing attack by ten Cant high level bombers, but these were hardly noticed. The torpedo-bombers circled round the convoy and then came in from both quarters simultaneously. The attack on the port column was successfully dealt with by gunfire and fighters, but that on the starboard column went unopposed. The aircraft came in low through a gap in the destroyer screen and released their torpedoes at close range. At 1135, Liverpool and the Dutch ship Tanimbar (at the rear of the convoy) were hit; the latter sank within a few minutes.

Despite the fact that the attack was coming in from the starboard beam, it was decided to turn Liverpool towards the aircraft. A turn away would have combed the tracks nicely, but it would have left the starboard column entirely exposed and without gunfire support. As it turned out, the latter amounted to very little and Liverpool was hit by one of four torpedoes which could be clearly seen throughout their short run. One of the attacking aircraft even flew over the ship and machine-gunned the upper deck, causing a few casualties.

While steaming at 21 knots, Liverpool had been hit by a 440 lbs. contact-torpedo that had struck the starboard side abreast the after engine room. A 24 ft. by 19 ft. hole was blown in the outer bottom and the lower deck was blown up by three feet. Liverpool turned right round and stopped within a short distance of the rapidly disappearing Tanimbar. Her after boiler room and engine rooms, starboard oil fuel tanks and compartments up to the lower deck flooded immediately, while flooding continued to fill the engine room.

The bulkhead between the engine room and the Main W/T Office was ruptured. Lights were out and water was coming in; although unharmed, C.P.O. Steele and Ldg. Tel. Kimbell were trapped with their communications cut off. Unable to raise the Main Office with the internal morse buzzer, P.O. Tel. Hamilton then assumed general control of W/T operations, being in direct contact with the bridge by voice pipe. With those in this 2nd Office, Hamilton was also trapped, but for quite different reasons.

The 2nd Office was on the Marines’ mess deck to which access was gained through a hatch, and along a narrow passage (above the fresh water tanks). This hatch was heavy and was supported by a strong spring, without which it could not be opened from the inside. Now the gunnery transmitting station, manned by the Marines, also had such a hatch requiring such a spring. However, since the latter had gone missing, the Marines had adopted the habit of ‘borrowing’ the one from the 2nd W/T Office. This spring must have again been borrowed after the Office had gone to action stations. Realising what had happened, a rating was stationed to bang on the inside of the hatch-way until he was heard. When able to leave the 2nd Office, P.O. Tel. Hamilton made a tour of inspection and found that the 3rd W/T Office (under the charge of P.O. Tel. Wright) was taking in water. A rivet had sprung, but a solution to this problem was to come later that afternoon when, under tow, a near miss on the ship had the effect of settling the sprung rivet.

As she had been hit, Liverpool had taken an immediate 7 degree list to starboard. The starboard outer, and both the inner propeller shafts had been put out of action, the steering gear had jammed and the propeller served by the port forward engine had become visible in the water. Even with this, revolutions were to be severely restricted because the water feeding the steam pipes to the engine had become contaminated with boilers’ priming. Water-tight compartments were flooded on the port side to get the propeller back into the water, and compartments forward back to `B’ magazine and shell room were also flooded to lift the stern. Power boats, aircraft and aviation fuel were ditched.

One Acting P.O. Torpedoman, who had been reduced to leading hand sometime before the 14th June, had his rate immediately restored (and was later recommended for the D.C.M.) by Captain Slayter, in recognition of his continuous and sterling work in damage control and repair. Overall, the damage control activity (in which Lieut. F. W. Lawson played a large part) was to become regarded as a model and to be used as such in post-war R.N. damage control courses. With this work undertaken, Liverpool was no longer in any immediate danger of sinking, but otherwise was in a pretty bad way. `X’ and `Y’ turrets were unable to train owing to the loss of power and all 6-inch guns were out of action. Her 4-inch guns had only ready-use ammunition available, as the shell hoists were out of action. The after HACS was out of action; the main W/T aerials had broken owing to whipping and all radar was out of action.

While the damage report had been awaited anxiously on the bridge, the Navigation Officer, Lieut. T.H.B. Shaw, contemplated the remains of the magnetic compass, and noted that both gyro-compasses were off the board. The whip of the ship at the moment of the explosion had flung the compass bowl out of its binnacle and had smashed it completely. Nevertheless, it was found possible to repair the forward gyro-compass, which had subsided into its bowl and was hanging by the power cables. Repaired, it was to give service all the way to Gibraltar.

Temporary repairs, carried out in dry dock, had to be completed within six weeks, since it was required to clear the dockyard before the August convoy. Liverpool left for Rosyth on the 5th August, steaming on one engine (with the three of her other screws lashed to the quarter deck) and making 17 knots. She left with Georgetown and Mansfield, two old American destroyers which experienced some difficulty in keeping up! As they steamed westwards out into the Atlantic, they passed the Pedestal convoy eastbound for the Mediterranean. (The tug Jaunty was to sail with this convoy to salvage any ship badly hit but capable of being brought in - a lesson learnt from Harpoon.) Georgetown left on the 9th and Mansfield on the 10th. Liverpool arrived at Rosyth on the 12th August where she was placed low on the list of priorities. She was unable to begin trials until April/May 1945.